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Preface 
The character of the European integration has changed subsequent to integration thrust from the mid 
1980s onwards. Each new initiative such as the Single Market or EMU and treaty changes havecaused 
many impulses for the modernisation of the European economy. This study, which is based on papers 
presented and discussedat the conference 'The Emergence of a new Euro Capitalism? Implications for 
Analysis and Politics' held on üctoberllthJl2th2002 bythe Forschungsgruppe Europäische Gemein­
schaften (FEG) at the Institute of Political Science in Marburg, tries to ans wer the political economic 
question whether the structural changes within the framework of continental capitalism indicate the 
evolution of a new andspecifically European type of c apitali sm. 
Analysing the changing mode of economic accumulation and political regulation in Europegives rise 
to several questions. Will national differences in theEuropean Union be adjusted because of political 
integration andcross border interconnections between economic. actors (transnational mergers & ac­
quisitions etc.) or will the divergence- between national models persist? Furthermore, beyond this inte­
rior perspective the European Capitalism and the European Integration are inextricably linked with the 
dominant military, political and economic force of the United States. This raises the question what 
kind of capitalism is developing in Europe: Does Europe create a model whichis distinct fromUS 
capitalism or are we witnessing the emergence of a transatlantic capitalism? The dyna:rnics of the 
global financial markets are of particular relevance for the European development. As the Lisbon 
strategy suggests, the European political actors hope that integrated financial markets will prov;ide the 
basis for a comprehensive growth process and strengthen the Euro in competition with the dollar. 
The general changes of global capitalism in the 90s, especially the growing relevance of the financial 
markets for the sphere of production and the private households, and their implications for European 
integration gave the' incentive for composing the publication. European societies are faced with the 
development of a finance-led growth regi:rne implyingtremendous alterations of the welfare state or 
the systems of corporate governance and finance. To broaden this political economic perspective con­
tributors will analyse the wider' dimensions of the integration process such as the transatlantic relations 
or the Eastward enlargement of the EU. Finally, the social dimension will be discussed. Which op­
portunities do new social movements have and how do trade unions react to the new challenges? 
The FEG in Marburg wishes 'to thank all those who attended this conference andenjoyed the discus­
sions. Special credit must be given to the authors and their commitment to the study as weIl as to the 
Hans-Böckler Stiftung and the Rosa-Luxemburg Stiftung who contributed to the conference with their 
financial support. 
Marpurg, April 2002 Martin Beckmann, Hans-Jürgen Bieling, Frank: Deppe 
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Financial Integration andEuropean Society 

Introduction 
These notes are directed againsttwo widespread misconceptions about .the nature of the fi­
nancial chang~s taking place in the. EU today. Firstly, there is the notion that these changes 
are, in essence, the outcome of a weH-defined political agenda (the exaggerated estimation 
that is frequently made of neoliberalism as a political antagonist); Secondly, there is the noti­
on that many aspects of financial change could be easily resisted at the level of public policy 
(financial voluntarism, or the notion that economic programmes can be designed without clo­
se reference to financial m~chanisms, or even in disregardof the latter). The two errors are 
linked - it is the belief that finance is not basic to the functioning of capitalist economies 
which leads to the belief that financial change is largely the outcome of hegemonie political 
strategies, rather than of developments of the productive forces, as weH as to the belief that 
these changes might be simply blocked or reversed by relatively straightforward policy initia­
tives. I 
It would be widely agreed that there aretwo basic forces behind financial change in 'th~ EU 
today: 
• 	 most fundamentaHy, jinancial globalisation - a cumulative series of developments aH ma­
king for increased interdependence among financial systems and which has taken the form 
of increasingly dense market interconnections . among financial agents; it is important to 
see that many interests are promoted by these developments - for every frustrated borro­
wer, deprived of the use of domestic financial resources, thereis a gratified lender able 
.. now to make placements which were previously blocked; corresponding to previou.sly do­
. minant lenders who now face external competition there are borrowers now able to access 
a wider rangeof financial possibilities. 
• 	 at a regional level; there is a strong political drive tqwards European financial integration, 
building on. the possibilities opened up by. monetary union and expressed currently by the 
1 The quite unjustified claims thathave frequently been made as to the feasibility and efficacy of a Tobin tax 
give a good illustration ofthese linked mistakes (se~ Grahl and Lysandrou, 2003). 
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financial services action plan and by such linked initiatives as the Takeover Directive. 
THese initiatives are central to the. EU' s current political agenda - they dominate every 0­
ther formof deepening of the integration process and seem to be seen aseven nlore urgent 
than the widening 6f the EU via its eastward enlargement 
A summary assessment will be made of each of these forces. 
1. Financia'l Globalisation / 
In retrospect, financial globalisation can be seen as moving through various stages, with each 
new development dependent' on the previous stage. In the 1970s the main development was 
the enlergence of aglobaI market in currencies after the collapse ofBretton Woods - a regime 
within which markets for foreign exchange were, initially at least, subject to effective admi­
nistrative control. Although the continuous exposure of countries to the immediate constraint 
of the FX market wasa major regime change (one which prepared the way for the monetarist 
experiments which followed and wmch led to a reassignment of macro policy instruments 
wmch has not been reversed to this day) it seemed· ~t the time that many other aspects ofnati­
onal financial systems were relatively unaffected - certainly the initial growth of the FX mar­
ket did not lead immediately to an active international market in financial c1aimsasa whole. 
The second key stage of financial globalisation, in the 1980s, saw the enlergence of a highly 
intemationalised market in public debt. The most important episode here was a two to three 
year period of very high US interest rates at the beginning of Paul Volcker' s tenure as chair­
man of the Federal Reserve System. Given the pre~existing market in currencies, it proved 
impossiblefor other countries to retain fuH control over their public finances.(although things 
might conceivably have been. different had the EU member states shown themselves to be 
capable ofa coherent, unified response). From this era we can date a second regime change: 
arouna the world, govemments ad3;pted to increasingly open markets in public debt andbegan 
to frame their budgetary policies in response to the continuous survey of their debt markets by 
international investors. 
The globalisation of public debt nlarkets has a double meaning for national govemments. 
Compared to their situation within the Bretton Woods system, it represents a clear loss of fi­
nancial autonomy since govemments no longer enjoyed privileged access to domestic finan­
cial resources. However, compared to the period of interregnum between the emergence of 
free currency markets and the disinflation of the 1980s it may represent a certain recuperation 
of financial control: it is no longer possible to use inflation in combination with financial re­
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pression to seeure virtually free publicfinance, but governments whose debt does become 
internationally tradablehave accessto a large and stable supply ofcredit. (The Stability and 
Growth Pact, in this' context, is a crude transitional device which it is pointless to perpetuate: 
if the budgetary policy of an EU member state satisfies the needs of international bond mar­
kets then there is little point in adding an additional arithmetic rule, which in any case bears 
no relation to the actual solvency of the govemment concerned; if, on the other hand, senti - ' 
ment in the bond markets turns decisively against an EU country, fonnal complianc~with the 
rules ofthe StabilityPact will be ofnoavai1.2) 
Both key instruments of domestic macroeconomic policy had now been compromised. Ne­
vertheless, some commentators still argued that ,private finance remained relativelyunaffected 
,.. appealing to the rather weak relationship between official interest rates (in themoney market 
and the bond market) on the one hand and private investment expenditures on the other, they 
were able to argue that the circumstances governing industrial investment temained essenti­
ally anational question. 
Two remarks will be made about these earIy steps towards financial globalisation. Firstly, 
although there is no doubt that globalisationtook the fonn of the deregulation and internatio­
nalisation of the US financial structure, neither of the two key episodes can be plausibly seen 
as the result of a deliberate attempt to establish US financial hegemony. Indeed, in both cases 
. the key US policy moves were undeniably defensive. Far from representing a drive for hege­
mony, Richard. Nixon's abandonment of the link between the dollar and gold, in the summer 
of 1971, was anattempt to create a certain spacefor domestic expansion on Keynesian lines ... 
it was actually accompanied by measures, ultimately futile, intended to restrict the access of 
US corporations tooff-shore finance. Far from being aimed at dollar supremacy, the Vo1cker 
squeeze wasundertaken to stern a dangerous slide in the dollar exchange rate (and it might 
even have been avoided had the Bundesbarlk been ready to support the dollar). Once the . 
squeeze had been put into effect, and had been seen to draw virtually unlimited capital 
inflows towards the US, a new situation was certainly created - one which many US interests 
were able to turn to their advantage.But this outcome was not planned - indeed the immediate 
2 The most direct way to .relax the constraints ~posed by intemationalised bond markets would be for eurozone 

governments to give reciprocal guarantees of each other's debt. Because this would require close coordination 

of national fiscal policies it would at the same tinie put the formulationof a genuinely integrated eurozone fis­
. cal strategy onto the policy agenda. The "autonomy" which is supposedly protected by the existing arrange­

ments is largely illusory because each country faces tighter' constraints both from the .markets and from the 

crude discipline of the Stability Pact. Although the latter is increasingly seen as dysfunctional there are as yet 

no coherent moves to reform it. 
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effectsof dollar appreciation were extremely embarrassing for the US authorities and led, in 
1985 and 1986, to the Plaza and Louvre experiments in international policy co ordination. To 
characterise the Volcker shock as a "neo liberal coup" (Gerard Dumenil3) is thus to ignore 
every intention and to read humanactions only by their unintended outcomes. 
Secondly, the moves towards financial globalisation which took place in the 19708 and 1980s 
are inconceivable without the previous increase in real international economic interdependen­
ce. Ofkey importance was the development, from the 1960s on, of a rapidly growing offshore 
financial system (eurodollars, then eurobonds and other eurocurrencies). The tensionsbet­
ween offshore and onshore financeeventually became a key source of the drive towards fi­
nancial deregulation and liberalisation. This set of markets was a certainly by-product of the 
international expansion of US multinationals, but it was not th~ expression of US policy. In­
deed, the nlain political support for offshore .financecame from the British govemment, 
which identified in it, perhaps correctly, an opportunity to perpetuate Britain' s overseas finan­
cial orientation beyond the collapse ofEmpire4• 
In other ways, economic internationalisation formed the basis of financial globalisation. It 
should be remembered that the first European country to nlove decisively towards liberalisati­
on was West Germany. This was in no way a result of neoliberal economic doctrines - rather, 
the problem was the generation ofmassive current account surpluses in consequence of quite 
mercantilist, but extremely successful, export policies. The chosen weapon in reconciling an 
undervalued currency with a huge trade surplus was sterilisation, but there are limits to such a 
policy, in particular when economic disturbap.ces in the US rendered the D-mark a "safe ha­
ven" for wealth holders around the world. It was in these conditions that Germany liberalised 
its capital markets - essentially in an attempt to maximise financial outjlows and thus to miti­
gate pressures for currency revaluation. Similarly, the internationalisation. of French enterpri~ 
ses proved to be a decisive constraint on the efforts of the French govemment, 1981-83, to 
achieve a measure of, financial autonomy: the reversal of Mitterrand's interna1ly oriented 
strategies was not simply a question of macroeconomic difficulties; there were deep industrial 
problems in trying to set purelydomestic targets for externally oriented companies. 
Today, the financial supremacy of the US economy is so absolute that commentators tend to 
see supremacy as the designed outcome of a deliberate . strategy. There is no intention here to 
3 In a seminar presentation at University ofNorth London, 2002. 
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defend US economic policies wh~ch have often had themost appalling consequences for other 
nations, most obviously in the developing country debt crisis which was triggered by the Vol­
cker experiment. But it is a distortion of the historical record to see US policy as involving a 
continuous drive for supremacy over three decades. Policy was often short-run, often deter­
mined by domestic rather than international considerations, often defensive in character. 0­
ther actors - especially European governments made decisive contributions to the globalisa­
tion process. And, though there is certainlya deep underlying logic to financial globalisation, 
that logic is to be explicated in the first instance not by reference to contingent an~ incon­
sistent policy moves but by strong trends in the productive forces of advanced capitalist 
countries - towards ever-increasing interdependence. When a host ofproductive interrelations 
are developed among the actors of capitalist economies, these relationships will necessarily 
have a financial dimension. 
The third, more recent phase of financial globalisation relates to the transformation ofprivate, 
especially corporate, finance. This third phase builds on the second, according to the c1assical 
formula that public credit is the basis of private credit. In particular, the most widely traded 
government bonds tend to become benchmarks forthe bond market as a whole, so that the 
. debt of corporations is priced through arisklreturn trade-off from the price of government 
debt: thus the internationalisation of public bond markets may lead to more homogeneous and 
comparable assessments of corporate debt instruments; this in turn may serve to unify condi­
tions on equity markets since debt and equity are close substitutes in corporate Jinance. Such 
indirect chains of causation may have been more important in the globalisation of corporate 
finance than· the direct trading of equity across national frontiers which is still very limited, as 
is the number of corporations whose shares are traded on more than one bourse. Even if these 
connections are indirect, the very high correlation between price movements on any two stock 
exchanges in the advanced economies testifies to a growing degree of interdependence. In this 
phase of financial globalisation it is harder to find dramatic policy moves, analogous to the 
devaluation of the dollar or the Volcker shock, which acted as catalysts for financial trans­
formation. The coordinated relaxation of monetary policies in response to the stock nlarket 
crash of 1987 may have been a significant development; so also, perhaps, the comprehensive 
liberalisation of European finance in the context of the single market programme of the late 
1980s. 
4 An important episode here was the Kennedy administration's imposition of a withholding tax in the domestic 
US bond market, which gave an immediate stimulus to the offshore bond market centred in London. 
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Is this most recent phase of financial globalisation an established reality? There are at least 
three reasons to pose the question (Grabi, Huffschmid,Plihon, 2002): 
• 	 Changes in thepattem of corporate finance in Europe - away from direct dependence on 
large banks and on "inside" investors - ate very recent and only seem to become significant 
after the launch ofthe euro in 1999;some changes are difficult to interpret - there was for 
instance a big expansion of corporate bond issues in 1999 and 2000 but thiswas very lar­
gely linked to a singleevent, the auction of mobile telephone frequencies at very high pri­
ces. 
• 	 These changes are far from uniform -. a rapid. increase in the importance of organised e­
quity markets is detectable' in France~ while Germany exhibits more institutionalcontinui­
ty; British corporate finance was always closely related to the US model. 
• 	 In the wak~ of the stock market crash, the globalisation of corporate finance in Eutope has 
gone into reverse; equity tradingand equityissues have collapsed; some ofthe more ambi­
tious experiments in equity-based venture capital have been virtually abandoned (the neue 
Markt); re-intermediation is taking place on a large scale as companies, unable to raise e­
quity or debt capital on the organised asset markets, turn back to "inside investors" and to 
the big banks. 
Nevertheless, sonle quite fundamental changes in corporate behaviour havebeen .identified 

which suggest that changes in corporate finance may be more than a passing episode (compa­

re the studies of corporate govemance undertaken by the Max Planck Institute in Cologne5). It 

should not be forgotten that the traditional, inherited mechanisms of corporate finance in Eu­
, rope have some significant disadvantages. They may achieve a very stable and precise alloca­

tionof financial resources within a given'industrial grouping but they attenuate the transfer of 

resources on' a wider scale. Often, also" groups of insiders have frequently relied on the ab­

sence of "exit options" to maintain the coherence of their financial-industrial arrangements. 

. 
Within increasingly open and interdependent economies, the ability of more powerful agents 
' 
to access extemal financial markets tends to constrain or even to disrupt such arrangements. 
In this context, the current re-intermediation should not necessarily be seen as areturn to the 
financial status quo ante. It does not imply that previous forms of relational banking, based on 
. 
very elose and permanent interactions between particular lenders and particular borrowers, is 
5 http://www.mpi-fg-koeln.mpg.de/ 
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being restored. The large banks themselves are operating in a changed competitive climate, 
even though there has been limited cross-border merger activity; they themselves may impose 
relatively standardised conditions on industrial customers, rather than rebuilding the tightly 
knit coalitions of the past. In this context, the reform of the German system of corporate ta­
xation in 2000 and the pension reform uf 2001 both tend to give institutional support for a 
more market-oriented financial system. The essence of the financial changes which are taking 
place nlay not be disintermediation as such, but the standardisationwhich ~s required for the 
emergenceof wideand deep markets (Lysandrou, 2003): bank credit may persist alongside 
disintermediated forms of finance such as corporate bonds; but bank credit relationship~ 
themselves are increasingly subject to market scrutiny and control. A dramatic demonstration 
of the changed· status of the German banks was given by the recent demo ti on· of Commerz;­
bank by the credit-rating agencies, which may presage a general tightening of the global fi­
nancial constraints on the German credit system. 
A decisive factor may be the new financial environment for the largest and most intemationa­
lised enterprises in the OBCn countries. The exit possibilities offered to these c6nipanies are 
greater than for other economic actors and it seems unlikely that, havingemancipated them­
selves from local constraints, they would willingly return to the relational insider finance of 
the past.The productive and matket interactions of these enterprises constitute a key compo­
nent of the structure of interdependence in which globalised finance has emerged. This relates 
also, perhaps, to an Increasing dissociation between large enterprises and national society, not 
in the sense that the enterprises lose alllocational roots, but in the sense that their interests are 
less aligned with those of other .national actors than was the case in the past. The same may be 
increasingly true of extemally oriented financial markets, ofglobalised regions such as the big 
metropoles, and of the biggest banks and otherfinancial enterprises. National social systems 
are treated as resources to be drawn upon in strategic contests taking place on a world scale. It. 
is through the actions of these most powerful players that national autonomy is limited and 
the strategic choices of other actors are constrained to satisfy extemal norms and standards. 
Once again, this outcome reflects fundamental changes in the relations of production more 
than policy choicesdriven by a specific ideology. The apprehension of this changed balance 
of forces finds different forms ofideological expression- being recognised even by trends of 
thought quite opposed to neoliberalisrn 6. 
6 The economic liberalisations carried out by Marxist regimes, e.g. China and Vietnam, are obvious examples. 
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/ 
Straightforward contrasts between "Anglo-Saxon" and "European" models of corporate prac­
tice are too cmde to capture possible changes in the European systenls. For example, it now 
seems extremely unlikely that German corporations will be exposed to hostile takeovers in the 
same way, as corporations in Britain or the USo But there is a large and growing number of 
agreed takeovers in Germany which may to some extent act as a functional equivalent or 
German version of the market in corporate contro!. This question of functional equivalence 
makes it difficult to reach strong conclusions ab outsystem performance from purely instituti­
onal evidence; it may represent an important methodological issue in the debate over financial 
transformations in Europe. There is more than one way to skin a cat. We may see examples of 
institutional continuity - in industrial relations, for example. But this continuity is compatible 
with an altered functioning of continental institutions which changes actual economic and 
social outcomes' towards those consistflnt with the new financial relations (Streeck, 2001). 
Discussion of the winners and losers from financial globalisation is sometimes simplistic. 
,From the fact that most of the eighties and nineties were periods of high interest rates, it is 
sometimes conCluded that the process as a whole favours creditors against debtors. Certainly, 
the initiatives taken by lenders and wealth-holders in the late 70s ("the revolt of the lenders") 
were a decisive factor leading to the Volcker shock. But it is also the case that the leading 
financial power is a heavy net debtor. 
The role ofspeculation deserves some consideration. In principle, speculation is a zero-sum ' 
game and can hardly account for a consistent financial interest. The period has been one of 
continuous financial innovation and the innovations, genuine or spurious, have generated hu­
ge rewards for the banks and other financial actors which have introduced them. Another 
source of income for financial actors which can be confused with speculative gains is the 
exploitation of asymmetries in powerand information between the strongand the weak - one 
usuallyfinds the least informed and weakest investors entering the stock market at the top, for 
example, allowing the professionals and the insiders to make good their escape. In general, 
market relations favour the strongest players. The fewer are the social constraints and limita­
tions placed on market behaviour, the more unequal market outcomes can be expected to be. 
Since wealth cannot be produced by financial mechanisms, there are limits to the amount of 
wealth that can be appropriated through finan~ial relations in the absence of real economic' 
development. The present period of financial downturn seems to be squeezing some of the 
situational rents earned, by investment banks and similar actors during the financial, upswing 
and the transformations which were associated with it. Defenders of financialliberalisation 
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have always argued that it reduces the spreads between rates of return available to the original 
providers of financial resources and those paid by the final users. This argument has seemed 
to be invalidated by the huge revenues earned by mqjor banks and other powerful· agents 
within liberalised financial systems. Present developments may be leading to an actual chea­
pening of spme financial services - but market structures are hardly such as toguarantee con­
tinuous downward pressure on the costs to non-financial agents ofusing these services. 
One sphere in which neo liberal ideology has clearIy been of decisive importance is in the' 
fun~tioning of the key international institutions - the IMF and the W orId Bank. No defence 
canbemade of the doctrinaire fornlulae which have been ruthlessly applied, over two deca­
des, to the vulnerable populations of heavily indebted developing countries. But two remarks 
will be made which might qualify aprevalent view of these institutions as the policemen of a 
global neo liberal project. The first is that the actual role of the IMF, however catastrophic it 
has been for many countries, is a massive demotion fronl lts place within the Bretton Woods 
order. The place of the IMF then was to administer the external constraint affecting all count­
ries - internationalliquidity, under Bretton Woods, was a policy variable: the balance between 
adjustment and finance of deficit positions, for all countries, was determined by a political 
process within the IMF; subsequently, in the international debt economy which emerged in 
the 1970s a11d 1980s, this balance has been determined, for industrialised countries at least, by 
market processes and it was for this reason that the IMF's new role is confined to policing 
those states unable to meet the general· conditions of solvency/liquidity imposed by western 
commercial banks andinternational bond markets.·Secondly, in one key respect, the strategies 
of the IMF and World Bank have to be interpreted in terms of interests rather than of ideolo­
gies.. The so-called refusal to lendinto open positions has everything to do with reinforcing 
the positionof western creditors and nothing to do with the rules of a market economy. The 
implication of this procedure is that access to official credit is only available on the basis of a 
prior accommodation with private tenders, inc1uding thosewhose claims are not on the state 
itself but on private sector agents such as the commercial banks of the country concerned. 
Although many commentators, inc1uding those with orthodox market-oriented standpoints, 
have stressed the adverse effects of this approach both in terms of distribution and in terms of 
capital market efficiency, the bailing-out of creditors remains the rule of the IMF a11d is cur­
rently facilitating the escape of powerful private interests from the debacles in Brazil and Ar­
gentina. The introduction of effective default procedures for states, and the exclusionofpri­
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vate debt from tbis kind of guarantee are very necessary reforms in the working of internatio­
nal institutions, none the less necessary for being market-conformable. 
In general, it is inappropriate to interpret the workings of globalised financein terms of its 
impact on developing and transitional economies. This point is not made to diminish. the cru­
cial socialimportance of the struggle fordevelopment, which remains 'the central drama of 
this century as of the last. It is a simple fact of the current international financial system that it 
concerns, above all, financial flows among developed economies. For instance, in the huge 
daily volumes of currency trading which are often adduced as a speculative threat to develo­
ping countries, trading in the currencies of these countries is tiny. 90% of all FX transactions 
involve the dollar on one side; in nearly every case one of a few developed economy curren­
eies is on the other. 
Thus financial interactions between small weak economies with primitive financial structures 
and the huge systems of the west should not be taken as typical or representative of the func­
tioning of global finance in general. Compared to the scale of interactiQns among industriali­
sed countries, financial flows involving the developing countries are vanishingly small. 
2. The European Response 
. The structuies of globalised finance, centred on US markets and the dollar, draw most of their 
power from their sheer scale - from the number of agents involved and the huge amounts of 
finap.cial resources wbich can be mobilised. This scale permits and requires the imposition of 
standards of performance and conduct - the recent impactof US credit rating agencies on the 
German banking system is again an excellent example. Two consequences follow: firstly, 
fluctuations and instabilities within tbis global system are hugely amplified when they strike 
the smaller and less developed systems which are exposed to it; secondly, the dollar-based' 
system can' override nlany micro-level failures. The relational finance which developed histo­
rically in' some European countries is probably moreefficient than US finance at a micro­
level: there is more scope, in particular, to limit information asymmetries between borrowers 
and lenders. But this does not mean that the sm aller, more localised systems have effective 
defences once they are exposed to the globalised system. The eXarnple of Japan is illustrative 
here: there is no doubt that the boom and bust of stock nlarket and realestateprices wbich 
destabilised the J apanese economy in the late eighties was a direct consequence of exposure 
to external forces; however, the failure, over a decade, of the J apanese banking system to deal 
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with the.legacy ofthis destabilisation testifies to the inadequacy of domestic financial institu­
tions within the new context of iuterdependence. 
The position taken here accepts the main argument nlade by critics of the contemporary glo­
balisation process - the need for social control. The argument rests on the instability of un­
controlled financial markets, on the inefficiency with which capital resourcesare allocated 
and on the adverse distributional consequences of free markets. But the view is also taken that 
it is not so easy to challenge this process - just because it is not merely the expression,üf a 
particular political strategy but also, and even more, the outconle of a deep change in produc­
tive structures, of a new phase in the socialisation of production. (The failure to see this· is 
usually linked to the notion that financüll processes are not intrinsic to the market economy, 
that they constitute some kind of superstructure on the base of "industry" or "production"). No 
argument will be made here against the use of capital controls to defend vulnerable societies 
and economies against the deep· disruption which can follow liberalisation. N evertheless, this 
is a d.efensive weapon (analogous to the strike weapon for employees). It is most appropriate 
for economies with relatively undeveloped financial systems; it becomes less appropriate as 
income levels rise and as interconnectionswith ot~er systems multiply;· over the long run it 
faces erosion; it does not,in itself, challenge the world-wide dominance of the present structu­
res. 
In principle, European construction offers an exceptional opportunity to challenge the directi­
on of the contemporary globalisation process and to assert new priorities within it. In practice, 
Europeanresponses are held back by innumerablehesitations 'and divisions which both wea­
ken the impact of European . initiatives and subordinate European cönstruction to all the most 
damaging aspects of theactual, dollar-centred, system of global finance. The need for scale, 
for a rapid and effective cortsolidation of European economic and financial resources is only 
partly appreciated; and, frequently, the drive for consolidation amounts only to a pusillani­
mous intemalisation of US standards and practices. At the same time, continual attempts are 
nlade to preserve the nationall:y speciflc structures which indeed seem to offer the best defen­
ce against global pressures at the present time but which can hardly provide an effective basis 
for anything other than a defensive strategy. 
Monetary unificationmust be the core of a coherent European strategy because only the suc­
cessful development of the euro could permit the development of abipolar structure of finan­
cial relations and thus contest the current unipolar structure within which all economic sys­
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tems other than that of the US itself are reduced . to more or less peripheral status 7. But the 
specific modalities of EMU work to frustrate anywiderambitions for a European impact on 
the nature of the international! global economy as a whole. The Maastricht compromise which 
. led to EMU already foreshadowed this outcome. Monetary union was, from the time of the 
Werner Plan some thirty years ago, ,essentially a French project aimed at the "exorbitant pri­
vilege" of the dollar (to us~ De Gaulle's still pertinent expression). German policy, on the 0­
ther hand, had always been to minimise the external use of the n":mark even when Gernlany's 
industrial success tended to attract international wealth-holders to. the currency. -Maastricht 
rescued the French project only at the price of its complete subordination toGerman concep­
tions of economic policy and to German institutional forms. Mitterrand even boasted that he 
had outflanked the Bundesbank by making more concessions than even the most obdurate 
representative of that institution would have dared to demand. Thus the predominant goal of 
the EeB was internal stability, to be pursued by methods as close to those of the Buba as Was 
possible (after three, rather disappointing, years experience, the EeB has taken some teluctant 
steps away from those Bundesbank procedures which are most obviously inappropriate to the 
functioning of a continent-wide economy). Interest rate policy is continuous with the social 
conservatism of Federal German policies in the past: predicated on the highly intermediated 
German financial system where continuously high realinterest rates underpinned middle-class 
wealth. No attempt is made to attract external resources into. the eurozone banking system ... 
such inflows would probably be regarded today, as in thepast, as a danger- to internal stabili­
ty. 
Note that there is no particular relationship between the monetary orthodoxy of the Bundes­
bank/EeB and "neoliberalism." The strategies and priorities involved are, quite continuous 
with German monetary policy stretching back to the sixties - for example, the maintenance of 
a "monetary pillar" in the EeB's assessment procedures would. imply attempts to sterilise any 
major monetary inflows into the eurozone, just as the Bundesbank used to do. Indeed, some of 
the technical problems which have arisen with the operating procedures of the BeB- are linked 
to a failure to recognise fully'the market nature of monetary and banking functions within a 
continentaleconomy, so that steering procedures which worked adequately within the highly 
7 The decision, at the very last moment, to go for a big monetary union (11, now 12,countries) rather than the 
little eurozone (Germany and its neighbours) which,seemed to be emerging may be evidence that EU leaders 
were at least partly aware of the centrality of scale to the new international structures. But even if such flware­
ness existed it has hadlittle or no impact to date on the functioning ofthe single currency which remainsreso­
lutely defensive. 
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stmctured German banking system were continued in the much more decentralised and com­
petitive environment of the euro zone as a whole. 
On the basis of the introduction of the euro, far-ranging attempts are being made to complete 
the consolidation of EU financial systems, especiallythrough the Financial Services Action 
Plan which is central to current EU policies. This drive for integrated financial markets, ho­
wever, is characterised by two key weaknesses - which are superficially in opposite directi­
ons, but which in practice combine to limit the radiation and the extemal influence of EU po­
licies. On the onehand, the FSAP has repeatedly permitted divergent national standards and 
procedures to persist even when these divergences constitute significant barriers to effective 
financial integration. Thus one finds frequent complaints from financial actors about the qua­
lity of legislation: the directives go through, but their enactment fails to bring about the uni­
fied markets which are aimed at. For example, it seems that a Europe-wide repo market still 
hardly exists and the result is that the. inter-bank credit mechanism. is impaired: in fact, the 
usual form of collateral employed in trans-national bank lending in theeurozone is the US 
dollar, so that liquidity conditions in the US impact direct1y onto the EU banking system. 
Although directives are passed to unify the treatment of collateral across the zone, they have 
not as yet led to an effective integration based on the use of European securities rather than 
dollar deposits. 
A similar outcome can be found in related fields, such as the attempt, long delayed by the 
European Parliament, to pass a European Takeover directive. Standardis.ation ofTakeover 
mIes was seen as necessary to integrate equi~y markets. There were many grounds for the EP's 
previous rejections ofthis measure, but the key issue at the end was the fact that there would 
be no "level playing field" - it would remain easierto take over a British company than a 
German one, for example. The latest draft of the directive appears to clear the way for a uni­
fied treatment of takeovers, but in practice it is likely to perpetuate the existing situation. The 
specificities of national corporate govemance systems - the most important caseis co­
determination in Germany - are ~eft untouched by the new draft; and although privileged pub­
lic sector shareholders are to be excluded from corporate law, it will still be possible to use 
public law, in France for example, to safeguard enterprises against hostile takeover bids. From 
the point of view of employees the status quo may have certain advantages in that drastic cor­
porate restructurings are delayed or prevented; but the draft legislation certainly gives no c1ear 
entitlements to employees - it tends to safeguard the veto power of existing managements 
without specifying how, or in whose interests, this power will be used. 
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On the other hand, the weakness of the actual integration programme is accompanied by a 
quite uncritical acceptance of US procedures· and US financial models which are taken, as a 
matter of routine, as the goals of the action plan. The most starry-eyed assessments of "the 
new economy", the "knowledge-based economy" and other euphoric interpretations of the US 
bubble (Brenner, 2002) pervade offidal European texts on financial integration. The collapse 
of the equity boom on both sides of the Atlantic, the flight of investors towards treasuries, the 
drastic widening of the spreads on corporatebonds, the virtual disappearance of equity-based 
venture capital, the huge losses sustained by the customers of pension funds and otherfund­
holders - none of this has led to any significant reappraisal of the direction of the FSAP or üf 
related polides such as the Takeover directive. The -few pronouncements made on these e­
vents have a self-congratulatory tone: Enron couldn't happen here. This may be true, but if so, 
it is mainly because the actual pattern of European financial relations is still a long way from 
the outsider-investor model which prevails in the US,not because the.EU offers more effecti­
ve investor protection - the losses sustained by European investors' in the recent debac1e are 
comparable to those suffered by their American counterparts. 
The problenls with the FSAP, however, go well beyond the issue of investor protection. The 
transformation offinancial structures which is envisaged has major implications for industrial 
I 
relations and sodal protection: the first because a move from insider to market-based ~nance 
will change the corporate governance, and hence corporate strategies, in ways which may 
weaken the position of employees; the second because the integration of financial markets is 
associated with a drive to pour resources onto these markets, often by diverting flows from 
public social security systems (Grahl, 2001). The effective division of competence within the 
EU, where sodal policy autonomy is jealously guarded by member states while the union 
predominates in 'economic policy, makes thesedangers very difficult to address. 
Within critical political economy, the most common response to these developments is simply 
to reject them. Reject the Americanising integration of European financial systems; preserve 
the localised, socially embedded, patterns of corporate finance which, after all, functioned 
with great effidency in the postwar decades, and which are c1early more compatible with e­
xisting sodal models in west European countries (Dore, 2000). The basis of this approach is 
the view that contempotary financial markets represent a dysfunctional distortion of economic 
relations - that they are essentially speculative in character and that they hinder rather than 
promote economic development. From· the same point of view the expansion of international 
finandal mark~ts can seem to be the expression of a political strategy, informed by neoliberal 
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ideology. Closed or fragmented financial systems could bepreserved, but the contestable do­
minance of certain political forces imposes liberalisation. In the background there lies a Key­
nesian tradition - enterprise must not be sacrificed to speculation~ The debates on "corpora­
tism" versus "neoliberalisnl"; the !'Anglo-Saxon" versus the "Rhineland" economy express 
such an assessment of financial change. 
If these judgements were unsustainable, if financial globalisation represented a productive 
development critical to the current phase of economic development, then it wouldbe necessa­
ry to formulate the critique of, and alternatives to, the existing financial integration strategy in 
a much more careful way. 
One key indicator of the assessment which is needed lies <in theability of individual member 
states to validate their historical patterns of financial relations. Everything suggests thatthey 
are increasingly unable to do.· The weight of highly internationalised corporations and banks 
within each national economy, the much reduced ability ofnational govemments t.o influence 
macroeconomic developments and themultiplication of linkages between domestic and exter­
nal financial actors all suggest that the historic; socially embedded, relational finance of con­
tinental Europe has come up against decisive limits that are set not by a hegemonic political 
strategy but by basic changes in economic relationships. 
Mainstream economic doctrines (with aclose but complex relationship to neoliberalism) may, 
if anything, underestimate the strength of the. forces making for financial transformation. 
From a neo-classical perspective, the essence of financial liberalisation is that itpromises a 
more efficient allocation of investible resources; other markets, however, are still presumed to 
functionwell in spite of obstacles to capital mobility. From a point of view which rejects the 
neo-classical belief in market efficiency, the recycling of financial resources is both a conditi­
on of existence of cl market economy (Cartelier, 1985) and the main source of pressure for 
economic adaptation within it. Fragmentation of, or isolation from, the overall financial sys­
tem then threatens not only to impose additional costs on the suppliers and users of finance: it 
may both threaten the very survival of economicagents operating in an international context 
and divert domestic processes of adjustment away from conditions in the externaleconomy. 
France perhaps offers the clearest example of the transformation of domestic, "relational" 
finance under the pressure of external forces. Not only was thepostwar system of "encadre;.. 
ment" abandoned at an early stage, buteven the modified form of dirigisme . represented by 
core public or parastate holdings in thebig privatised enterprises has been largely dissolved. 
Today there are massiveexternal shareholdings in most of the corporations quoted on the 
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stock exchange. The dismantling was carried out by political forces - socialist or Gaullist ­
with a deep hostility to neoliberalism. The extemal promotion ofFrench financial Iharkets and 
financial corporations has become a continuing priority for govemments of all colours. 
In the case of Getmany, apparently nI0re solid institutions have gradually lost their autonomy: 
the long economic stagnation exposes the inability of domestic financial processes to reorient 
productive structures, while corporate practice and the strategies of banks and other financial 
actors are increasingly driven by extemal standards and criteria. The vaunted German capa .. 
" ' 
. city for coordination among national economic agents8 is now little more than a memory. 
Thus the priorities für European action in the monetaryand financial spheres have very little 
to do with either a rejection or an acceptance of "neoliberalism" in a general sense. The de­
velopment of a vast, unified, financial mechanism is not a neo liberal strategy, but a producti­
ve. necessity: attempts to avoid this necessity by perpetuating the particularist systems of 
"Rhineland capitalisnI" can only aggravate the loss of policy autonomy of both national and 
EU structures. 
However, the goal of enhanced policy autonomy is meaningless if the acceleration and inten­
sification of the FSAP· is not accompanied by attempts to give the new struc1ure of economic 
relations a different content from those ofthe contemporary USo Once again, the key issue is 
not neoliberalism·..., the general requirements ofmarket finance are transparency and standar­
disation; these however are quite compatible with, and could even be furthered by, social and 
industria1 relations. policies related to European values and priorities. 
How do these considerations relate to social policy? The basic division of competence within 
the EU today can be summarised by saying thateconomic policies are a matter for the Union, 
social policies for the member states. The ambiguous status of employment policy makes it 
the exception proving this rule; it is in the fie1d of employment that spillovers from economic 
to social relations are most pervasive; some standardisation of employment rules is necessita .. 
ted by competition in other spheres. In general, however, EU employment regulation is mini­
malist; wherever possible, directives have been permissive, leaving wide scope for variations 
in national practice9 • 
. 8 This is the argument ofDavid Soskice;see, for example Hall and Soskice, 2001. 
9 The assertion in the text refers the EU employment legislation. The more ceremonial aspects of Union 
employment policy (the employment guidelines, "soft coordination" and so on) are probably best,seen as a res­
ponse to the legitimation problems arisingfrom the basic division of competence (Schäfer, 2002). 
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Now it followsfrom the argument so far that 'this distribution of responsibility is full of dan­
gers. In the long run, it is a formula for anever deeper separation between the economic and 
the social. Defensive considerations frequently dictate that national priorities in social security 
andemployment regulation are strenuously asserted against the general direction ofEuropean 
construction.Nevertheless, it is difficult to find exarilples of national initiatives which go 
beyond this, because the emergence of new economic constraints at the international level in 
fact places every version of the European social model pernlanently on the defensive. 
Generic critiques ofneoliberalism may obscure the causes ofthis situation. No doubt there are 
occasions on which external constraints are invoked as a spurious justification for policies 
which are in fact pursued for quite othe~ reasons. But the j ealousy with which national go­
vemments preserve discretion over domestic social policy seems mostly to stern from the 10­
gic of their objective e?onomic and politicalsituation. External economic pressures, both on 
macroeconomic policy formulation and on enterprises, multiply the emergencies and instabi­
lities arising within 'each state; the political tensions which result are extremely specific to 
each country; since the use of economic policy instruments to avoid or counteract such pres­
sures is increasingly prQblematic, governments, whatever their ideQlogical orientation, seek to 
keep as much room for manoeuvre as possible in defining priorities in .the social policy field. 
Pensions, for example, may be a flashpoint in one country; regional imbalances, youth. u­
nemployment or health care services in another. Thusgovernments resist supranational rules 
and standards for the provision of social services and social protection, which would rob them 
ofthe key remaining instruments for the nlanagement ofdomestic political events. 
The essence of the resulting problem is not to contest the universal triumph of neoliberal 
strategies, but to reconnect political and economic processes. Local and nationairevolts which 
fail to do so - which simply emphasise claims to sovereignty over such fields as remain within 
the scope of dom,estic politics (the Danish referend.um, for example) - are fundamentally li­
mited if they cannot expand the real scope of democratic decision-making' to embrace the e­
conomic processes and outcomes which are moving beyond nationafboundaries. On the other 
hand, the notion that financialmechanisms could be' subordinated once again to national poli­
tical priorities rests on the view ofmarket finance, as a field of dysfunctional speculation or a 
dispensable superstructure on the basis of industry and production, which was criticised abo­
ve. 
3. Con'clusion 
The main pUIpose of these notes is not to fOlIDulate alternative integration policies but merely 
to suggest that the overuse of the notion of neoliberalism is becoriling a barrier to clear thin­
king on policy questions. Of course it is widely recognised that appeals to market ideologies 
can often be a way of disguising interests, particularly those of dominant groups. The sugges­
tion here is different - that critical political economy often sees market ideologies behind de­
velopments which are in fact attributable to market forces 10. 
This argument has been sketched out in two spheres. In the fIrst instance, it is claimed that the 
process of fInancial globalisation is essentially arefleetion of deep economic developments 
and not primarily a consequence ofpolitical strategies. The outcome of fInancial globalisation 
has certainly been to reinforce the econonlic donlinance ofthe US; but the basic force behind 
this dominance is the desire of wealth-holders around the world to hold dollar-denominated 
assets, rather than the success ofa particular geo-political strategy: the fact· that the dollar is 
central to contemporary fInancial processes results from the scale and sophistication. üf US 
fInancial markets in a context where productive changes are driving forward all fOlIDs of eco­
nomic interdependence 11. Of course, ideologies have been crucial in certain phases of the 
genesis of the global fmancial system, but to say this should not obscure that the system has a 
dynamic and a resilience which are hoth quite independent of neoliberal doctrines. Similarly, 
the fact that certain institutions (notably the IMF) have c1early been guided by neoliberal 
thought should not obscure the key roles played in the genesis of global fmance by policy­
makers and other actors with different orientations and theories 12. 
At the same time, an exaggerated assessment of neo liberal influence leads to a simplifIcation 
of the role of the state within the globalisation process. Neoliberalism as a doctrine certainly 
proposes a reduction in state activities and interventions; but such a reduction is not an obser;.. 
10 To distinguish thisposition from market apologetics it should be repeated that no claims are being made about 
the effidency, stability or soda1 desirability ofthe market processes in question. 
11 Gowan (1999) sees the hegemony of the "Wall Street-dollar system" as, in essence, the outcome of a political 
strategy. The reverse is more tiue - the basis of US political hegemony today is the primacy ofthe dollar. For 
example, in those years when its economic/financia1 dominance was most in question (late seventies) US lea­
dershipswere more willing to share political decision-making (Trilateralism). 
12 One shoUld also recognise the important differentiations among neoliberal doctrines and the fact that several 
variants of neoliberalism have themselves become victims of the globalisatlon process. Four· examples: the 
Hayekian fusion of market liberalism and social conservatism is subverted by the colossal exposure of traditio­
nal sodeties to external forces within a global system; Friedman's quantitative monetarism is rendered absurd 
by the explosion of fmandal transactions which now dwarf the use of money to circulate mere goods and ser­
vices; Jensen1s ce1ebration of shareholder control over the enterprise ends with a plea to CEOs to "just say no 
to Wall Street";Nozick's naturalist interpretation ofproperty seems increasingly obsolete in a world where key 
forms ofproperty are pure creations of the legislator - patents, copyrights, brand-names and trademarks. 
27 Financial Integration and European Society 
vable aspect of contemporary economic developments. We see rather a reorientation of the 
state as it is caught within the circuits of global finance. The constraints on certain types of 
Keynesian intervention which follow from this are not imaginary. 
Secondly, in the light of thisfirst argument, it has been suggested that current economic poli­
eies within Euro~e, notably monetary union and the drive for financial market integration, are 
not usefully interpreted as expressions of a neoliberal hegemony. The historie financial sys­
tems of continental. countries are largely indefensible, given the scale and the force of the 
dollar-based system which confronts them. In these circumstances, monetary andfinancial 
integration, together with many of the market-oriented transfonnations which they involve, 
are necessary conditions for any coherent economic policy within the EU. Finally, the acute 
social problems which these transfonnations make inevitable are by no means the expression 
of a homogeneous neoliberal strategy. They can be related to the problems facing national 
political forces of all orientations ,in a world where key aspects of economic development ha­
ve moved beyond national controL 
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Hans-Jürgen Bieling 
The New European Economy: Transnational Power Structures and Modes 
of Regulation 
,No-one is forcing the European Union to becom,e more competitive than the 
Uni ted States· in nine years time. But if that is what we really want, we roust 
. leave tlie comfortable surroundings of the Rhineland and move closer to the 
touglIer conditions and colder c1imate of the Anglo-Saxon form of capitalism, 
, where the rewards aregreater but the risks also.' (Frits Bolkenstein 2001: 2) 
Introduction 
In Spring 2000 the heads of the European governments solemnly dec1ared: 'The Union has 
today set itself a new strategic goal for the next decade: to become the most competitive and 
dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth 
with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion.' (European Council 2000). The set of 
nieasures which is supposed to support this goal has been called the 'Lisbon strategy'. It can 
be seen as the expression of theambition to benefit from the new mode of European integra­
tion which has changed in quality from the mid 80s onwards.The new mode of European 
integration is based above all on aseries ofcore economic projects, i.e. the Single European 
Market (SEM), Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), and firtancial market integration. All 
theses projects have fostered and facilitated the emergence of a new transnationalised finance­
led regime of accumulati.on within the EU (cf. Bieling2003). 
However, so far the operation 6fthis regime of accumulation is far from heing completed. fu 
view of recession and potential conflicts, both politicians and theorists - last but not least 
regulation theorists like Michel Aglietta (2000) - are preoccupied with the regulative, techni - . 
cal, and administrative necessities to make it more viable. fu this context, the regulationist 
view runs the risk to boil down to a simple 'problem-solving-approach' concemed less with 
the articulation of the contradictions and conflicts caused by the new regime than with regu­
lative measures to level and overcome them. The aim of this paper is to counter such tenden­
cies by a shift in th~ general focus of analysis. Instead of looking for the new, more adequate 
ways to stabilise finance-led accumulation, it will highlight the underlying powerstructures of 
the new regime, its impact on economic distribution, and the inherent conflicts· as weIl as the 
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possible ways to win the support of workers and trade unions or at least to compromise with 
them. In view of the complex and controversial nature of European integration, this is, how­
ever, a rather difficult undertaking. Therefore, the presentpaper represents only a tentative 
approach to this issue. 
The paper is structured in four sections. The first section deals briefly with the question of 
power in the European and the international politicaleconomy. It emphasises the dimensions 
of given power relations on a transnational level as weIl as within the society, in reply to the 
prevailing state-centrism. The second section discusses briefly some central features of the 
newEuropean economy. It attempts to outline two main issues. The first of these is that the 
new European economy iS,at least partially based on a new finance-Ied regime of accumula­
tion. The second issue is that thecapability toinfluence the regulation and operation of finan­
cial markets is instructive tounderstand the given power relations. The implications of this 
will be illustrated in the third section. It will be argued that although the new European econ­
omy seems to be already partof the global 'Dollar-Wall-Street-Regime' (Gowan 1999), its 
incorporation is neither complete nor without contradictions. This is due to the fact that Euro­
pean regulation of financial markets is not only connected to global institutions and develop­
ments, but also subjected to a range of other domestic and European interests and their politi­
cal articulation. In other words, even if dominated by transnational finance the new European 
economy includes also the other components of the circuit qf capital accumulation. Hence, the 
final section will discuss whether these components, i.e.collective bargaining and monetary 
and financial policies, do already fit into the new European economy or whether they tend to 
hinder its smooth operation. 
1. Social forces and the 'power to define' 
Not only power itself is an ubiquitous phenomenon, concepts of power are numerous as weIl. 
Within the disciplines of International Relations or International PoliticalEconomy, there are 
as many concepts of power as directions of !heoretical thinking. This does not imply, how­
ever, that most reflections on power are an expression of elaborated theoretical conceptions. 
On the contrary, they frequently rest on rather unreliable theoretical ground. Therefore, con­
cepts of power are often only fragmentary, iIl-founded or based on rash deductions from su­
perficial developments. In other words, they are not partof a broader concept or analytical 
approach which aims to und.erstand the transformation of global capitalism as a power-:based 
and socially contested process. 
30 Hans-Jürger Bieling 
Onlya few theories have such a cognitive interest and only two of these are particularly,rele­
vant for this paper: First, there is the 'regulation school' approach which focuses above all on 
the articulation between aparticular 'regime of accumulation' and the accompanying 'mode 
of regulation'. Basically, this articulation is seen as subjected to diverse influences. The most 
important issues are the conflicts· between social forces and their mediation on the one hand, 
as well as the repercussions of the global environment, i.e. the world order and the world 
market, on the other hand. Without doubt, the regulationarist approach provides a number of 
insights. Based on a non-reductionist understanding of different dimensions of society, it of­
fers a proper solution to the structure-agency problem and a non-deterministic, i.e. 'open', 
crisis-ridden and contested view of societal development (cf. Lipietz 1987). Despite all these 
advantages, it is also characterised by a fundamental weakness. Its focus is primarilyon the 
nation nl0des of development, while the economic, social and institutional configUration of 
the world economy and world order is taken für granted. Since it tends to· neglect transna­
tional, supranational and transgouvernmental relations and processes of mediation, the regu­
lationarist approach is biased' towards a dichotomous view of the relationship between the 
nation-state on the one hand, and the world market on·· the other (cf. BielingIDeppe 1996). 
This weakness, however, can be overcome by a second theoretical approach: Neo-Gramscian 
International Political Economy (IPE). Neo-Gramscian IPE is complementary to the regula­
tionarist approach to the extent that it focuses on a non-teleological phasing of capitalist de­
velopmentand particular structures of governance and class struggle. In this context it focuses 
not only on the national dimensions of capitalist development. Simultaneously, it directs the 
-attention to the forms of its embeddedness into the global economy and worl~ order which 
themselves are subj ect to political struggles between transnational social fortes and state 
agencies. 
While the main merit of the neo-Gramscian extension of the regulationarist approach is the 
overcoming of the dichotomy'nation-state - world market', it is not confined to this aspect. 
Another advantage of neo-Gramscian theory is without doubt to emphasise the domestic and 
transnational power relations which accompany and underpin a particularmode of capitalist 
development. As the term 'power relation' already indicates, power is not simply a medium or 
possession. Instead, power shouldbe conceived above all as a feature of social relations .. This 
implies that individuals, groups or classes can wield power only vis-a-vis other individuals, 
groups or classes.Hence it is above all theconcrete configuration of social relations which 
determines the content and character of the diverse foims ofpower. 
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In this sense, power relations contain always two analytically distinguishable dimensions: 
more general and endurable social structures (structural power) as well as particular forms of 
action by which the structures are reproduced or transformed (relational power). The impact 
of this very general statement is threefold: First, depending on the analytical perspective, the 
structural dimensions ofpower can be located in different contexts. They might be assigned to 
different autonomous spheres of social reproduction, such as security, finance, production, 
and knowledge (cf. Strange 1994) or they might be seen as part of an overall transnational 
social hierarchy, which nleans that despite all particularities the different power structures are 
linked and 'over-determined', i.e. framed by the 'social relations of. production' (cf. Cox 
1987). Second, whatever perspective might be chosen, power structures always differ in 
scope. Some are rather local and domestic, whereas others reach out' to European or global 
levels. Depending on the area concerned, the relationship and interaction between various 
levels is not always clear. On the contrary, often it is rather difficult to ascertain, which level 
is dominant. or determinant. A third' aspect which needs emphasised is that none of the . given 
power relations can be analysed by looki:q.g only at the structural dimension. For there are 
never just structures without action. If this is the case, structures would become meaningless. 
In fact, structural power always involve some form of relational power by which it is repro- . 
duced ör transformed. 
The apparatuses and agencies of the nation-state still represent core elements of domestic and, 
global power structures. Yet some of their capacities have become weakened in the course of 
continuing oreven accelerated economic internationalisation, transnationalisation and glob­
alisation. Within western Europe to a large degree these processes have been shaped by the 
European Union. As an additional level of governance, the EU mediates between the con­
striction of domestic markets and the limited scope of govemmental action, on the one hand, 
and the global expansion of the world market, on the other hand. During the post-war dec­
ades, European mediatio~ served above all to facilitate govemment action in order to shelter 
and stabilise the particular national models of development (cf. Statz 1989). In the course of 
the 80s and 90s, however, it then changed its purpose and character. European mediation be­
came not only more important due '10 treaty reforms, supranational institution building and 
additional European competencies. 1t was also subj ected to a fairly different content. The core 
economic projects - the Single European' Market (SEM) and Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) - show very clearly that the new European regionalism was increasingly determined 
by a neo-liberal agenda. Hence, from the mid 80s onwards European integration functions 
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less and less as a mediator for· fairly encompassing government regulation, but rather as an 
additional lever to promote domestic neo-liberal reform~. 
According to Stephen Gill (1998: 5), this shift in operation and orientation of interna­
tional/supranational agreements and governance structures can be seen as an expression of a 
'new constitutionalism' which 'seeks to separate economicpolicies from broad political ac­
countability in order tomake govemments more responsive to the discipline of market forces 
and correspondingly less responsive to popular-democratic forces and processes' . This proc­
ess of constitutionalisation is, however, neither simply the outcome of unavoidable systemic 
changes nor does it come about without public disputes and conflicts. On the contrary, the 
supranational institutional and regulatory frameworks are exposed to many<- sometimes con­
tradictory influences and interests. In this context, the representatives of national govern­
ments"play 'a significant role. It remains their privilege to bargain, to decide on and to comply 
with supranationalconstitutional agreements. Nevertheless~l they are not the only forces in 
global and European politics. Other social forces such as the organised interests of big busi­
ness, trade unions and various NGOs matteras well. Yet the relevance of their interests is 
difficult to evaluate. Generally, their direct influence on the process of bargaining and formal 
decision-making (Le. 'decision making power') seems to be rather weak. On the other hand, 
their discursive impact on the basic purpose and content of supranational institutional and 
. regulatory arrangements (i.e. the 'power to define') can be rather serious (cf. Bieling 2002). 
The implications of this for the influence and power of social forces, large businesses and 
trade unions, can be illustrated by a four-pronged heuristic model of discursive policy­
framing( cf. O'Brian 2000: 38). The first the option that the social forces have within this 
model is to operate on the national level. This implies that they can try to influence the do­
mestic and/or inter- and transgouvemmental' strategies of national governments an4 state 
agencies by promoting particular public discourses or campaigns in favour or against official 
state policies. A second option is to deal directly with international organisations such as the 
EU. In this case, next to national associations, European associations need to be taken into 
consideration. According to their character, some of these associations concentrate on the' 
more technical and administrative aspects of European regulation. By the same token, how­
ever, their arguments are often, implicitly ore expli citly, placed within broader ideological 
discourses about the very fundanlental nature of the arrangements under consideration. The 
third option is to address neither national nor supranational state agencies but to engage di­
rectly with other social forces.In the meantime, within the European Union there are quite a 
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few possibilities for market actors, associations and NGOs to co-operate or to come into con­
flict on a transnational basis. Finally,the fourth option is to connect the different levels by 
e1aborating a broader strategy of co-operative transformation guided by a particu1ar 
hegemonie eoneeption. This does not niean that the other options can work detached from,any 
conceptua1 work. The 1atter is a1ways part of the power po1itics of socia1 forces. The separate 
enumeration shou1d only emphasise the difference between the se1f-perception of the socia1 
forces as dependent and sub ordinate to supranational and national govemance structures, on 
the one hand, and as autonomous entities that seek contact primarily with simi1ar socia1 
forces, on the other. 
It wou1dbe naive to assume that in terrhs ofpo1itica1 decision-making the politica11everage of 
all socia1 forces is the same. Even nlore critica1 neo-p1ura1ist scholars (cf. Lindbloom 1977) 
have highlighted the uneven power relations, particu1arly between organised business and 
1abour. This does not mean that theprivi1eged position of business is simp1y credited to une­
qual po1itica1 resources, capabilities and 10bbying skills. On the contrary, in view of the re­
quirements of capita1ist accumu1ation and of the probable imp1ications for politica11egitimacy 
govemment officials are se1f-interested in encouraging business deve10pment. In Lindb100m' s 
(1977: 175).words: The govemment official 'does not have to be bribed, duped, or pressured 
to do so. Nor does he have to be an uncritical admirer of businessmen to do so. He simp1y 
understands, as is p1ain to see, that pub1ic affairs in market-oriented systems are in the hands 
of two groups of leaders, govemment and business, who must collaborate and that, to make 
the system work government leadership must often defer to business leadership. ' However, 
the prerequisite of such a relationship between govemment and business is that the market or 
capitalist system itse1f shou1d be ·generally approved of and that business represeritatives 
shou1d not appear as representatives of a 1imited, but of a general interest (cf. J essop 1990). 
This condition is not fulfilled automatically. To estab1ish, secure and make such a world view 
operationa1 a lot of pub1ic and po1itica1 engagement is required. And this engagement is not 
confined to individual companies, but often mediated by common associations and particu1ar 
po1icy networks. 
2. The emergence of a finance-Ied new European economy 
Transnational business engagement also app1ies to the making of the new European economy 
and the process of financia1 market integration. Since the mid 80s European business - indi~ 
vidua1 or associations ·has become increasing1y invo1ved in nlanufacturing a European con­
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sensus to improve competitiveness on a transnational scale. This happened partly through 
very concrete regulatory commentsand suggestions, i.e. by direct business involvement in the 
exertion of public . authority. More important is, however, that the content of technocratic 
regulatory change was inspired by the more general vision to stimulate European economy by 
means ofliberalisation, deregulation and flexibilisation. It would be too sin1plistic to give a11 
the merit 'for this shift in the general orientation of European economic and social policiesto 
business representatives. The analytical perspective developed here, only maintains that to­
gether with scientists, journalists, politicians etc. these have been successful to provide a par­
ticular interpretation of the crisis of national and global Fordism, manifest in the persistent 
'Eurosclerosis', forinstance. This entails an advanced, market-based andcornpetition oriented 
integration of the European economy. 
This,development can be regarded as evidence ofthe formation ofa new trans national bloc of 
social forces under the guidance of global productive and money capital. Nevertheless, this 
bloc is not free ofinternal conflicts and contradictions. Yet these are not difficult to copewith . 
as long as the political agenda contains commonly accepted terms regarding the benefits of 
market integration, more competition, lower costs, and an investmentclimate which is fa­
vourable for business. In this context, financial market integrationhas been of utmost impor­
tance since the mid 1980s. Nevertheless, at first it was not a political project in its own right. 
It seems to be more appropriate to see financial market integration as the condensed outcome 
ofaseries ofdifferent itiitiatives. 
First, although financial market integration accounts for a great deal of economic gains cal­
culated in Cecchini (1988) report, it did not attract public interest. In scientific circles, finan­
cial market issues have been of interest only for economists and a fewpolitical scientists at 
best. Moreover, even the financial services industry itself was hesitant: 'The financial players 
across Europe, apart fron1 central bankers; became aware surprisingly late in the day how the 
internal market was likely to affect them. With a handful of exceptions, banks, insurance 
COnipanies and· stock exchanges took litde part in theagitation for the single market and in 
most member states: the time lag between the Act in 1986 and active awareness could be 
measured in years rather than months.' (Middlemas 1995: 473) Seen in this way, at least at 
first European financial market integration was not so much driven by transnational social 
forces, but initiated by a European Commission which - against the background of global 
financial services liberalisation and regulation - gained its main support from national gov­
emments and central banks (cf. Helleiner 1994; Kapstein 1994). 
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The same applies 10 the following initiatives, however, with the difference that the European 
financial . services industry and globally oriented TNCs - i.e. individual companies as weIl as 
European and national associations - became nlore actively involved. The impact of the for­
mation of transnational business networks was above all twofold. Due to their expert knowl­
edge they became either directly relevant for concrete r~gulative liberalisation policies and the 
establishment of a level playing field, or they managed to organise specific co-ordinating or 
communicative discourses to frame the content of economic initiatives at stake. The fol­
lowing cases of network discursive framing have been most important: first, the political 
campaigns of AMlJE (Association for Monetary Union of Eirrope) in the run up to EMU; 
second, the engagement of EASD (European Association of Securities Dealers) as weIl as the 
support of the ERT (European Round Table of Industrialists) andEVCA (European Venture 
Capital Association) for EASDAQ, a pan-European market for risk capital, which eventually 
triggered the establishment ofthe differentnational 'new markets'; third, the pressure ofindi­
vidual financial firms - investment banks, institutional investors and brokers and theCAG ' 
(Competitiveness Advisory Group) to launch the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) and 
to up-date security market regulation; fourth,the' broad support of the financial services in­
dustry for the suggestions of the Lamfalussy expert group for accelerated regulation via two 
new advisory and regulatory committees (ESC and CESR); and finally, the formation of a 
European Round Table ofFinancial Services (ERF) - modelled afterthe ERT -to secured the 
continuation of the process of accelerated financial market integration. 
The influence or the 'power to define' of varlous associations and networks results from two 
factors: 'first, from the ability to ,make their voices heard by EU Institutions i.e. European 
Commission, Council and the EU Parliament - by providing useful technical and administra­
tive information, but also information about the general political view of the industries con­
cemed; and second, from the ability to form broader political alliances inclusive of non­
financial associations (UNICE, ERT, EU Committee), scientists, think tanks (CEPS) and 
journalists (Financial Times, Economist, Wall Street Journal) that share more or less similar 
vlews. 
These discourses initiated and stimulated by transnational European networks in favour of a 
liberal integrated financial market refer to several objectives. In general, it is emphasised that 
financial market integration is self-evidently related to SEM and EMU.~ It represents an 'in­
evitable next step by which the precedent proj ects will be completed and strengthened. On the 
one hand, it is' repeatedly stressed that, without an integrated and dynamic financial market, 
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the,EU 'will forgo the potential reduction in the cost of EU capital offered by the' single cur­
rency' (European Commission 1998: 2), with detrimental effects on competitiveness and em­
, , 
ployment. On the other hand, it is also mentioned that only an integrated financial market will 
direct sufficient capital and investment to the EU economy and strengthen the Euro. 'Who­
ever wants the Euro to stand proud must ( ... ) support structura1 reformsand in particularthe 
European Commission's Financial Services Action Plan.' (Bolkenstein 2001). Obviously, 
both aspects - additional investment and employment as well as the strengthening of the euro 
- are related to the broader discourse on improved European competitiveness. T~is has been 
made clear at the Lisbon summit, where European governments with the support of transna­
tional business underlined the necessity of deepened financial market integration. In the 
meantime, almost all associations of the financial and non-financial sector and man)' discus­
sion forums emphasise the 'strong link between changes in capital markets and competitive­
ness' (CAG 1998: 1). The ERT also states that '~n integrated pan-European capital market 
would drive down the cost of capita1, increase financing options, lower the cost of doing busi­
ness (dramatically in the case of securities), increase the yields on investment and pension 
funds for all citizens, and release more venture capital.' (ERT 2002: 7) As part of the com~ 
petitiveness discourse, accelerated finance-Ied restructuring appears as a 'win-win' strategy, 
which Europe cannot afford to refuse. Financial integration is not ()nly represented as an es­
sential requirement to mobilise resources for technological innovation, but also as a leverage 
to boost investment, to create more jobs, and to deploy the opportunities of capita1 markets to 
cope with the demographie 'time bomb'. As a Commission official puts it: 'integrating finan­
cial markets is a very good socia1 policy: higher pensions for everybody, more employment, 
better opportunities for young peop1e and so forth.' (Interview, May 2001) 
Yet, this positive view of financial market integration and finance-Ie'd restructuring was not 
only the outcome of changed public discourses and political canipaigns. It emerged also 
against the background of structural transformations in the global capitalist economy and the 
new significance of financial markets, above all of security markets. A few developments in 
this direction are summarised in the following (cf. ECB 2001; Huffschmid 2002): 
Even in the US and Great Britain, the operation of financial firms is no longer determined by 
the separate banking system the separation of credit and investment banking - but by in­
creased inter-penetration of different market segments. 
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At the same time, at the latest in the second half of the nineties, security markets became 
more significant. In continental Europe market capitalisation of companies almost quadrupled 
due to privatisation programmes, mergers and acquisition strategies and the mania for specu­
lation gains ofmany investors. 
The growing role of security markets is also underlined by the fact that there has been a boom 
in share trading. Shares change hands after a few weeks or months now instead of years as 
before. 
Obviously, non-financial firms, particularly TNCs, direct their attention more andmore to 
security markets. This shift in orientation can be seen as the counterpart of the improved role 
of shareholders and institutional investors, which, in turn, becomes manifest in mergers and 
acquisitions as well as in improved opportunities to raise capital by issuing bonds or equities. 
Finally, security exchanges have undergone a fundamental transformation during the nineties. 
Originally, they represented protected and cosy c1ub-like organisations' operating on a mutual 
basis. Nowadays most ofthem are profit-motivated corporations90mpeting for market shares. 
All these different dimensions can be seen as indicators for the transition towards a ,finance­
led mode of capitalist restructuring. The impact of the new financialised economy naturally 
depends on the concrete terms of financial market regulation. So far, most regulation isbiased 
towards neo-libenll objectives such as investor protection, prudent person regulation or the 
subordination of public economic and social interests to cross-border competition of financial 
firms. Consequently, it can be expected that financial market integration may have a far­
reaching impact on the whole mode of capitalist reproduction. First,' by upgrading and privi­
leging shareholder interests it will stimulate a transformation of corporate governance. Mana­
gerial strategies will become more short-term oriented relying primarilyon more flexible, 
often deteriorating working conditions (cf. Bieling/Steinhilber 2002). Second, as privatisation 
of pensions is a core element in the financialisation process, national retirement systems will 
be further weakened, intergenerational solidarity will be undermined, and pensioners will be­
come dependent on the market trendof financial assets (cf. Becknlann 2002). ,Third, national 
govemments see themselves disciplined in view of highly mobile financial capital and tend to 
lower corporate taxes, curtail public spending and investment, and forgo anti-cyclical inter­
vention in the economy (er. Gill1995). Finally, monetary authorities will be tempted to direct 
their attention not only to inflation and economic growth, but also to financial market trends 
(cf. Grah12001). 
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3. Balancing the newEuropean economy: social forcesand the organisation of 
hegemony 
So 'far the finance-Ied regime of accumulation is still based on shaky ground. This is partly 
due to economic recession, falling stock market prices and fraudulent financial reporting and 
auditing practices. From a regulationist point of view this me ans that in order to make the new 
regime viable additional regulation, better supervision and a different macro-economic ap­
proach is required (cf. Aglietta 2000; Boyer 2000). The neo-Gramscian perspective, however, 
stresses that these aspects are only half of the story.To understand the operation of finance­
led restmcturing, it suggests to look at both the global dimensions of European financial mar­
ket integration and the longer-term consequences for politics and society: i.e .. the disciplinary 
impact of financial market criteria, generally increased economic and social insecurity, and 
accentuated sodal inequality. In otherwords, the content and character of European financial 
market integration is determined by the co-operation of transatlantic political and socia! 
forces, on the one hand, and the particular bargaining structures within European societies, on 
the other hand. 
3.1. The transatlantic context: European integration and the 'Dollar Wall Street R,egime' 
The transatlantic dimension of financial market integration raises the question whether or to 
what degree.the European economy is already part ofthe global "Dollar Wall Street Regime' 
(DWSR). This term hasbeencoined by Peter Gowan (1999). It refers to the emerging global 
monetary and financial stmctures after the break down of the Bretton Woods system of fixed 
exchange rates and politically controlled capital markets. Compared to this old regime which 
provided national govenlillents with a certain degreeof economic,financial and monetary 
autonomy, the new DWSR is less generous. Its main features, are open capital markets, float­
ing exchange rates, and the world-wide supremacy of the US dollar. The most influential 
forces' determining the mIes of this regime are theUS treasury department, the Federal Re­
serve andthe private financial firms located in Wall Street. The relation between both is char­
acterised by personal exchange, close working relations and similar aims. Besides, the centre 
oftheDWSR, the 'Wall Street-Treasury Complex' (Bhagwati 1998: 10-11), is c10sely linked­
up with international organisations such as IMF, World Bank, WTO, BIS and the Basle' 
Committee, IOSCO etc. It is therefore not only in favour of a world of free capital mobility. It 
is also the most important proponent of the 'Washington Consensus', i.e. the view that free 
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trade, open financial markets, currency convertibility, domestic structural adjustment and neo­
liberal refonns provide the only successful way for economic development. 
In some respects, the DWSR contains institutional and legal dimensions. Its functioning is 
facilitated by a range of mutually approved regulations. More important, however, is the ma­
terial basis of the regime which determines other governmerits to follow its rules. Trus is 
mainly due to the predominant economic power of financial and non-financial US corpora­
tions and the fairly' undisputed role of the US dollar as the world leading currency, which 
places the Wall Street and the treasury at the centre of financial networks. Most international 
credit is denominated in dollars, US banks are the most important internationalereditors, and, 
as the Basle Accord reveals, the standards of international regulation and supervision are 
strongly determined by the US aüthorities. Moreover, the dominant role of the dollar and the 
control over, the IMF and World Bank minimises the risk for US-based financial operators 
while enabling the US go'Vernment to pursue its 'American first' approach and exploit aB 
seignorage ofthe global key currency (cf. Gowan 1999: 25-30). 
Generally, other economiesare incorporated into the DWSR in two ways. One way is that of 
disciplinary subordination, i.e. of total exposure to the global financial operators and thereby 
to the vagaries of global financial markets. This path is taken by economies unable to follow a 
self-determined path of development. Relying on foreign capital and investment, they often 
accumulate huge foreign debts. As a consequence, they have then almost no chance to resist 
various pressures by private creditors, the US government and the IMF and World Bank ­
to remove national barriers to the free flow of funds, to give full rights of operation to foreign 
financial investors, and to redesign national financial systems according to external require­
ments. The other form of incorporation is that of achieving the position of a privileged junior 
partner. This seems to apply to the European. Union. Since the EU has some bargaining 
power in international forums and organisations such as the G7, the Basle Committee, 
IOSCO, and the WTO, itis not simply a 'regime taker', but to a certain degree.also a 'regime 
shaper'. Inprinciple, the European approach to the regulation of global capital markets is 
broadly in line with US objectives. This is mainly due to the influence of US business inside 
the EU (e.g. via the EU Committee), the c10se links ofAmerican financial firms to the City of 
London, and intensified transatlantic business co-operation based on a huge flow of foreign 
direct investnlent. Hence next to the co-operation in the area offinancial market regulation by 
supervisory authorities, there are also more recent examples of institutionalised business co­
operation such as the Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD) or the establishment of the 
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Financial Leaders Group which strongly supported the Financial Services Agreement (FSA) 
negotiated in the follow up of the GATS talks (cf. DobsoniJacquet 1998). All this can be 
taken as evidence that in the course of the 90s European financial and non-financial firms 
have developed anincreasingly global orientation. Moreover, theyare the main advocates of 
an 'open regionalism' in the EU, i.e. of a mode of regional institution building and regulation 
generally in line with globalliberalisation of trade, finance and investment. 
Eventually, however, it would be too simple and one-sided to highlight only the similarities 
and forms of co-operation between the US and the EU. Thereare quite a few very significant 
differences and. controversial issues, which are by far not meaningless. First, the European 
bargaining approach seems to be less unilateral and more co-operative than the US one ... In 
the case of the FSA, the endeavours of the EU have been nluch more directed towards re ach­
ing an agreement on binding common mIes and regulations, and it was rather willing to re­
duce its original claims (cf. Garten 1995: 56-7) .. Except for this difference in strategie action, 
the EU also pursues a different objective. EMU, financi~l1 market integration and the Lisbon 
strategy can be seen as an attempt to counter-balance the dominance of theUS economy. The 
clainl ofthe EU to compete on an equal footing suggests that the role of ajunior partner is not 
entirely accepted anymore. Considering this, ,EMU is not only the completion of the SEM, but 
also achallenge to the DWSR. This means that the EU aims at both sharing global currency 
seignorage and getting a stronger voice in the regulationand supervision of global financial 
markets. The third difference refers not to the form and distribution, but to the content of 
global regulation. Although European finance has become strongly glo1;lalised, there are· still 
other forces in the public and manufacturing sectors - which are much more sensitive and 
adhere to given forms of societal co-operation and compromise, e.g. with employees and trade 
umons. 
3.2. Disciplining and incorporating labour 
The latter point indicates that the hegemonie bloc of social forces in favour of the new Euro­
pean economy needs to balance it on two fronts: extemally, within and against the DWSR, 
and intemally, by incorporating trade unions anq labour. It is unquestionable that trade unions 
have been seriously weakened in the course of the 80s. They have been faced with high un­
employment, structural change, labour market deregulation, social cutbacks, declining mem­
bership and intensifiedeconomic competition.as a result ofaccelerated European integration. 
Nevertheless~in almost all member states trade unions still represent an important social force 
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whose willingness to co-operate governments and companies obviously caimot afford to lose. 
Hence the relationship between the advocates of European market integration European 
Commission and national governments - and trade unions is rather ambivalent: 
On the one hand, the Commissionand national governments have been very receptive to pres­
sures of transnational business to go ahead with economic and monetary integration. In this 
sense, the' single market programme and EMU have' been building blocs of a new European 
constitutionalism which implements the twofold logic of 'competitive deregulation' and 'de­
creed austerity'. As a consequence, the disciplinary elements of capitalist restructuring have 
become' stronger, particularly in terms of employment and working conditions (cf. Bieling 
2001). Moreover, the new constitutionalism changes fundamentally the terms of compromis­
ing since in view of the new economic and political constraints national goverillnents are 'no 
longer able to accommodate c1ass conflict through credit expansion or currency devaluation.' 
(Bonefeld 2002: 132). 
On the other hand, the Commission and most governments have been' quite aware that trade 
union support remains a crucial precondition for their legitimacy. Thus even if at the national 
level the old forms of compromising and bargaining higher wages in exchange for political 
self-restriction - have become ineffectual, political authorities have been engaged to develop 
a new multi-level modeloftrade union involvement. In this context, however, the content of 
involvement, bargaining and political exchange has changed substantially (cf. Biel­
ing/Schulten 2003). First, at the firm level, employees and their union representatives often 
feel impelled to agree to a strategy of 'competitive investment bargaining' (Mueller 1996). 
This means that in order to attract investment- and secure employment they accept wage cuts 
and more flexible employment conditions. Second, at thenational or sector level,political 
exchange within the new forms of 'competitive corporatism'(Rhodes 1998) is similar but 
more complex. It is based on trade union concessions in terms of wage moderation, more 
flexible forms of employment, and the reform of social security systems, whereas political 
authorities annqunce tax cuts, active labour market policies and perhaps lower interest rates in 
order to stimulate investment and employment. Finally, at the European level, some elements 
of Euro-corporatist involvement have also emerged (cf. Falkner 1998). Most important is the' 
European 'social dialogue' whose up-grading enabled socialpartners to negotiate. biriding 
framework agreements enacted by political authorities. Without doubt, supranational social 
regulation was certainly extended in the late 80s and early 90s. Eventually, however, Euro­
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pean corporatism remains largely symbolic since it covers only a few areas, and it is not 
backedby strong political mobilisation and collective action (cf. Martin/Ross 1999). 
The question which eilsues from these facts is that of the role of trade unions in the new 
European economy. Apart from the structural changes outlined above, the European socio­
economic governance structure has suffered only minor changes for the benefit of trade· un­
ions. To compensate for the disciplinary impact of the Euro and the dangers of generalised 
austerity, they have beenable - with the support of Social Democratic Parties to push 
through a European employment strategy and to partake in a non-binding macro-economic 
dialogue. It is, however, unlikely orat least unclear how this should evolve to a leverage fora 
changed macro-economic approach. This is all the more relevant as in the field of financial 
market integration, European trade unions failed to press for strong elements of social and 
democratic contro!. The mode of regulation, intervention and supervision of financial markets 
is left to the Commission,· national govemments, national regulators and supervisors and the 
financial service industry itself. Trade unions raise their voice only if issues of immediate 
concern for employees are on the agenda. Hence their engagement has been confined to few 
aspects (ETUC interview, February 2002): first, to European regulation of employee in­
volvement as part of the European Company Statute; second, to lobbying the EU Parliament 
in order to prevent the adoption of the take over directive which contains no conlffiitment of 
the board to contact works councils in 'case of a takeover bid; third, to a· kind of accounting 
and auditing regulation which makes company practices comprehensible for works councils; 
and finally, to look for most favourable ways of financial participation of employees Via Em­
ployee Share-Ownership Plans (ESOPs) or via· collectively bargained, perhaps even collec­
tively managed pension schemes (cf. O'Kelly 2002). 
Naturally, allthis is far from sufficient to endow trade unions with significant power. Their 
adherence organisational involvement in the new European economy is not based on autono­
mousbargaining strength, but rather on their political weakness under conditions of acceler­
ated capital ~obility and intensified cross-border competition. As Colin Crouch (2002: 303) 
has recently conc1uded, trade unions 'have the strongest relative preference for neo­
corporatism in the choice between it an either deflation or deregulation. Therefore they are 
likely to seek this goal wherever the basic institutional design makes it feasible, though this 
should not be interpreted as some kind ofnewunion "power". Their power is only that, as the 
ones who most nee~ a partiCular outcome, they will be the onesmost willing to make sacri- . 
fices to achieve it. And the outcome they seek is mainly negative: avoidance of high unem­
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ployment,the right to bargain, and measures of employment security. This logic of the situa­
tion and power balance in the new economyexplain why the objectives of recent and pro­
, ' 
spective future revivals of neo-corporatism are, not only very limited - for example, they ex:.. 
c1ude any attempts at income redistribution - but will usually embody an attempt at reaching 
neo-liberal goals through the means ofcorporatistconsensus.' 
4. Prospects 
So far in this paper it has been argued that the new European economy arid the emerging re- , 
gime of finance-Ied capitalist accumulation is far from being completed. In several regards its 
mode ofreproduction and regulationis still controversial. The bloc of social forces organising 
the new European economy has to balance it on two fronts. The first front has a strong inter­
national or global, at least transatlantic dimension, which is structura11y detennined by the 
DWSR and the global govemance institutions related to' it as for example the Basle Commit­
tee, lOSCO and the WTO. In this regard, we can interpret the EU .strategy via EMU and fi­
nancial nlarket integration as an attempt to change the power balance within the DWSR, 
without changing its socio-economic content. The second front is primarily domestic, as sup­
port for EMU and financial market integrationremains dependent on the involvement oftrade 
unions. In this case, we have seen that the ways of reaching a compromise - above a11, the 
willingness of the trade unions to engage in new social pacts and competitive corporatism ­
seem to function fairly well. 'Consequently, there is much evidence that, despite its incom­
pleteness, the twofold' balancing of the new European economy will result in an adequate 
mode of transnational govemance and regulation. At 'least at the moment'there are no signs 
that the power structures and govemance mechanisms supportive of the new European econ­
onlY might become weaker or change. 
In a medium or long-:-term perspective, nonetheless, it may be expected that the 'tensions in­
herent to this configur~tion will come to the fore. This will be mainly due to threedevelop­
ments. First, transnational financial and non-financial companies are pressing for the deregu­
lation, privatisation and financialis~tion ofthe European public infrastructure and social,secu­
rity regulation. This applies toall areas, above all to public transport, air trafftc, energy sup­
ply, telecommunication as well as the health service and retirement arrangements. Second, the 
European institutions and agreements, i.e. the EU treaty, various action programmes and the 
deregulation approach ofthe Directorate General 'Competition' ofthe European Commission, 
look for solutions to the pressure exercised by transnational business. Finally, all European 
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welfare and socüll security systems are faced with serious challenges which areby far not 
easy to manage. Some ofthem are closely connected to the depressive macro-economiccon­
stellation whereas some are caused by demographie trends which increase pressure on social 
security systems, mainly on heaIth care and pension systems. 
All this shows that the approach of the Lisbon strategy to improve European competitiveness 
in order to overtake the US econoniy without catching up with it, seems to be destined to fail. 
Even ifthe new European economy included a more encompassing - perhaps even social ori­
ented regulation of financial markets, it would not be possible to avoid a further dismantling 
of the European social model. In other words, accelerated financial market integration, i.e. the 
creation of a stronger European basis of a transnational regime of finance-led restructuring, is 
unlikely to come out as a 'win-win' -strategy. It creates not only winners but also many losers, 
at least if it remains part of the global DWSR. Therefore, an alternative path of European in­
tegration and societal development is required. Thisentails the establishment of new forms of . 
transatlantic regulation -e.g. currency exchange targets or capital controls - which give some 
political control over globalised finance. Thisalso involves aredefinition of the global gov­
ernance structure and a substantial transformation, if not even abolishment, of the DWSR, ' 
particularly in terms of the IMF, World Bank, WTO etc. Thirdly, the enlarged room for ma,;. 
noeuvrehas to be filled by an expansive macro-economic management improving the condi­
tions for and employment-oriented revitalisation of the European economy. Finally, this will 
also motivate trade unions and social movements to achieve a more social oriented moderni- ' 
sation ofwelfare systems and indusiPal relations. 
References 
Aglietta, Michel (2000): Ein neues Akkumulationsregime.Die Regulationstheorie auf dem 
Prüfstand (Hamburg). 
Becknlann, Martin (2002): Shareholder-Ökonomie und die Reform der Alterssicherungssys­
. terne in der Europäischen Union, FEG-Studie Nr. 17 (Marburg). 
Bhagwati, Jagdish(1998): The Capital Myth; in: Foreign Affairs 77(3), 7-12. 
Bieling, Hans-Jürgen (2001): European Constitutionalism and Industrial Relations; in: Bieler, 
Andreas/Morton, Adam David (Eds.), Social Forces ip. the Making of the New Europe 
(Houndmills), 47-69. 
Bieling, Hans-Jürgen (2002): Changing Boundaries:Die europäische Reorganisation von Ö­
konomie, . Staat und Zivilgesellschaft als politischer Prozess; in: Hegmann, 
HorstINeumärker, Bernhard (Eds.), Die Europäische Union aus politökonomischer Per­
spektive (Marburg), 93-114. 
45 The New European Economy: Transnational Power Structures ... 
Bieling, Hans-Jürgen (2003): SocialForces in the Making of the New European Economy: 
The Case of Financial Market Integration; in: New Political Economy 8(2), forthcom­
ing. 
Bieling, Hans-Jürgen/Deppe, Frank (1996): Internationalisierung, Integration und politische 
Regulierung; in: Jachtenfuchs, MarkuslKohler-Koch, Beate (Hrsg.), Europäische Integ­
ration (Opladen), 481-511. " 
Bieling, Hans-Jürgen/Schulten Thorsten (2003): Competitive Restructuring and Industrial 
Relations within the European Union: Corporatist Involvement and Beyond?; in: Ca-, 
fruny, Alan/Ryner, Magnus (Eds.), The Political Economy of the European Union 
(Boulder), forthcoming. 
Bieling, Hans-Jürgen/Steinhilber, Jochen (2002): Finanzmarktintegration und Corporate Go­
vernance in der Europäischen Union; in: Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen 
9(1), 39-74. 
Bolkenstein, Frits (200l):'European Competitiveness', Arubrosetti Annual Forum, Cernob~ 
bio, 8 Septeluber, http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_nlarket/en/speeches/spch373.htm. 
Bonefeld, Werner (2002): European integration: the market, the political and class; -in: Capital 
and Class, No. 77 (Summer), 117-142. ' 
Boyer, Robert (2000): Is a finance-led growth regime a viable alternative to Fordism? A pre­
liminary analysis; in: Economyand Society 29(1), 111-145. 
CAG (1998): Capital Markets for Competitiveness. Report to the President of the Commis­
sion and the Heads of State and Govemment for the Cardiff European Council (Brus­
sels). 
Cecchini, Pa()lo (1988): The European Challenge - 1992. The benefits of a Single Market 
(Aldershot). 
, Cox, Robert W. (1987): Production, Power and World Order. Social Forces in the Making of 
History (New York). 
Crouch, Colin (2002): The Euro and Labour Market and Wage Policies; in: Dyson, Kenneth 
(Ed.), European States and the Euro. Europeanization, Variation, and Convergence (Ox­
ford), 173-211. 
Dobson, Wendy/Jacquet, Pierre (1998): Financial Services Liberalisation in the WTO 
(Washington DC). 
ECB (2001): The Euro Equity Markets (Frankfurt). 
ERT (2002): Will European Govemments in Barcelona keep their Lisbon Promises? Message 
from the European Round Table of Industrialists to the Barcelona European Council 
(Brussels ). 
European Commission (1998): Financial Services: Building a Framework for Action, COM 
(1,998), 625 final, 28 October (Brussels). 
European Council (2000): Presidency Conclusions, Lisbon 23 and 24 March (Brussels). 
Falkner, Gerda (1998): EU Social Policy in the 1990s. Towards a corporatist policy commu­
nity (London; New Y ork)~ 
Garten, Jeffrey E. (1995): IsAmerica Abandoning Multilateral Trade?; in: Foreign Affairs 
,74(6),50-62. 
46 Hans-Jürger Bieling 
Gill, Stephen (1995): Globalis'ation, MarketCivilisation and Disciplinary Neoliberalism; in: 
Millennium 24(3), 399-423. 
Gi11, Stephen (1998): European Governance and New Constitutionalism: Economic and 
, Monetary Union and Alternatives to Disciplinary Neoliberalism in Europe; in: New Po­
litical Econorny 3(1), 5-26. 
Gowan, Peter (1999): The Global Gamble. Washington's Faustian Bid for World Dominance 
(London). 
Grahl, John (2001): Globalized Finance. The Challenge to the Euro; in: New Left Review. 
Second Series 8, 23-47. 
Helleiner, Eric (1994): States and the Reemergence of Global Finance: From Bretton Woods 
to the 1990s (Ithaca; London). 
Huffschmid, Jörg (2002): Financial Markets in Europe - Structure, Changes, Actors and 
Strategies (www.epoc.uni-bremen.de/publicationsl.htm). 
Jessop, Bob (1990): State Theory. Putting Capitalist States in their Place (Cambridge). 
Kapstein, Ethan B. (1994): GoverninK the Global Economy. International Finance and the ' 
State (Harvard). 
Lindbloom, Charles E. (1977): Politics and Markets. The World's Political-Economic Sys­
tems (New York). 
Lipietz, Alain (1987): Rebel Sons: The Regulation School. Interview mit Jane Jenson; in: 
French Politics and Society 5(4), 17-25. 
Martin, 'Andrew/Ross, George (1999a): In the Line of Fire: The Europeanization of Labor 
Representation; in: Martin, Andrew/Ross, George (Eds.), The Brave New World of 
European Labor. European Trade Unions at the Millennium (New York; Oxford), 312­
367. 
Middlemas, Keith (1995): Orchestrating Europe. The ,Informal Politics of European Union, 
1973-1995 (London). 
Mueller, Frank (1996): National Stakeholders in the Global Contest for Corporate Invest­
ment,in: European Journal ofIndustrial Relations, 2(3), 345-368. 
O'Brian, Robert (2000): The Agency of Labour in aChanging Global Order; in: Stubbs, 
RichardlUnderhill, Geoffrey R.D. (Eds.), Political Economy and the Changing Global 
Order (Oxford), 38-47. 
O'Kelly, Kevin (2002): Financial participation: seeking a European Consensus; in: Transfer 
8(1),13-17. 
Rhodes, Martin (1998): Globalization, Labour Markets and Welfare States: A Future of 
"Competititve Corporatism"; in: Rhodes, MartinJMeny, Yves (Eds.), The Future' of 
European Welfare: A New Social Contract? (London), 178-203. 
Statz, Albert (1989): Die Entwicklung der europäischen Integration - ein Problemaufriß; in: 
Deppe, FranklHuffschinid, JörglWeiner, Klaus-Peter (Eds.), 1992 - Projekt Europa. 
Politik und Ökonomie in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft (Köln), 13-38. 
Strange, Susan (1994) [1988]: States and Markets. Second Edition (London; New York). 
Christoph Scherrer 
'Double Hegemony'? State and Class in Transatlantic Relations 
Abstract 
The paper introduces research on transatlantic relations done by neo-Gramscian authors. This 
research is distinctive by focusing on class in international relations and by using the concept 
ofhegemony in a relational sense. Hegemony is leadership through the active consent ofother 
classes and groups. A central question of this neo-Gramscian research is whether an internati­
onal c1ass of capitalists has emerged. Some authors have answered in the positi~e. This paper, 
however, maintains that hegemony in the international realm is still exercised by the Ameri­
can state, though its foreign eGonomic policies have. been greatly influenced by international­
ly-oriented corporations and that these actors have. increasingly found allies among economic 
elites in other countries. The paper· explores the relationship between hegemony by the Ame­
rican state and by internationally-oriented capital groups against the backdrop of transatlantic 
relations in the post-war period and the current debate on labor rights in international trade 
agreements. 
Introduction 
The United States govemment has been, without doubt, the deCisive force in establishing and 
shaping themain multilateralinstitutions ofthe world market since the Second Wo~ld War. It 
has consistently pursued the. opening of other nations' markets to gain foreign suppliers.This 
leadership in liberalizing international trade has been mainly achieved by lowering access 
barriers to the American market. Given the mercantilist history of US foreign economic poli­
cy and the injury inflicted on many American industries by lowering tariffs, this leaclership is 
quite an extraordinary achievement. This is. all the more true, as trade deficits and, more re­
cently, the end of the Cold War have undermined the original foundations of the American 
commitment to a liberal world-market order: economic superiority and anti-communism. 
Foran explanation ofthe US post-war commitment to a liberal world market, I will turn to the 
so-called neo-Gramscian approach. This concept picks· up on key insights from the prison 
writings of the Italian communist leader, Antonio Gramsci. Inparticular, Gramsci's specific 
interpretation of hegemony and his focus on class. promise a betterunderstanding of power 
asymmetri~s in international relations. In the following, I will argue that the ability of the US 
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govenunent to exert hegemony in world markets continues to rest on the hegemony of a 
group of 'corporate internationalists' within the United States. There is thus a 'double hege­
.. 
mony' at play: a nation state and aclass-based hegemony. 
In dealing with this 'double hegemony' my main focus willlie on the domestic side of US 
hegemony. Only in passing will I concern myselfwith the quality.of American leadership in 
the world market: whether this, leadership passes as hegemony in a Gramscian sense. 
1. Theoretical Approaches to American Foreign Economic Policymaking 
In the immediate post-war era, interest-group 'pluralists' and 'realists' in the field of interna­
tional relations were at ease in explaining the dominance of so-called free-traders within the 
US polity.l Most industries displayed a foreign trade surplus and the Uni ted States reigned 
supreme arilong Western nations. After 1970, when the. trade surplu~ turned i~to a huge deficit 
and when the United States' international predominance eroded, however, the US govenunent 
not only continued to espouse a free traderhetoric but also pursued actively further multinati­
~nal negotiations for trade liberalization. Theexecutive'sinterest in maintaining the commit­
ment to a liberal wotld-market order (shared by Congress, thoughto a lesser degree) has so 
far Jent no supp,0rt to the gloomypredictions of economists and public choice scholars using 
models of a 'market for protection' .2 
Authors in the tradition of Max Weber find the reason for this contradiction in the indepen­
-' 	 dent status ofpolicy-makers. For example, Stephen Krasner has argued·that state actors try to 
represent national interests. When confronted bya choice of interests,state actors would usu­
ally give priority to broader . foreign-policy concerns over more narrow economic interests, 
such as the inexpensive supply of raw nlaterials.3 
Similarly, Judith Goldstein has argued that "continued support for the liberal economic re­
gime is a function of the acceptance by the policymaking community of a set of mIes and 
1 See Raymond A. Bauer, !thiel de Sola Pool, and Lewis A. Dexter, Am?riean Business and Publie Poliey: The 
PolWes ojForeign Trade, 2nd ed., (Chicago, IL: Aldine Altherton, 1972), and Robert O. Keohane, "The Theory 
ofHegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes, 1967-1977," Change in the Interna­
tional System, eds. OIe Holsti, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alexander L. George (Boulder, CO: Westview, 
1980):131-62. 
.2 SeeStephen P. Magee and Leslie young, "Endogenous Protection in the United States, 1900-1984,",U.S. Tra­
de Policies ina Changing World Eeonomy, ed. Robert M. Stern (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987): 145-195; 
and Jagdish Bhagwati, Proteetionism (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988). 
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norms".4 This ideological consensus among decision-makers rests on the beliefthat free trade 
i8 beneficial as long as all participants respect the ruIes. The increase in exceptions to the free 
trade rule whilethe rule inprinciple is upheld fits well with these statist arguments. However, 
the mechanisms for maintaining the ideological consensus among state actors have yet to be 
conclusively identified. To suppose a greater sensitivity to international obligations among 
state actors may be justified, but since the content ofthese obligations is open to interpretation 
and not all of them hav~ been honored' in recent years, this sensitivity may not be sufficient 
for maintaining ideological consensus. Furthermore, the assumed coherence and internal co­
hesiveness of the state bureaucracy in this Weberian tradition contradicts the institutional 
structure of the US' state, commonly described as decentralized, fragmented, and relatively 
responsiveto socia! forces. Even in the area of foreign policy, where Krasner' believes a 
"strong state" exists, numerous state agencies and actors compete vigorously forpolicy autho­
rity. All attempts to create an effective, centralized tradeministry have failed thus far. 
The belief that capitalist elites instrumentalize the state for their foreign economic interests 
dominates the heterodox political science tradition.5 The free trade ideology of the state actors 
would therefore be the result of their dependence on dominant capital fractions.· While ,the 
influence of resourceful capital groups must be considered in any explanation, the power elite 
theory falls short for at least three reasons. First, like pluralist approaches, itdoes not question 
state capacity. Second, it neglects the unintended consequences of actions as well as the unra­
veling of economic 'logic'. Third, the state remains a 'black box':' This approach does not 
explore the relationship between society, on the one side, and the structure and functions of 
the state on the other side. 
This critique applies less to studies inspired by a reading of Gramsci'swork. These studies 
can account for the role ofideas, for the mechanisms producing consent, and for the impact of . 
economic 'logics'. 
3 See Stephen D. Krasner, ,~United States Commercial and Monetary Policy; Unravelling the ParadoxofExternal 
Strength and Internal Weakness," Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies 0/Advanced Indus­
trial States, ed. PeterJ. Katzenstein (Madison, WI: U ofWisconsinP, 1978): 51-87. 
4 Judith Goldstein, "Political Economy ofTrade: Institutions ofProtection," American Political Science Review 
80.1 (1986): 161-184; 180. 
5 See Laurence H. Shoup, The Carter Presidency and Beyond. Power and Politics in the 1980s (Palo Alto, CA: 
Ramparts Press, 1980), and C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford UP, 1956). 
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2. Neo-G.ramscian Approaches6 
The point of departure of Antonio Gramsci's analysis of power relations is that capitalist so­
ciety cannot ensure its own reproduction. The "dull compulsion of the production relations", 
based ort the separation of producers from their meansof production, is insufficient for kee­
ping the working class in its dependent position forever. But even the use of coercion is not 
adequate for this purpose; other, non-'coercive' strategiesare required. To analyze these stra­
tegies, which aim at creating active consent among the subordinate classes, Gramsci develo­
ped several concepts: hegenl0ny, organic intellectual, common sense, and historic bloc. ~Of 
primary interest here is the concept ofhegemony. 
Hegemony refers to an entrenchedform of rule that resorts to coercion 'only in exceptional 
cases. A ruling c1ass is hegemonic and not just dominant if it succeeds in winning approval to ~ 
its authority among the members of other societal c1asses. The more this authority is not me­
rely passively tolerated but actively supported, the more secure thehegemony iS.The degree 
of approval generally rests on how far the ruling institutionsaddress the respective interests of 
the other classes. The congruence of interests can be achieved, first, by taking into account the 
interests of other classes in the formative stage of the institutions. Second, attemptscan be 
made to mold these interests so that they become equated with the institution itself. A hege­
monic order will try toembrace both variants because a simple adaptation to the interests of 
other classes carries the risk that its own interests will be ignored and thus hegemony cannot 
be exercised. On the other hand, aligning the interests of other classes with one' s own can 
only be achieved by cunning or extreme 'coercive' measures. Whenever hegemony essenti­
ally relies on cunning and coercion, as Gramscibelieved the ruling middle class did ':lfter suc­
cessfully removing the yoke offeudal power, then it lacks ethicallegitimacy. One particularly 
effective form of hegenl0ny by deception, Gramsci argued, is the co-option of the leadership 
of subordinate classes, so-called transformism. The ethical side of hegemony - leading other 
groups to the pinnacle ofknowledge, technology, and culture pertains onlyto alliedc1asses, 
not to riyal, 'mIed' classes. 
The prerequisites for the hegemony of a class, Gramsci maintained, are,first, that the class 
effectively organizes the production of goods; second, that it be capable oftaking into account 
the interests of other groups; and thlrd, that it has eultural leadership. The hegemonie elass 
passes through typically three phases that correspond with its division of society into a socio­
6 See A. Gramsci, Gefängnishefte (Hamburg: Argument, 1991ff): Gef2 H3 §119; Gef3 H4 §38; Gef4 H6 §88. 
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economic structure, a civil society, and a political society. In the economic-corporative phase, 
the members of a class disco ver their sets of interests based on their status in production and 
begin to organize then1selves accordingly. In this stage, their demands are short-sighted and 
fixated on their own economic interests. Only once when they are in a position to develop 
strategies for 'universalizing' their interests - which presupposes abandoning short-tenn inte­
rests ~ do they re ach the next, ethico-political phase. The final, hegemonie or state phase is 
attained if the members of a class can give their political agenda the nature of astate and thus 
'annor' their hegemony in civil society with state coercion. Even though Gramsci saw hege­
monyas rooted in the production sphere, the so-called base, he nonetheless understood the so­
called superstructure henceforth differentiated by Gramsci as 'bourgeois-civil' and 'politi­
cal-statist' society - as more than a mere reflex of the base. On the one hand, dominance of a 
class in the social relations ofproduction does not automatically translate intoits dominance 
in the superstructure; on the other, power relations, institutions, and ideologies in the ~u­
perstructure have an impact on the production sphere. 
Gramsei beIieved that the ruling middle classdoes not rely solelyon the state in the narrower 
sense but finds its support in civil society. This point is worthy of further investigation in a' 
field characterized by the absence of a central 'coercive power'. In contrast to the neo-realism 
theory of international relations, which sees the state as the sole actoron the international sta­
ge and reduces power relations to quantifiable resources, neo-Gramscians introduce the pa­
rallel dimension of class and develop a concept of power that primarily rests on the ability to 
'universalize' the particular interests of a group. 
The first approach to using Gramsci's work for understanding international relations is found 
in an essay by Robert Cox on the United States' relations with the International Labour Orga­
nization (ILO).7 Cox shed light on the quality of Ainerican hegemony within international 
organizations as well as on the neocorporatist integration of US unions into the hegemonie 
project of the USA. In his critical contribution to the debate on Kindleberger's hegemonie 
stability thesis, Cox presented Grams ci 's concepts as an alternative method of analyzing the 
7 For a succinct introduction to the work of Cox, see Timothy Sinclair, "Beyond International Relations Theory: 
Robert W. Cox and Approaches to World Order/' Approaches to World Order, ed. Robert W. Cox with Ti­
mothy J. Sinclair (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996): 3-18. The same volume contains abrief autobiography 
by Cox. See also Robert W. Cox, "Labor and Hegemony,"International Organization 31.3 (1977): 187-223. 
Robert W. Co x, "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method," Historical Materia­
lism and International Relations, ed. Stephen Gill (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1993): 49-66; Robert W. Cox, 
Power, Production, andWorld Order (New York: Columbia UP, 1987). See in this context also Roberi O. Ke­
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international relations of capitalist nations. Cox demonstrated . the empirical implications of 
this instrument in a comprehensive study on the social structure of the capitalist accumulation 
process and the emergence of international historie blocs since the beginning of the industrial 
age. 
Kees van der Pijl, still strongly influenced by structural-deterministic Marxism, studied pro­
ces ses of transatlantic class formation in the post-war era, laying the groundwork for the cent­
ral research field of the neo-Granlscians: formation processes of an international bourgeoisie. 
'Cox student' Stephen Gill in particular was instrumental in propagating the neo-Gramscian 
approach. The textbook he co-authored with David Law on" international political econonlY 
contrasted the theoretical. bases, methodology, and empirie al application of the approach with 
those of the leading paradigms of the discipline. What followed was an empirie al study of the 
Trilateral Commission (see below), which underpinned Gill's previous thesis about an 'ethical 
hegemony' of the Unit~d States over the Western industrial nations. 8 
From the neo-Gramscian viewpoint, the liberal world-market order of the post...:war era may be 
interpreted as a project of internationally-oriented capital fractions in the United States (no­
tably New York banks and law practicesas weIl as transnational corporations from the vari­
ous sectors). These fractions succeeded in hegemonically integrating into their project impor­
tant groups in the United States on the one hand, and - through the resources of the US go­
vemment - the other capitalist industrial nations on the other. Contact with the allied nations 
was organized not only at govemment level but also at private forums that served the capital 
fractions in terms of promoting the congruence of interests. The American actors were hege­
monie in the sense that they took into account the interests of allied nations/capital fractions 
in the pursuitoftheir own long-term goals.9 
ohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (princeton, NJ: Princeton 
UP, 1984) 32; 39; 44. . 
8 See Stephen Gill and David Law, The Global Political Economy. Perspectives, Problems, and Policies (Balti­
more, MD: The John Hopkins UP, 1988); Stephen Gill, "US Hegemony: Its Limits and Prospects in the Rea­
gan Era, " Millennium 15 (1986): 311-336; Stephen Gill, American Hegemony andthe. Trilateral Commission 
(New York: Cambridge UP, 1990); Alan W. Cafruny, "A Gramscian Concept ofDeclining Hegemony: Stages 
of USPower and the Evolution of International Economic Relations," World Leadership and Hegemony, ed. 
David P. Rapkin, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publ., 1990): 97-118. 
9 See Cafruny, "A Gramseian Concept"; Gill, American Hegemony. 
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Criticism of the now voluminous works by neo-Gramscians commenced in the 1990s. Within 
the broad and diversified Marxist scholarship, critics of Gramsci and neo-Gramscians can be 
divided into two camps: orthodox and post-positivist. They differ primarily in their un­
derstandingof the reproduction mechanism of the capitalistic means of production. In the 
orthodox view, once the major institutions of capitalism have come into existence, then the 
capitalist means of production will perpetually create their own conditions for reproduction 
owing to an immanent capital logic. By contrast, from the post-positivist perspective, this 
reproductionprocess i8 never secure but is constantly in a position of peril. Rather, the con­
tingentand open-ended nature of all societal institutions is assumed. 
Tlie orthodox literature accuses Gramscianism primarily of politicism or voluntarism. Their 
main charge is that the Gramscian tradition neglects capitalist structural constraints, thus ove­
restimating the possibilities for conscious and strategic action and at the same time ove­
remphasizing the necessity of such action for the reproduction of capitalist society. According 
to Burnham,lO market mechanisms of competition are what ensure the reproduction of bour­
geois dominatioU', political c?ordination in civil society being merely of secondary importan..; 
ce. Economic laws, particularly the law of value, govern internatiorial relations. Burnham 
citesas empirical evidence how the pace and manner of world-market integration ofGreat 
Britain in the ünmediate post-war period were dictated by itsbalance ofpayrnents. 
The accusation of politicism has a long tradition. 1I It is based on Gramsci's break with the 
then predominant theory of the Communist movement, economicreductionism, which chal­
lenged not the primacy ofthe.economic base in capitalism per se but the notion that society is 
fully determined by its base and that economic trends have the quality of laws <;>f nature. 12 Yet 
Gramsci only just touches onconcrete economic laws, though regt:tlation-theoretical works 
show that his political insights are compatible with an economic base (as long as the latter is 
not awarded ontological status). Likewise, the challenge to the laws of societal development 
in Gramsci' s writings should not be taken as an undervaluation of the restrictive effect of 
structures. Althoughas party leader he tried to overcome structural constraints, and in prison 
he held on to the party primacy by taking a positive stance .toward Jacobinism,13 his reflecti­
10 See Peter Burnham "Neo-Gramscian Hegemony and the, International Order," Capital & Class 45 (1991): 73­
93. 
II See Christian Riechers, Antonio Gramsci - Marxismus in Italien (Frankfurt/Main: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 
1970). 
12 See A. Gramsci, Gefängnishefte: Gef4, §38. 
13 See Gramsci, Gefängnishefte: Gef1, §44; Christine Buci-Glucksmann, Gramsci und der Staat. Für eine mate­
rialistische Theorie der Philosophie (Köln: Pahl-Rugenstein, 1981): 61ff. 
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ons on defeat as preserved in his prison writings are characterized by an analysis of structural 
conditions. 
The . charge of politicism is more appropriate conceming Grams ci ' s followers. Though Cox, 
Gill, and Law never fai! to stress that hegemonie relations are entrenched in production, they 
do not consider how much economic functional interdependence (e.g., balance of payments) 
influence the action of political players. Gill and Law in particular. credit the elite with a 
surprisingly high degree of freed.om of action.14 . Rupert's analysis of the connection between 
US hegemony and labor disputes in the mass production industries shows, however, that 
Gill's voluntarism is not immanent in the Gramscian approach. 15 Moreover, Rupert stresses 
" 
one importantelement of the post-positivist approach: that (econ~mic) interests are not fix, 
but instead develop and are therefore changeable and subject to influence by actors. 16 Sadly, 
world-market-mediated effects are underrated by Rupert as well. 
Thus, while orthodox criticism only partially applies to Gramsci, there renlain some proble­
matic orthodox remnants in Gramscianism. Emesto Lac1au and Chantal Mouffe convincingly 
argued that it has not consistently distanced itself from the essential apriorisms oftraditional 
Marxist theory.17 Among these essentialisms is primarily classism, the idea that the working 
c1ass represents the privileged actor of social change. In taking this criticisnl seriously, my
/ 
approach differs from previous neo-Gramscian-inspired studies of the United States, and the 
world market by not privileging the world-market-oriented capital fractions apriori in my 
analysis. Instead, first all relevant society and state actors and'their positions on foreign eco­
nomic policy are identified. Then the factors contributing to the defense or shifting of these 
positions will be defined. Only then did I study the rt:latioIiS of dominanc<? in the free-trade 
camp. Additionally, I look for open situations where theoption of preventing further, or 
backtracking from previous, liberalization steps would have been possible. In so doing, I en­
deavor to recoustruct the context of thedecisions taken in terms of opportunities for action 
and structural constraints. 
14 See Gill and Law, The Global PoliticalEconomy 83-10l. 

15 See Mark Edward Rupert, Producing Hegemony: The Politics 0/ Mass Production and American Global:' 

Power (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1995). 
16 See ibid. 56. . 
17 See Emesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemonie wid radikale Demokratie (Wien: Passagen Verlag, 1991). 
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3. Project World Market: The Liberalization of US Foreign Economic Policy 
As mentioned earlier, the US government exercised its economichegemony notably by ope­
ning it8 own market. In accordance with the standard of reciprocity of the wodd irade regime, 
the US government eased access to its own market in return for every tariff reduction and for 
every lifting ofa non-tarifftrade barrier (e.g., technical standards). Access to this huge market 
was and remains coveted. The success of companies from Germany, Japan, South Korea, and 
now China on the US market has been responsible for the dynamic strength oftheir respective 
economies. At the same time, this success has bolstered the export-oriented forces in these 
countries. 
Although the opening of the US marketis akey prerequisite for globalization processes, it 
cannot be taken.as a matter of course. Even less so, considering that US reliance on an inter.;. 
national division of labor has been comparatively small. 18 Untilthe Second Wodd War, US 
foreign economicpolicywas shaped by an. ideology of economic nationalism, which took the 
form of a high tariff policy for industrial products. Ever since, the key players in foreign eco­
nomic policymaking have been guided by the free trade gospel of dismantling trade barriers 
of aH kinds. Yetpolls show that, over the entire post-war period, a majority of Americans 
have viewed the opening of the· US market witha great deal of skepticism, if they have not 
outright opposed i1. The question arises how foreign economic policy could have been libera­
lized when there was neither obvious economic necessity nor unequivocal democratic legiti­
mization. 
The liberalization of US foreign economic policy from 1936 found wide consensus among the 
elite, the approval being strongest among repre,sentatives of government, banks, corporations, 
and the media as weH as among economic experts. Their interests in a liberal foreign econo­
mic policy can only be partly explained by economic self-interest and the preservation of in­
stitutional power. In the various international and foreign-economic policy organizations (e.g., 
Council on Foreign Relations), consensus on the advantages ofa liberal foreign economic 
policy was driven by other political goals, particularly the containment first of German and 
then of Soviet influence. 
18 For the post-war domestic growth path, see Christoph ScheITer, Im Bann des Fordismus. Der Konkurrenz­
kampfder Auto- und Stahlindustrie in den USA (Berlin: edition sigma, 1992). 
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The emphasis here on the discursive fonnation of free. trade consensus should however not 
lead to the assumption that this consensus came about pureI)' intentionally. Tendencies toward 
internationalization are immanent in the capitalist economic order. And the internationalizati­
on of economic activities cannot be reversed at the drop of the hat. The greater the integration 
of global nlarkets, the higher the adjustment costs when trying to seaJ off the national econo­
lilie arena. The irreversibility of internationalization is secured through international agree­
ments. The renationalization of economic activities either violates contractual obligations or 
entails an arduous renegotiation with a multiplicity ofnation states. Yet as the transition to the 
flexible exchange rate regime(1971-73) showed, the United States as world economic hege­
monie power could flout agreements with impunity (see below). 
Although in the post-war period the world-market-oriented' corporate elite needed the· support 
~ ofthe White House, the media, and experts for fonnulating and implementing their tradepoli­
cy intetests" they wielded the greatest power in the free trade camp. Their authority is under­
pinned chiefly by money. Thus they have formidable influence in the selection of candidates 
for political offices including the Presidency. The fact that the media are privately owned is a 
boon for them, as over 40 percent of campaign budgets are spent on radio and television ad­
vertisements. 
Thus the world-market-oriented capital fractions canbe characterized as hegemonie because 
they could give their political agenda astatist fonn, i.e. their agenda was institutionally incor­
porated into the government. Moreover, they succeeded in shaping the discursive terrain of 
foreign economic policymaking. In contrast to the period prior to the Second W orld War, the 
demand for product-specific protection no longer has the status of a universally valued prin­
ciple but is now handled as a specific exception to a general principle of free trade. This re­
versal from the principle to the exception, which occurred in the immediate post-war era, fa-· 
cilitated th,e institutional channeling of prote~tionist demands and prevented compaJ.ues 
threatened by imports from closing ranks. 
Although the public was not convinced by the principle offree trade, it was open to the idea 
of fair trade, understanding fair to meanbasically the reciprocal opening of the respective 
national markets. This distinction was never forgotten by the key players in foreign economic 
policy liberalization. They reached bi- and multilateral agreements on liberalization, propa­
gated thecontent of such accords as reciprocal measures, and, after the Kennedy Round of 
GATT, they held out the prospect of compensatory payments for jobs lost due to import com­
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petition. There was another reason why the public' s trade policy fears found Httle resonance 
in public discourse: It had no political representation. Until the late 1970s, both the unions 
and the pro-labor wing of the Democratic Party advocated the liberalization policy mainly out 
of considerations for the Western Alliance. 
Beginning in the mid 1970s, however, some of the central assumptions underpinning the libe­
ral foreign economic policy were successively called into question. First, the system offixed 
exchange rates proved to be less and less compatible with America's global political ambiti­
ons and full enlployrl1ent goal. High expenditures for international military deployment {the 
Vietnam War), the growing demand for foreign products, and increasing direct investments in 
foreign countries led to a deficit in the balance ofpayments, which could be corrected only by 
official sales of gold or the int1ationary printing of dollars. Presidents Kennedy and Johnson 
(1961-68) thus were confronted with the choice of scaling back' their military engagement, 
rescinding the liberalization of the movement of goods, slowing down capital drain, or defla-:­
ting the domestic economy. They decided to restrict the formerly uninlpeded cross-border 
capital movements. 
As long as the capital coritrols were merely temporary measures, the societal protagonists of 
the free trade project, notably the New York financial world, accepted these restrictions of 
their power of disposition andprofit-making opportunities. From 1965, however, as the, cross­
border activities of more and more companies came under state supervision, the search began 
for ways of reconciling free trade and free capital movements. One remedy, propagated espe­
cially' by monetarist economist Milton Friedman,19 was the transition to flexible exchange 
rates. 
The rejection of capital controls marked a shift of the interests in the world market. Where 
earlier anti -communism united the free trade coalition, with the world marketas the means for 
integrating both the allied nations and the working public into a Fordist production ,coalition, 
now the unifying interest was 10 use the world market in order to rej ect workers' demands. 
The unions' departure from the free trade coalition accelerated this shift of interests. The 
'Burke-Hartke' bil1launched by the unions in 1971, which called for extensive state regulati­
on of transnational corporations, sent the domestic-market-orientedcorporations and the re­
maining newspapers with protectionist stances into the camp of the free traders. 'Burke­
19 See Milton Friedman, "Using the Free Market To Resolve the Balance-of-Payments Problem," Statement in 
Hearing before Joint Economic Committee ofthe Congress, 1963, reprinted in: American Foreign Economic 
Policy, ed. Benjamin J. Cohen (New York: Harper & Row, 1968): 87-98. 
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Hartke' tumed foreign economic policy into a c1ass question: nearly all business assoeiations 
were pitted against nearly all unions. 
4. Trilateralism: A Response to Nixon's Unilateralism 
In the Nixon administration, the internationalists had to share power with groups of a more 
domestic-market orientation. This became painfully c1ear when, in 1971 - the year of the first 
trade deficit since the turn of the century PresidentNixon abandoned the Bretton Woods 
Monetary Order and tmilaterally imposed a ten percent import surcharge. The latter poliey 
alarmed the intemationalists since unilateral US protectionist action would have seriously 
undermined the credibility of the free trade gospel. Several transnational liberals resigned 
their posts within the administration and joined the efforts of David Rockefeller to found the 
Trilateral Commission. The Commissionset daunting tasks for itself; namely, "to oppose a 
return to the mereantilist policies ofthe 1930s, to integrate Japan into the c6re ofthe Ameri­
can alliance system; and to change the orientations of the foreign and domestic policies of the 
major capitalist powers so that they might become congru~nt with a globally integrated eco­
nomic structure". 20 The Commission explicitly included CEOs and political" eonsultants from 
Western Europe and Japan. Its credo was to overcome the nationstate: "The public and lea­
ders of most countriescontinue to live in amental universe which no longer exists - a world 
of separate nations - and have great diffieulties thinking in terms of global perspectivesand 
interdependence.,,21 The objectives ofthe Trilateralists went further than criticizing Nixon for 
a lack of concern for the liberal world-market order. Those Commission members affiliated 
with the DemocraticParty were tryingto regain domestic consent to and internationallegiti­
mation for US international" activism, which had been lost owing to" the Vietnam war and the 
cynical use Nixon and Kissinger madeof 'Realpolitik'. 
Their solution was most forcefully articulated by ZbigniewBrzezinski (the Trilateral Com­
mission's first director): Engage in a human rights campaign, share power with the Western 
20 Gill, American iIegemony 143. 
21 Trilateral COlnmission Task Force Report, "Toward aRenovated International System," January, 1977, quoted 
inNACLA Report, FromHemispheric Police to Global Managers, Ju1y/August (1981) 6. 
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allies, and respond to Third-World aspirations "within a framework of generally cooperative 
relations".22 
The Trilateralists were successful at first. The import surcharge was rescinded. With the de­
mise of Nixon, the' access of the Trilateralists to the €xecutive was greatly improved. At the . 
end of 1975, President Ford realized the idea of closer coordination"among the Western po­
wers by attending the first summit of the seven most powerful Western nations held at Ram­
, . 
bouillet. The apex of the Trilateralists' triumph was reached when their fellow member Jim­
my Carter became president. Carter recruited most of his foreign-policy staff from within the 
Commission and started in eamest the experiment to manage the world market (and world 
politics) in elose collaboration with the most important allies. 
Seen fronl outside tl;te Uni ted States, the policy success of the Trilateralists was an attempt to 
reinvigorate US hegemony in aGramscian sense, i.e. by taking into account the interests of 
allies. To accomplish this renewal of hegemony, the c0!1'0rate internationalists had to renew 
their own hegemony within the United States. They succeeded by developing an intellectually 
cohesive program and by establishing a new organizational vehicle to lend institutional sup­
port for this program. They benefited greatly from the obvious failures of 'Realpolitik'. 
5. The Limits of Trilateralism 
At the end of Carter's tenure, the Trilateralists considered their own ptoject a failure. The re­
volution in Iran and theSoviet intervention in Afghanistan were both interpreted as resulting 
from a lack of Western determination. A decision-making structure built on consensus, they 
argued, could not adequatelyavert the challenges to the capitalist world order. The allies also 
displayed little willingness to share in the costs of maintaining the Pax Americana. West 
Germany' s chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, showed little inclination to support the Carter admi­
nistration's policies of economic expansion. He refusedto defend the US dollar. The dollar's 
subsequent precipitous decline in 1979 encouraged Carter to impose budget austerity and the 
Federal Reserve to increase interest rates. The world of nation states, which supposedlyhad 
already been overcome, had reared its ugly head. 
22 Fred Bergsten, quoted in Holly Sklar, "Trilateralism: Managing Dependence and Democracy," Trilateralism. 
The Trilateral Commission and Elite Planning for World Management, ed. Holly Sklar (Boston, Mass.: South 
End Press, 1980): 1-58; 25. 
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These foreign developments did not simply challenge the idea of trilater~lism. They also po­
sed an immediate threat to the interests of the Commission' s corporate members. Third World 
assertiveness translated into higher prices for raw materials, threatened their steady supply, 
and led at times to the expropriation of assets. The weakness of the US dollar imperiled the 
privileged role ofAmericanbanks in the world capttal markets. 
The critique of trilateralism on an international scale coincided with the rejection of tripartism 
in the domestic arena. The Carter administration haddeveloped the concept of tripartite 
re-industrialization to manage the impact of growing foreign competition. This was to be 
jointly conceived and implemented by representatives of capital, labor, and. the state. From 
management's perspective, however, trip art i sm perpetuated precisely what was perceived to 
be the main cause oftheir lack of competitiveness: the accommodation of labor's interests. In 
contrast, political action 'against' the state held the promise of improving industry's conditi­
ons ofaccumulation at the state's expense. It would also give firms the freedom to pursue 
strategies to weaken labor or, ifthese failed,to move out ofproduction altogether. Themana­
gers of industries in distress, with the exception of Chrysler~ rejected Carter's offers for tri­
partite crisis management. 23 
In response to the international challenges and the new domestic agenda, many internationa­
lists abandoned trilateralist 'accommodationism' and tumed to the unilateralist position 
espoused by the supporters ofRonald Reagan.24 US interests were to be furthered by the'free 
play' of market forces. Inten1ational cooperation was no longer considered necessary. 
Complaints of other countries that the US budget deficit and high dollar were distorting the 
international monetary and financial system, went unanswered. 
Instead, itwas hoped that the unilateral actions would force other countries to pursue ,;structu­
ral (i.e., microeconomic) policy reforms to bring down inflation and free-up labor, capital, and 
product markets".25 Thus Reagan's unilateralism was not arerun of Nixon's 'domesticism' 
but a consciousattempt to project America' s structural economic power abroad and set the 
conditions of its economic relations with other states. Internationalism was not abandoned. 
Rather, itwas stripped of its 'cosmopolitan' rhetoric and became firmly rooted in 'national 
interests' . 
23 See ScheITer, Im Bann des Fordismus 200-209. 

24 See Gill, American Hegemony 223-226. . 

25 Henry R. Nau, The Myth 0/America's Decline. Leading the World Economy into the 1990s (New York: Ox­

ford UP, 1990) 216. 
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Yet the limits of unilateralism beeame apparent shortly after its. adoption. When Mexieo 
threatened to. default on its loans, the liquidity erisis threatened US banks. In, response, the 
Reagan administration negotiated a eommon debt erisis strategy with, other ereditor ,nations. 
Moreover, the poliey of strengthening the dollar had made imports ever more cheaper and 
ubiquitous. Hard-pressed domestie industries eried for proteetionism. The administration de­
fleeted these ealls with a devaluation. strategy. But this presupposed eooperation with the 0­
ther eentral banks, for unilateral action would have risked an uneontrollable flight out of the 
dollar. Thus, by the mid 1980s, the United States returned to eooperation (co operation here 
should not be eonfused with harmony ofinterests). 
Despite these obvious limits ofunilateralism, the return to a more eooperative strategy at least 
toward the Western allies was made possible precisely beeause unilateralism had aehieved its 
main objeetive: to avert the challenges to eapitalist rule. The power of labor, both inside and 
outside the United States, had been weakened. The terms of trade for raw materials deteriora­
tedand the debt erisis foreed many countries in the periphery to adopt a more 'weleoming' 
attitude to foreign enterprises.Furthermore, Ameriean unilateralism did enjoy support from 
abroad. 'Basieally all those groups who wanted to break loose from theChristian/Social' De­
moeratic class compromise welcomed the policy shift under Reagan, forenlost the British To.., 
ries under Prime Minister Margaret Thateher. 
6. The New Trilateralism as Global Constitutionalism 
A further consequence of the high interest rate and high dollar poliey of the early Reagan 
years could be usedagainst the allied industrial nations; namely, the meteorie rise in trade 
deficits. Contemporary trends in foreign'economie theory provided arguments for a 'strategie 
trade poliey', whieh would force other nations to open their markets by threatening to c10se 
the US one. In addition to eompanies from the high teehnology ßeetor, suppliers of sophisti­
cated services and owners of copyrights joined the group of open market strategists. Together 
with Val'10US think tanks and supported by large internationally-oriented foundatiöns, they 
popularized the notion that services could be rendered transnationally, that national regulati­
ons of the' respective sectors prevented this, and that eonsequently the dismantling of these 
barriers must be riegotiated in the franlework of GATT. This idea was received enthusiasti­
cally by the Reagan administration because it afforded the possibility of channeling commer­
cial pressure toward free trade. 
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Paradoxically, the trade deficitgave the United States bargaining power. Foreign countries 
were much more dependent on access to the US market than the American economy was on 
access to foreign markets. Thus the Washington government could function as a battering ram 
against the national self-interests of transnational corporations in other countries. The threat 
of imposing sanctions occasionally enforced compelled not only Japan to lower non-tariff 
trade barriers and to deregulate its economy, but Western Europe as weIl. Again, the US de­
mands were welcomed in both regions by many economists, the top leadership of business 
groups, and parts of the ministerial bureaucracies. 
The unilateral measures proved to be helpful in concluding bilateral free trade and investment 
protection agreements as weIl as in establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO). The 
Canadian government's decision to crown its neoliberal policy change of the mid 1980s with 
a free trade zone with the Uni ted States was driven by a growingwariness of increased pro­
tectionist measures on the part ofthe US governrilent. Moreover, Jhe conservatiye Mulroney 
administration saw a free trade agreement with its neighbor (enacted in 1988) and the conco­
mitant concessions to the USgovernment as a catalyst for further neoliberal reforms in Cana­
da. 
Similar motives underlay the Mexican government's interest in the North American Free Tra­
de Agreement (NAFTA). Among the NAFTA boosters in theUnited States, who, like David 
RockefeIler before them, had pushed for a continental free trade zone since the 1960s, support 
for NAFTA took on virtually counter-revolutionary dimensions. The motive of contractually 
exorcising the specter of an independent Latin American course was divulged in manifold 
ways in the statements of NAFTA advocates. In six out of 10 New York Times editorials on 
NAFTA, the lock-in of neo liberal reforms in Mexico was mentioned as one of the specific 
advantages of the agreement. This motive conspicuously resurfaced in the discussions on the 
peso crisis after NAFTA came into effect. Appearing before a Senate committee, develop­
ment expert Rudiger Dornbusch raised the specter ofbolstering the "retrograde canlp" in Me­
xico if "oUf model" there were not safeguarded by the monetary rescue package.26 
Moreover, negotiations on a free trade zone with Canada aimed at influencing the GATT 
round, as the first-time inclusion of services in a free trade agreement should serve as a model 
for GATT rules. The investment and copyright protection provided for in NAFTA should in 
26 Rudiger Dornbusch, quoted in Edward Herman, "Mexican Meltdown; NAFTA and the Propaganda System," Z 
Magazine 8.9 (1995): 36-42; 37. 
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turn serve as the basis for multilateral agreements with developing countries and emerging 
economles. 
At the close of the Uruguay Round of the GATT, the developing countries were willing to 
make hefty concessions toward opening their markets in -the hope that a more powerful dis­
pute settlement process in-the framework ofthe World Trade Organization would hinder Wa­
shington from taking unilateral trade actions. In contrast to its stance toward the International 
Court of Justice, the Unit~d States has thus far abided by the decisions of the WTO. 
The restrietions to.state 'tyranny' notably toward foreign investors ~ brought about through 
debt crises, NAFTA, and the W:rO would be broadened and cemented in the 1998 Multilate­
ral Agreement on hlvestments (MAI), which would initially apply only to OECD member~ ­
states. This agreement would guarantee the protection of international investors from exprop­
-riation and from discriminatioll that favors locally based companies. Investors would even be 
given the right to sue a govemment inan International Court of J ustice. The implications of 
this agreement were aptly described by the former Director General of the WTO, Renato 
Ruggiero: "We are writing the constitution ofthe united world economy.,,27 At first, oppositi­
on by France and determined mobilization, particularly by the American consumer organiza­
tion, Public Citizen,blocked the signing of the. MAI. But this initial failure did not discourage 
the diverse national and internationalcorporate alliances (inc1uding BUsiness Investment 
Network, Transatlantic Business Dialog,. European Roundtable, as weIl as the Trilateral 
C?mmission). Together with the finance and economics ministries of most industrial nations, 
they pursued this 'bill ofrights' of capitalism primarily throughbilateral agreements between 
their state spearhead, the US govemment, and other countries. 
Since its beginnings in the early 1970s, the tri lateral project has moved from securing a liberal 
world-market order by accommodating labor and Third World interests to aglobai constituti­
onalism where private assets are protected from state interference and restrietions. 
The success of the intemationalists rested notonly in their ability to transform nationalist im­
pulses into strategies for opening up other nations' markets. They used their privileged positi­
on in society and the state for effective discursive strategies. 
On the one hand, they swayed public opinion through numerous strategies: by appealing to 
and invoking common sense, by restricting the field of public discourse, through selective 
27 Lori Wallach, "Das neue internationale kapitalistische Manifest," Le Monde Diplomatique, German edition 
(February 1998): 16. 
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publication and interpretation of poIl results, bypl~ying down the significance of a given 
subject in the public's eye. They used canvassing methods to develop their discursive strate­
gies; i.e. they conducted surveys to test the persuasiveness of individual foreign trade policy 
arguments. This revealed the effectiveness not so much of econon1ic arguments but of 
portraying liberalization measures as a wayof honoring the United States' right to leaders­
hip.28 Nor did the administration, the media and the experts shy away from consciously de­
eeiving the publie on a number of oeeasions.29 
On the other hand, they sueeeeded in preventing the stiIllargely eritieal attitude of the publie 
fromaffeeting poliey. In partieular, their ability to build consensus among the elite enabled 
them to hinder until the late 1960s the publie' s free trade skepticism from finding politieal 
representation. Later, the free trade consensus ofthe elite (~hieh was especially strong among 
. the media) helpedmarghializethose persons and organizations who tried to exploit the pub­
lie's proteetionist tendencies for campaign purposesorto mobilize against further liberalizati­
on measures.3°In some eases, most reeently during the implementation legislation forthe U­
ruguay Round of GATT, the administration and eongressionalleadership delayed eontrover­
sial votes until therisk ofnot being reeleeted was at a minimum.31 
Moreover; each administration knew how to play on the foreign trade fears of the publie. 
Although often no more than· symbolie gestures, the president and Congress insisted on re­
ciproeity, stipulated speCial protectionist clauses, and granted finaneial compensation. 
Meanwhile the erities of liberal foreign trade policies eontributed to their own marginalizati­
on. The trade union federation AFL-CIO was incapable of closing ranks with crities of other 
aspeets .of the prevailing foreign poliey, nor did it show itself adept at using aeademie experti­
se or attraeting experts for its positions. In important foreign irade poliey deeisions (e.g. the 
Bretton-Woods monetary crisis, the dollar erisis under President Carter), it therefore laeked 
eonvincing . alternatives. The analysis of publie opinion polIs further demonstrates that the 
AFL-CIO did not grasp how to turn its foreign trade poliey positions into a foreign poliey 
program palatable to the publie.32 Thus proving the critieal relationship between the quality of 
a political project and its power to influence policy. Quality means not only asolid academic 
28 Christoph ScheITer, Globalisierung wider Willen? Die Durchsetzung liberaler Außenwirtschajtspolitik in den 
USA (Berlin: edition sigma, 1999) 145-155. 
29. See ScheITer, Globalisierung wider Willen?: 347-348 . 
. 	30 See ScheITer, Globalisierung wider Willen?: 240-246. 
31 See ScheITer, Globalisierung wider Willen?: 304. 
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basis for the arguments, but primarily the ability to incorporate the interests of important so­
eietal actors as weH as to take into account structural' effects of practices that are either un­
questioned or weH-defended. NaturaHy, this insight applles also to projects of the elite net­
works. 
7. Symbolic Politics: Social Clauses33 
The disputes over social c1auses in the World Trade Organization during the Clinton adn1i­
nistration (1993-1999) are instructive for a discussion on the double nature ofthe United Sta­
tes hegemony because they disc10se the foHowing paradox:the opPQsing forces were the he- . 
gen10nic intemationaHy-oriented economic circles in the US, whereas the Washington go­
vernment was one of the most staunch supporters of social clauses. 
For many years the Inten1ational Confederation ofFree Trade Unions hascalled for the incor­
poration of core workers' rights into trade agreements as social c1auses.' The trade privileges 
granted in these agreements would be made contingent on the respect for the following core 
rights: freedom of association, collective bargaining, prohibition ofchild labor and forced 
labor, banning discrimination in work and career as weH as the eliminationof gender-based 
'" 
wage discrimination. Ajoint advisory body ofthe WTO and the International Labour Organi­
zation would monitor compliance of the clauses. In the event of non-conipliance, technical 
and financial assistance would be provided in an effort to support the respective country in 
achieving compliance. The ILO could recommend further measures inc1uding trade sancti­
ons only in cases of flagrant or per~istent violations and government intransigence. 
A good case can be made for claiming that internationaHy binding socialstandards not only 
guarantee respect for human rights, but can also enhance a country' s opportunities for econo­
mic development. 
Yet this viewpoint is shared neither by most governments of developing and threshold count­
ries nor by economists and managers. All the major trade associations in the United States 
reject social clauses. Why'then had the Clinton adn1inistration become their champion? Past 
experience might help to answer this question. In 1984, human rights groups were able to 
pushthrough the social c1ause in the United States' General System of.Preferences (GSP) 
against the will of President Reagan at the time; They succeeded because of a particularly 
32 See Scherrer, Globalisierung wider Willen?: 97-104, 284-300. 
33 For an extensive discussion of social c1auses, see Christoph Scherrer and ,Thomas Greven, Global Rules 
(Müster: Verlag WestflHisches Dampfboot, 2000). 
66 Christoph' Scherrer 
favorable political situation. Apart from President Reagan, only a handful of active supporters 
advocated the renewal of the GSP program; namely, those exporters, multinational corporati­
ons, and US importers trading in goods that would have incurred high or very high tariffs 
without GSP. In addition, Reagan stood behind the demruld ofbusiness to link the granting of 
GSP to the protection ofintellectual property. In view ofthis breach ofthe General System of 
Prefetences principle' of non-reciprocity, Reagan as weIl as Congress could not refuse social 
, I 
conditionalization. Opposition to these clauses was indeed minimal, not least because the pre­
sident was afforded ample power of discretion. The enforcement history of the social c1auses 
confi~s the Reagan' administration' s calculation that it could get by with symbolic politics 
for the most part. Preferences were withdrawn only' from politically outcast countries. 
The 1994 North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation marked the first time within the 
framework of an international trade agreement, NAFT A, that a Commission for Labor Coope­
ration was set up to monitor compliance with national social standards. This agreement came 
about because many Americans did not share the enthusiasm for NAFT A feIt by the leaders 
of diverse political-societal institutions. Candidate Clinton tried to dispel criticism by promi­
sing renegotiations., As president he promptly honored his promise, and in March 1993 nego­
tiations began with the Mexican and Canadian govemments over subsidiary agreements on 
workers' and environmental issues. In light of Mexico's intransigence, private sector opposi­
tion in America, and the conservative Canadian govemment' s apathy, the outcome of the ne­
gotiations was quite paltry. Although the unions and environmental groups reinained steadfast 
in their opposition to NAFTA, the subsidiary agreement facilitated its passage. 
The Labor Side Agreement provides little leeway for imposing sanctions, which is then an 
involved procedure.Mainly rnoral suasion or diplomatic pressure is exercised. No noteworthy 
progress has been made in any ofthe cases thus far. 
The Clinton administration' s demand for social clauses in the framework of a continental free 
trade ~one (Free Trade Area of the Americas, FTAA) or the WTO would have perfonned the 
same function; namely, to supply the president with a congressional mandate to conduct ne­
gotiations. Yet he was denied this mandate after the ratification of NAFTA in 1993 and 
GATT in 1994. The Republicans, who'reached a majority in Congress in 1994, were reluctant 
to give the democrat president an opportunity for success in trade policy, which would have 
further loosened the purse strings of corporate donors. At the same time, though, they were 
eager to show' the business community which party had its trade interests at heart. TheRe­
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publicans succeeded at this balancing act over the issue of social and environmelital c1auses: 
By making the argument on behalf of the business community for free trade and against social 
and environmental conditions, they laid the blame for the mandate bill's ~ailure at the presi­
dent's door. Once the latter was ready to abandon the social and environmental conditions, the 
Republicans attempted to discredit as protectionists the House Democrats who were still 
committed to those c1auses. These Democrats in turn maintained that it was the Republicans' 
unwillingness to compromise on the issue of the social and ecological conditionalization of 
world trade that led to the bill's demise. 
This maneuvering was possible only because the point of the negotiating mandate. the crea­

tion of a continental free trade zone was less urgent than NAFTA, even amongFTAA sup­

porters. For US corporations, the planned· WTO Millennium Round was less important than 

. China' s negotiations for membership in the World Trade Organization and the fight against 

trade sanctions being used as·a foreign-policy too1. 
The minor significance the business community attached to an FTAA is conspicuous in the 
hard line it took on the issue of social and environmental c1auses. The prevention of another 
precedence case linking workers' rights and environmental standards with the trade regime 
was a higher priority than a continental free trade zone. Corporations and corporate alliances 
even fOlmded a new organization, the Coalition for aSound Trade Policy, to fight social and 
environmental c1auses. In the run-up to the third ministerial conferences in Seattle, leading 
free trade theorists including J agdish Bhagwati advised against a WTO Millennium Round as 
long as there was still the danger ofsuch a precedence case. 
This opposition also explains why the Clinton administration came out strongly in support of 
social clauses in Seattle in December 1999 but was not willing to make concessions. in other 
areas to the countries involved. Inview of the strong reservations of the business community, 
Clinton could not possibly link the den land for social c1auses with concessions to developing 
countries. 
In conc1usion, the apparent contradiction between the American govemment' s supposed 
function as astate 'battering ram' to open markets.world-wide and its actual position on soci­
al clauses becomes unraveled uponc1oser analysis of the actions of the economic internatio­
nalists. First, the internationalists could usually count on the opposition of the govemments 
involved (see the ministerial conferences of the WTO). Second, because of this opposition, 
they could use the demand für social c1auses as leverage for achieving other demands. At the 
second ministerial conference in Singapore in 1996, suspicion was rife. that the United States 
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had cüme üut sO' staunchly in suppürt üf sücial c1auses in ürder tü achieve its real güal: the 
liberalizatiün üf the würld market für infürmatiün technülügies. This measure was initially 
rejected by many cüuntries of the Süuth, but nüt as vehemently aswas the demand für sücial 
c1auses. In exchange für drüpping the latter,the agreement üninfürmatiün technülügie,s füund 
easier ratificatiün. Third, whenever sücietal üppüsitiün tü their liberalizatiün plans threatened 
tü übtain a cöngressiünal majürity, the internatiünalists' succeeded in reducing the cüntent üf 
thesocial clauses tü an almüst purely symbülic dimensiün (see GSP social c1auses and the 
NAFTA subsidiary agreement). Füurth, they have recently had üther üppürtunities für achie­
ving their güals (read debt crisis); thus they cüuld affürd tü püstpüne further negütiatiüns ün 
üpening markets, as 1üng. as the negütiating mandate für these cüuld ün1y be acquired at the 
Cüst üf a strüngercünditiünalizatiün üf trade (see FTAA and the WTO Millennium Rüund). 
Fifth, there Is an alternative tü sücial clauses: vü1untary cüdes üf behaviür. Andfinally, they 
Cüu1d wait für a Republican candidate tü becüme President. In the summer üf 2002, President 
GeürgeW. Bush succeeded in übtaining. a cüngressional mandate für trade negütiatiüns, the 
Trade Prümütiün Act, withüut any sücial and ecülügica1 cünditiünß,lizatiün. 
8. The 'Complex Interdependence'of 'Double Hegemony' 
, Dües Grams ci?s cünceptualizatiün üf the .term hegemüny deliver a better understanding üf the 
püwer relatiünships in würld markets? One will recall that Gramsci defined hegemüny as the 
ability üf a grüup tü 'universalize' its particular interests. Hegemüny is achieved primari1y by 
'nün-cüercive'means (e.g., by üffering a framewürk für the sülutiün üf üther grüups' prüb­
1ems) thüugh nüt withüut coerciün as a backdrüp. 
On the internatiünal level, US interest insecuring a liberal würld market and in cüntaining 
cümmunism matched well with . Western Eurüpe' sand Japan' sinterest in military prütectiün 
and in rebuilding their war-türn ecün6mies. Access tü American markets prüved tü these a1­
lies extreme1y valuab1e. This access was madepüssible by areversal üfpreviüus prütectiünist 
pülicies and by US suppürt für a fixed exchange rate regime. 
American hegemüny erüd~d, however, when the US güvemment attempted tü shift the increa­
sing costs üf hegemüny üutü its allies. A transitiün periüd füllowed that was marked by failed 
attempts tü regain hegemüny under" President earter. Interestingly, the assertiün üf self­
interest and the use üf müre 'cüercive', unilateral means led tü a renewed hegemüny under 
President Reagan. Höwever, cüerciün was by far nüt the ünly and düminant means.Intellectu­
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al efforts toward shaping a new, decidedly more market.,.oriented vision werewell received 
among the allies. While achieved mostly in a unilateral fashion; Western allies benefited from. 
the restoration of a regime of secure and inexpensive raw materials and from the strengthe­
ning ofproperty rights in general. 
The interests in ~trengthening the right to manage,however, was not shared by all political 
groups and reveals a dass bias in the renewed hegemony: It moved from a Fordist (Christian­
Söcial Democratic) proj ect, which included workers and their representatives, to a neo liberal 
constitutionalist proj ect. 
This bias became apparent within the domestic US context when economic internationalism 
lost support among the representatives of workets. In fact, the internationalists have never 
succeeded in obtaining the active consent of a majorityofAmericans to their policy of easing 
access to the Arnerican market. However, the internationalists have displayed an extraordina­
ry capacity for instrumentalizing domestic nationalist challenges for their own purposes. They 
l1ave transformed nationalist impulses into strategies for opening up other nations' markets. 
This transition period from Fordist to neo liberal hegemonyhighlights three valuable Grams­
cian insights. First, it shows that economic· strength may be a necessary precondition for he­
gemony but not a sufficient one. Economie or military strength does not automatically trans­
late into hegemony. Rather, hegemony has to be diseursively and strategically maintained. 
Second, international hegemony and domestic hegemony are interdependent. On the one 
hand, a nation's hegemony is· eonsolidated only when its hegemonie forees support its out­
ward strategies of 'universalizing' its national interests by aeeommodating foreign ones.Onee 
this support waned in the·US case, ·US hegemony beeame fragile. On the other hand, ehallen­
ges to international hegemony threaten domestic hegemony. Theinereasing eosts of the For­
dist hegemony undermined the position of intenlationalists in the US domestie arena. The 
internationalists had to reinvigorate their hegemony by forging new domestie allianeesand by 
diseursively readjusting their objectives. This in turn allowed them to further their project of 
liberalizing the world market. In breaking down barriers to market access abroad, they made 
effective use of American power. Third, the common focus on hegemony in international re­
lationsas a characteristic of a nation state is far too narrow. The international space is divided 
not onlyby national boundaries but also byclass and other eategories of identity. American 
hegemony was suecessfully renewed because its market-oriented message fell on the recepti­
ve ears ofowners and managers of firms world~wide. 
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Leo Panitch & Sam Gindin 
Euro-Capitalism and American Imperialism 
Introduction 
For some two decades now, progressive Anlerican, British and Canadian intellectuals, deter­
mined to resist neo-liberalism's 'there-is-no-altemative' mantra, have looked to continental 
Europe for an alternative model. One virtue of this academic and political project - which 
within t\1e field of comparative political economy has nowcome to be knownas the'varieties 
of capitalism' approach - has been that it challenged the notion thatcapitalist globalization 
inevitably needed to take the form it has, apparently entailing, as so many of its proponents 
imagined, the growing impotence ofnation states and the increasing homogenization ofsocial 
formations. The insistence on variety among states has meant trying to refocus attention on 
the continuing salience of institutional arrangenlents and social relations specific to particular 
social formations and their histories, the very dimensions laigely ignored in the equations of 
neo-classical economics and the policy prescriptions ofthe IMF. Above all, this approach has 
suggested that whether and how societies adapted themselves to global competition remained 
an open and important question . 
. There are, however, a number of analytic problems with the varieties cf capitalism approach 
which must give us pause. We argue in this paper that apart from an inadequate and mislea­
ding conceptualization of the relationship between state and market in the era of globalization, 
the most severe problem is the tendency to treat all the advanced capitalist states as equal u­
nits of analysis. This occ1udes the overivhelming power - and above all the penetrative capa­
city - of the American state and capital vis avis· even the. other leading capitalist states in the 
world today. On the basis of this critique, we go on to make the case for the need for Europe­
an capitalismto be theorized within the framework of American neo-imperialism today. In 
this light, we critically examine various recent attempts to theorize the nature of American 
empire, and attempt to point the way to a more adequate theorization. 
This then leads us, in the second part ofthis paper, to present historical and empirical eviden­
ce thatchallenges the presumption (constantly lurking in the varieties of capitalism approach) 
that the material base for the maintenance of American hegemony has eroded. That this is not 
in fact the case, as we shall show, does not mean that contradictions for the American imperi­
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um and neoliberal globalization do not exist. But ~trategic advance for the left in this context 
. . . 
will have to entail far more than defending or extolling existingEuropean models of capita­
lism. Indeed, it will require advancing, as we conclude in the final part of the paper, funda­
mental changes in Europ.ean as weIl as Anglo-Americanclass and state structures. 
I. Rethinking Varieties of Capitalism in relation to Neo-Imperialism 
One major strain in the varieties of capitalism literature [Evans 1997; Weiss 1998; Hirst & 
Thompson 1996] has attempted to counter the nostrums of neo-liberalism by extolling the 
ideal ofthe state, thereby reflecting acertain neo-Hegelianism on the left today. [Panitch 
2002]. Proponents ofthis approach sometimes downplay the significance of globalization,·but 
in any case all emphasize thecontinuing vi ability of state-Ied economic development and 
competitiveness strategies. Apart from the fact that many of the states they look to in this 
respect hardly qualify as. progressive; there has always been an other-worldly quality to the 
categories of "weak" and "strong" states employedby this approach. This especially applies 
to the designation of the American state as "weak" 'solely "on the basis of the limited scope of 
its domestic industrial and social policies, while states that are puny players in the setting of 
the global neo-liberal policy framework are considered "strong" on the basis üf domesticeco­
nomic interventions alone. This all too often ignores the role of the American state in the 
post-war erain reconstructing the very states considered "strQng" domestically, and it occlu­
des any.clear view of the domestic and intenlational strength of the American state as revea­
led through its sponsofship of the neo-liberal globalization in the subsequent era. It also igno­
res how Japan - once the apple of the Neo-Hegelian statists' eye - floundered through the 
1990s;and it is unable toaccount for why the American Treasury dictated the terms of ad­
justment - right in the Japanese state's own regional back yard - during the East Asian crisis 
of 1997-98 [Panitch 2000: 5-6]. 
There are .those in the varieties of capital school [see Hall and Soskice 2001] who put more 
emphasis on firms, rather than states, pointing in particular to the linkages between banks and 
industry and, to a lesser extent, to certaincorporatist relations between unions and employers 
associations, as the· key to the difference between European 'coordinated market economies' 
(CMEs) and Anglo-American 'liberal market economies' (LMEs). They therebyavoid some 
öf the statist idealism discussed above, hut it must be said that the expectation that LMEs can 
be brought to emulate CMEs on industrial and social policy looks suspiciously voluntarist in 
light of the ontological foundation of the whole approach in notions of institutional sedimen­
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tation and path-dependency. Indeed, Hall arid Soskice themselves admit that actors with 'little 
experience of such coordination to underpin requisitecommon knowledge will find it difficult 
to develop non-market co ordination' . In fact, theygo so far as to suggest that enlulation can 
only go the other way: because 'market relations· do not demand the same level of common 
knowledge ... there is no such constraint on CMEs deregulating to become more like LMEs' 
[Hall and Soskice 2001:62l In light ofthis, it would appear that the policy implications ofthe 
'varieties of capitalism' analysjs can only relate to helping CME's adjust to neo-liberalism in 
a way that involves conserving the core institutional arrangements that 'have heretofore alle­
gedly given them 'comparative advantage'. This has been the basic point of Albo's [1994, 
1997] long-standing critique of 'progressive competitiveness'. 
It is sometimes claimed that greater recognition in theAnglo-American 'liberal market eco­
nomies' of the existence and success of the 'coordinated market economies' would have 'ra­
dical im1?lications for policy making' in the former countries [Hall & Soskice2001 :vi]. But 
far from offenng a strategy for radicalchange against neoliberal globalization, what is in fact 
being advanced here is at best a li:inited and defensive sttategy. Trying to convince policy 
, . . 
makers in the state and business inthe Anglo-American countries to pay more attention to 
following the European example by improving thecoordinating capacities offirms with other 
actors in the community, and convincing them that social policies could improve the operati­
ons ofmarkets rather than impede them, does notamount to a radical strategy. On the contra­
ry, to make it8 case, this approach adopts a mode cf analysis that embraces not only the com­
petitive criteria of success and failure of neo-classical econoinists, but even their categories of 
analysis to the extent that it is mainly oriented to demonstrating that state intervention, col­
lective bargaining and inter-firm collaboration do not necessarily distort market efficiency. 
The categories of analysis (states, firms and ,markets), are the same; only their ideal values are 
inverted.Nor can the consequences of competitivesness in material terms be averted. As Ri­
chard Bryan has put it: 
With the ris~ ofthe competitiveness agenda asthe rationale for national economic policy, 
there is a conceptual merger of a theoretical discourse from a microecononric framework 
(the individual firm's performance in open markets) with claims ofbenefitin a macroeco­
nomic framework ethe national gains of competitiveness) ... The notion that [benefits] acc­
rue throughout thenation i~ but a hypothetical possibility, with no clear mechanisms for 
realization, certainly none of the conventional Keynesian mechanisms of national redistri­
bution ... A predictablepolicyconsequence is to shift onto labor the costs involved in the 
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pursuit of national competitiveness ... Although the advocates of competitivess extol the 
possibilities ofhigh wages associated with working for high profit companies in high.pro­
ductivity industries ... benefits accrue only to labour only for relative productivity ... for it 
is only productivity converted into profitability that supports wages growth. Hence the 
prospect is that penalties in the form of wage cuts andlor work intensification are the li­
kely dominant outcomeof global competition for most of the world' s workers. National 
policies of competitiveness for collective gain thereby seeure the complicity oflabor in a 
policy program in which the gains are private, and the collectivism is a rhetoricalconst­
ruction based on statistical aggregation. [Bryan 2001:70-1] 
Yet there is perhaps an even more problematic aspect of the varieties of capital approach, and 
it lies in the fact that it posits no relationships among national economies at all apart from 
competition among them. The strategie and analytic problems of the varieties of capitalism 
approach are rooted in how it conceives the nation state and the actors within it in relation to 
capitalist globalization. In this approach, globalization - and its economic expression as com­
petitivemarket pressures - is merely seen as an external constraint to which states and do­
mestic firms and social forces mus! adjust. The only difference with th.e conventional account 
of globalization is that the varieties of capitalism approach argues that one of the ways in 
which states can successfully cope is by paying special attention to. adapting or restoring, un­
der the new conditions created by globalization, the national institutional structures making 
for economic coordination. 
What is obscured here is the extent to which globalization is· a development' not external to 
states, but internal to them. Recognition of the active role of nation states and domestic capi­
talist forces in constituting the more liberal international trade and financial regime associated 
with capitalist globalization and carrying responsibility for its expanded reproduction is 
hardly a new discovery [GiIl1992; Panitch 1994]. Trying to und erstand why and how even 
CME states have come to play this role cannot be left out of the analytic focus ofany serious 
comparative political economy . 
• This must involve an examination of the role played by foreigncapital as a social force within 
each nation state, as well as of the increasing transnational orientation to accumulation on the 
part of domestic .capital. It must also not ignore the responsibility that states have increasingly 
taken for the ensuring that. their national policies contribute to the stability of, or at least do 
not disrupt the,functioning of, the global economy. This is what Robert Cox [1987] meant by 
'the internationalization of the state'. And especially for those who take political institutions 
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seriously, the study of the relationship of the state to globalization also needs to involve, as 
Cox insisted, examining the restructuring'of states in tenns of shifts in the hierarchy of state 
apparatuses away from those agencies concerned with domestic social forcesand issues, such 
as labour or welfare departments, to those, like central banks, more directly concerned with 
and c10sely linked to the social forces and international institutions associated with globaliza: 
tion. Moreover, this analysis must remain open to recognizing that departments of labour and 
welfare often seek to retain their status amidst globalization by redefining their main role as 
that of developing policies to make the domestic labour force contribute more to facilitating 
international competitiveness. 
It should be . evident that reconceptualizing the state's relationship to globalization in this fa­
shion is a very different exercise than that engaged in by those who practice the varieties of 
capitalism approach. It is rather . strange that social scientists of a decidedly institutionalist 
bent shouldlargely leave out modes of co ordination (and institutional capacities for coordina­
tion) among states, let alone ones that reflect asymmetrie power and that indicate which states 
and which capitals and which modes of coordination are most salient in the process of globa­
lization. This is especially so in a world where the tenn imperialism, whether used positively, 
negatively or just descriptively to designate the global capacities of the American state is now 
becoming so commonplace that one finds articles on itin the Sunday New York Times Maga­
zine. [Ignatieff2002] Avariety of capitalisnlliterature that blithely ignores the global preemi­
nence of the American state and treats the USA only as one of many 'liberal market 'econo­
mies' against which to contrast coordinated market economies must, in this context, be seen 
as impoverished. 
What is needed therefore is a new approach to comparative political economy that avoids the 
mere epithets or sertsationalist joumalism so often associated with the tenn imperialism, yet 
does not shy away from contributing to arieher analysis.of the world we live in by examining 
the diverse ways states have been involved in the constitution of both capitalist globalization 
and American enlpire, and by encouraging analysis of the w.ay in which a wide variety of na­
tional institutional fonns can be reproduced and. articulated within them. Conceived in this 
way, such an approach can link up with the varieties of capitalism literature, but go beyond it 
by paying attention as well to a co~parative understanding of the role capitalist states play in 
thereproduction of global capitalism. This must today involve attempting to comprehend the 
nature of the American state' s preeminent role in this respect, and therefore appreciating that 
the role of other nation states can only be understood in the context of their relationship to the 
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American state and capital. But it will also be necessary to conceive this relationship as not 

. simp1y a matter of external, one-way imposition. Indeed a crucia1 dimension of any theoriza­

tion of what might be best called neo-imperia1ism in the era of globa1ization must be the 

exp1aining why the penetration by the American state and capita1 into other socia1 formations 

has so often been we1comed as contributing to the strengthening· of the host state, to theex­

panded reproduction of domestic economic and socia1 relations, and to the possibi1ityof in­

fluence on American po1icy-making. 
At the core ofthis neo-imperialism is the relationship between,the American state and the 
other deve10ped capita1ist states; it is here, not with the capita1ist peripheries, that imperial 
penetration is densest and institutiona1 linkages and coordination most deve10ped. It is the 
implicit recognition of this that makes th6 varieties of capitalism literature's relative neg1ect 
of third worldcapita1isms plausible. Of course, this very fact means that po1itical economy 
today requires a very different conception of imperialism than the c1assica1 one of inter­
imperial rivalry associated with Robson and Lenin at the beginning ofthe century. The notion 
of inter-imperial riva1ry is one that the varieties of capitalisl1lliterature, unfortunate1y (even if 
unintentionally) tends to reinforce, especially when it coa1esces with the competing EU/East 
Asia/North American regional triad literature. A new theory of imperia1ism, moreover, will 
need to overcome the limitations of c1assical Marxist definitions of imperialism, whose main 
defect, as Kautsky [1914: 908] already saw in 1914 was that 'the word is used in every which 
way, [so] the more we discuss and speak about it the more communication and understanding 
becomes weakened'. Andthis was a characterization that Arrighi [1994:365] cou1d repeat, 
almost word for word, towards the end of the 20th century: 'What happened to the term irnpe­
ria1ism is by the time itflourished in theear1y 1970s, jt had come to mean everything and the­
refore nothing. ' 
It needs to be stressed, perhaps, that such an approach to theorizing neo-imperialism in· com­
parative politica1 economy need not be Marxist. Susan Strange's attempt to advance 'a theory 
oftransnational empire' [1989] with Washington, D.C. as its capita1 was founded on the noti­
on of structural power embedded in American state autonomy and the institutional power of 
multinational corporations, and she explicit1y put itforward with the goal of improving, 
maiIitaining and pro10nging American hegemony rather than destroying it. And so is Martin 
Shaw's Theory olthe Global Stafe [2000] put forward, seeing the 'global-Western state' cen­
tered in Washington D.C. as the best practica1 hope for enforcing human rights cosmopo1ita­
nism, and dismantling those authoritarian states with regional sub-inlperia1 ambitions that are 
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still' üutside the American' ürbit. Shaw' s theüretical mentürs are vün Clausewitz, Mann and 
Giddens, and he is würking with a cünceptiün üf state autünümy nüt unlike the institutiüna­
lists üfthe varieties üf capitalism apprüach. But they wüuld dü weIl tü heed his püwernd cri­
tique üf 'sücial science as stamp cüllecting', which has involved cümparing distinct sücieties 
and states in a manner that 'substitute[ s] für understanding the relatiüns hetween them and the 
general structures within which these cümparisüns might be explained'. This is as' impürtant 
as the case he makes against the recent turn tü 'glübal theürizing' characterized by an 'ecü­
nümism and süciülügism' which, even in the disciplines traditiünally 'cüncerned with in­
terstate and pülitical relations [have] füund it difficult tü cünceive üf glübality except as the 
negatiün üf statehüüd and pülitics' . [Shaw 2000: 69] 
Für Shaw, the crucial turning püint that laid the füundatiün für what is tüday called glübaIiza­
tiün is the replacement üf the classic (imperial) natiün-state after W ürId War II by a new in­
ternatiünal state fürm entailing the 'unprecedented integratiün üf manyautünümüus majür 
centres üf state püwer in the würld, under US leadership' . It was ün the basis üf its military 
predüminance that the American superpüwer recünstructed, and even strengthened, the fürmer 
natiün-states of Eurüpe, while linking them tügether and even penetrating them thrüugh the 
institutiüns üf Bretton Wüüds ~ weIl as NATO. This nütiün üf 'penetratiün' functiüns in 
Shaw's frameWürk nüt unlike the cüncept of 'semi-citizen' in Strange's framewürk, whereby 
thüse natiünal citizens whü würk für American multinatiünals ür are trained by and integrated 
in NATO's military structures are seen as the American empire's'semi-cHizens whü walk the 
streets üf RiO' ür üf Bünn, üf Lündün ür Madrid'. [Strange 1989: 167]. But Shaw is clearer in 
viewing the American state as 'a püwer centre' by virtue üf its capacity tü be 'tü a significant 
degree inclusive and cünstitutive üf üther fürms and layersof state püwer' (Shaw 2000:190). 
Shaw rightly argues that 'Eurüpeanintegratiün shüuld nüt be üppüsed tü the Atlantic allian­
ce', which was the 'essential framewürk' intü which the fürmer was histürically 'fitted' . In 
terms üf 'the histürically central criteriün of ürganized viülence, Eurüpe remains ,a secündary 
derivative fürm üf state' which is 'dwarfed by the continuing transatlantic Western military 
pülitical thrust led by the United States' as weIl as by the düminant röle üf particular natiünal 
states within the EU. Even in the cüntext üfthe implüsiün üfthe USSR and ecünümic glübali­
zatiün, he argues, the 'glübal-Western state' is still centered in the USA, but is alsO' nüw 
'multiply determined by a cümplex, üverIapping set üf relatiüns and institutiüns' thrüugh 
. which 'fürmally distinctcentres üf state püwer are mediated byhighly develüped and still 
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extending linkages of economic and cultural as weIl as military-political kinds' [Shaw 2000: 
200-1]. 
Shaw unfortunately downplays the political economy of this American neo-imperialism, and 
especially how international financial institutions, and the US Treasury and Federal Reserve 
through them, set limits to the economic policy making autonomy of other states. In general, 
comparative political economyrooted in the Marxist tradition has been better at this, but only 
insofar as its practitioners have broken with theclassical conceptions of imperialism [Arrighi 
1978]. Exemplary in this regard was Poulantzas's [1975] understanding that the entryinto 
Europe ofAmerican multinationals meantthat a powerfill new social forcehad been establis-. 
hed within the European social formations with the consequence that that the European bour­
geoisies - even at the height of the dollar crisis in the late 1969s and early 1970s - no longer 
had any interest in challenging Americanhegemony. This did not mean that European states 
were by-passed or rendered irrelevant; on the contrary, they became responsible for coordina­
ting a more complex set of domestic class relationships, which still remained distinctively 
specificto each social formation. Yet Poulantzas's admirable concern to demonstrate that 
globalization was not about 'the virtual disappearance of national state po\yer' in Europe led 
him to consider Americancapital primarily in terms of its effects on European social formati­
ons and states. He did not ex amine in any detail the forces within the Americaneconomy that 
were impelling foreign direct investment in Europe and the contradictions this represented for 
American capitalism. Even morecrucially, he also failed to ex amine the modalities and me­
chanisms of American neo-imperialism as it was expressed in and through the apparatuses of 
the American state and the international institutions it dominated. Peter Gowan's re cent work 
[1999] has done much to fill, this gap (although it is arguable that the. European. states are 
treated as too passive agents in his account ofthe transition to neo-liberalism). 
What still needs attending to, however, i8 a more detailed examination of the distinctive in­
stitutional make-up ofAmerican state power, and its institutional capacit~ to act as the global 
state that global capitalism needs to keep order, to manage crises, and to close contradictions 
among the worldnation states and the diverse social forces that compose them. Whatever its 
other defects, Hardt and Negri's cele;brated post-modernist Marxist Empire at least tries to 
conceptualize this. Theyargue [2000:160] that the 'decentered and expansive' form of state 
sovereignty embodied historically in the American state (which they call 'networ~ power') is 
the basis for the 'new imperial sovereignty that has been formed' ,planting the seeds for 'the 
novelty of the structures and logics of power that order the contemporary world.' They take to 
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task those, like Edward Said,· who see 'the tactics of the great empires dismantled after the 
first world war being replicated by the US'. Such a perspective fails tosee that 'Empire is not 
a weak echo ofmodem imperialisms hut a fundamentally new form of rule. ' 
What is frustrating, however, is that the capacity of American forms of power to penetrate 
other states, which is indeed one of the most remarkable aspects of the wOrld we now live in, 
is merely asserted again and again while the concrete practices of the American state and ru­
ling class in this new era' are largely undocumented. Hardt and Negri are not lacking insight 
into the way in which· the USA used 'its hegemony as the highest point of exploitation and 
capitalist command' to make other ·countries bear the brunt of the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods arrangements. Nor are they wrong to insist that this involved using international agen­
cies and treaties to effect the necessary internal change within countries to try to establish 
neoliberalism globally. Butthey fail to ex amine in any concreteness the contradictory and 
.. complex process of strategic global restructuring and management the American state has 
actually been engaged in since the 1970s. Theirconception ofwhat is still 'internal' to states, 
moreover, is obscured by repeated hyperbolae about 'the end of nation states', and also 
contradicted bytheir extravagant argument that 'what has changed in the passage to the impe­
rial world ... is that this border place no longer exists.' As for how far they think Empire has 
reconstructed all states and the social forces within them, Hardt and Negri's claim that 'the 
United States and Brazil, Britain and India' today show 'no differences of nature, only diffe­
rences of degree' is so under-argued as to appear absurd. 
Hardt and Negri's conception of 'state right' in terms of Madisonian 'network power' is 
mainly useful in accounting for its ideological attractiveness, not for the concrete mechanisms 
and practices of state and ruling class power. Arguing that the legitimation ofthe new impe­
rial order rests on its 'capacity to present force as being in the service of right and peace ... to 
enlarge the realm of consensus that supports its own power', they note that even humanitarian 
supranational organizations often expect 'the United States to assume the central role in the 
new world order.' But when the USA through its appeal to universal values asserts its 'right 
to inteNention' in other states, and demands that other states support or participate in such 
interventions as part of their own 'right and duty', the· answer to the question of who defines 
'right and duty' is not 'open', as Hardt and Negri constantly insist. Indeed at one point (gene­
ralizing on the basis ofthe GulfWar) they actually say this themselves: 
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, ... the United States [is] the only power able to manage international justice, not as a 
lunction 01 its own national motives but in the name 01 global right. Certainly, many 
powers have falsely claimed to act in the universal interest before, but this new role of 
the United States is different. Perhaps it is most accurate to say that this claim to univer­
sality mayaiso be false, but it is false in a new way.' [Hardt and Negri 2000: 180-1] 
It is our view, as we shall indicate in the second part of this paper, that the new American em­
pire that evolved after W orId War Two was not dismantled in the wake of the crisis of the 
Golden Age in the 1970s, and the development of greater trade competitiveness and capita1 
mobility that accompanied it, but rather has been refashioned through the era of neo-liberal 
globalization over the past two decades. None of this means, of course, that homogeneity of 
state and economic structures - or indeed the absence of divergence in many policy areas ­
characterizes the new imperialism. Nor is there any reason to aSsume that contradiction and 
conflict do not enter into the asymmetric power relationships within it,as they do inany 0­
ther. Rather we locate those contradictions not so much in the relationships between states, as 
within states as they try to manage their internal processes of accumulation, legitimation and 
dass struggle, and especially in the American state' s ability to do this while also managing 
and containing the complexities ofneo-imperial globalization. Assessing tliis, however, requi­
res, sober and careful analysis. It is to this that we nowmay turn. 
2. American Hegemony Beyond the Crisis of the GoldenAge 
The American state' s ability to maintain its hegemonic authority and capacity to act on behalf 
of global capital is conditional on its capacity to reproduce the material base of American ca­
pital. What has often been common to both Marxian and non-Marxian analyses, whatever the 
analytical and political differences between them, is their belief that this capacity has been 
undermined, and they 'see tbis as central to the crisis that ended the post-war 'golden age' [Ar­
righi 1994; Petras and Morely 1992; Kennedy 1988]. Attempts at resolving thecrisis - the 
accelerated internationalization summarized as "globalization", and the turn to social regulati­
on through markets summarized as "neoliberalism" - are, in this perspective, generally seen 
as having failed, simply causing new problems and new instabilities, or postponing old ones. 
The American spurt in the last half of the nineties must thus have been a last hurrah, and the 
piercing of the bubble is aconfirmation of this. 
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We take issue with this interpretation. It i8 too pat a reading of the dynamies - and dynamism 
- of capitalism since the seventies, and too casual a treatment of the depth of American hege­
mony. The American boom of the latter nineties, and therefore the current potential of the 
American economy, cannot be so easily dismissed. There remains an underlying strength in 
American capital and the American. state, a strength that is the cunlulative consequence of the 
economic and social restructuring that. took place since 'the V olcker shock' over two decades 
ago. All this does not, of course, imply that there may not be new crises, but it does suggest 
that such crises must be analyzed in a new context, not as a postponed outcome of the early 
seventies. And it me ans that, whatever our moral judgment of the American-Ied model, our 
political agendas cannot rely on a protagonist in decay. 
In what follows we first attempt to clarify the special historical status of the period called the 
goldenage - the quarter century after World War Two. We then argue that the crisis of the 
1970s needs to be understood as a tuming point, a decade during which capitalist states and 
bourgeoisies stumbled through strategie confusionsas well as class and international 
conflicts. Those theorists who see the period since that time through the lens of the 1970s ­
portraying the past quarter century in tenns of the working out of the crisis of that began in 
that decade - are, wecontend, wrong. We argue that anew period begins with Reaganism and 
Thatcherism andabove all with the Volker, shock ·applied to the American economy· (and 
though it to the world economy) at the beginning ofthe 1980s. During this period, we argue, 
the economic as well as the ideological and military underpinnings of American imperial he .. 
gemony were reestablished. 
By way of presaging our overall argument, it may be useful to begin with an even longer 
historie al overview, which affords some perspective on why it is that establishing the post­
1945 golden age as the standard - especially in defining 'crises' - sets the bar too high [Gin­
din & Panitch 2002]. When people point to the slower growth of the last quarter century in 
contrast with the previous quarter century as indicative of a capitalist crisis characterizing the 
whole period, we must remind ourselves that it was the earlier and not the later period that 
was historically unique. In fact, as Table 1 indicates, the growth of the post~73 period is rather 
respectable whenplaced within the sweep of capitalism's longer trajectory. 
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Tab. 1: Annual Growthin Real GDP per Capital 
V.S. EVROPE WORLD 
1820-1870 1.34% .95% .53% 
1870-1913 1.82% 1.32% 1.30% 
1913-1950 1.61% .76% .91% 
"1950-1973 2.45% 4.08% 2.93% 
1973-1998 1.99% 1.78% 1.33% 
Source: Maddison, The W orld Economy, A Millennia1 Perspecti-
ve,_OECD, 2001, p.265. 
In terms of OUT own periodization, which separates the decade of the 19708 from the two sub­
sequent ones, what is especially worth noting is that the growth in American real GDP/capita 
in the periodthat followed the Volcker tuming point (1982-2001) was 2.4% - not as high as 
the 3% ofthe booming 60's, but hardly suggesting stagnation. [Economic Report ofthe Presi­
dent2002: Table B-31]. And though productivity growth as measured by overall output per 
hour declined significantly in the U.S., if we concen~nlte on manufacturing, where data are 
also more reliable, the productivity growth since 1982 is actually higher than in the golden 
age: annual manufacturing output per haur increased from an average of 2.6% in the period 
1950-73, to 3.5% in the period 1982-2000 [U.S. Bureau ofLabor Statistics 2002]. 
Let us now take a c10ser look at the twists and turns of the past half-century. The economic 
dimensions of the post-1945 world order did not get designated as 'globalization' until weIl 
after the economic slowdow!1, but the project of moving towards a seamless, single world 
" economywas initiated at W orld War Two' s end; in re action to the catastrophic failure of a 
pre-W orld War One international capitalism that was· fragmented into riyal imperialisms and 
separated spheres of influence. International a~cumulation·had actually been relatively thin 
within each imperial block in the pre-World War One era. The globaJ division of labour then 
was largely complementary rather than competitive (man~facturing in one country and re- . 
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sources in another, rather than, as at present, a two-way flow of similar products), and capital 
flow was largely arms-Iength portfolio investment. From World War Two on, however, direct 
foreign investment with its deeper impact oneconomic and social structures, had a much lar­
ger role to play. The fact that the term 'globalization' did 110t become part of our lexicon until 
the late eighties/early nineties, was not because it wasn't already pervasive - international 
trade, production, and finance had already been growing much faster than domestic econo­
mies by the mid-sixties - .but because its later combination with neoliberalism accelerated tho­
se international trends and the process seemed to take on a life of its own. 
In the iriunediate post-war period, rebuilding economies and social relations implied a: bias in 
the process of accumulation towards structures that emphasized the mobilization of resources. 
This did not set aside competitive pressures, but it did limit some of its dimensions - for e­
xample, capital markets were generally subordinated (domestically and internationally) to the 
needs ofreconstruction. This period was, however, transitional both in its underlying goal of 
moving towards an international liberal order, and its inherent logie. Its successes tended to 
subvert its institutional foundations:, the rebuilding ,of 'Europebrought American direct in­
vestment and'that investment, along with the expansion oftrade, undermined capital controls; 
capital mobility undennined pegged exchange rates; rising standards of livingmeant larger 
pools of savings and increased competition within the financial sector, just as rising inflation 
undermined existing forms of financial regulation and corporatist integration; steady growth 
raised worker expectations at the same time as the exhaustion of the singular conditions, e­
xisting in thepost-war years eroded the system's ~~ility to continu~ to deliver economic secu­
rityand rapid growthat the same pace as before. 
A key economic dimension of the challenge faced by capitalism by the late 19608 and early 
1970s took the form of a falling rate ofprofit. .The well-known productivity slowdown at this 
time was due in large part to the growing relative size in the economy of low-productivity 
service sectors, which lowered average productivity growth for the economy as a whole. Ma­
nufacturing represented over 30% ofU.S.·non-agricultu~al employment in 1966;. by 1978 this 
was under 24%, andby late 2000 it was under 14%. [U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2002] 
But while the lower productivity rates showed up primarily in sectors outside of manufactu­
ring (sectors which were growing in relative weight), this did not ne gate potential problems 
for, accumulation within manufacturing. 
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Sustaining the productivity growth in manufacturing required relatively more capital inputs at 
the same time as worker militancy was resisting any downward pressures in wages. This led 
to the familiar decline in the rate ofprofit. 
In Marxist terms [Webber & Rigby 1996; Dumenil & Levy 2003], one would see this in 
terms of the organic composition of capital rising while the rate of exploitation remained re­
latively stable, causing,adecline in the rate of surplus extraction. But the debate, in this con­
text, about whether or not the cause of falling profits lay with technical conditions of produc­
tion or a profit squeeze rooted in labour's strength, is largely beside the point. Even if the 'o­
riginal' cause was technical, from capital's perspective the restoration of profit rates was 
being frustrated by the relative strength of labour (relative, ,that is, to capital's capabilities and 
needs through the sixties and seventies)., 
Robert Brenner [1998; '2002] has correct1y emphasized that the strength of labour, in itself, 
does not explain a sustained crisis. What needs illumination is why the profit-Ied downturn 
was not self-correcting through the normal process of the devaluation of a portion of capital, 
the consequent concentration of capital in the most, dynamic firms, and the accompanying 
weakening of labour through this restructuring. Brenner' s intriguing explanation was that inc­
reased international competition increased entry while the concentration of capital and the 
large sunk investments ofcorporations decreased exit. This led to excess capacity and a profit 
squeeze independent of the relative strength of labour. There are two fundamental problems 
with this rather elegant response. First, while Brenner is quite right to point to the limits on 
competition as being a condition of the crisis -- that is, to restrictions on the logic of capitalist 
competition working itself out - he is wrong on the source of those limits. Second, Brenner 
incorrect1y generalized the contradictions of the late 1960s and 1970s into a permanent feature 
ofcapitalism. 
To grasp what was in fact happening we have to integrate the state into the discussion and pay 
special attention to the role of the American state. [Gindin 2001] With the end of the cir­
cumstances that made the golden age possible, capitalism inevitably had to confront anew the 
question of where its new source of vitality would come from.' Because this issue emerged in 
the form of slower growth and intensified competition, there was some inclination on the part 
of national states to bothextend the competitive capacity within their own social formations 
and limit the negative outcomes of competition domestically. No western state was really pre­
pared to go so far with this as to impose the kind of trade and capital restrictions that would 
undermine international economic integration, but their initial domestic response at least blo­
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cked in the 1970s the kind of intensive restructuringof capitalism necessary for capital's revi­
val, and it was only unblocked when 'the American state itself accepted the need for competi­
tive discipline at home (expressed in the Vo1cker shock of 1980), and the consequent genera­
lizationof such discipline intemationally, that capitalism's vigour seemed to revive. 
Through the sixties and into the seventies, all states, facing pressures at home, were reluctant 
to let the market dec1are - at least to the degree necessary to resolve global excess capacity ­
that domestic facilitieswere redundant. The American state in particular was not about to let 
this process work itselfout according to market criteria, and in the seventies it moved errati­
cally from import surcharges to periodic houts of economic stimulus, from supply side incen­
tives to some degree ofmanipulation of exchange rates. 
This was not just a matter of imperial arrogance or even a reflection of the fact that the de­
struction of global excess capacity would falldisproportionately on the,domestic U.S. econo­
my. It is important to recognize that for the American state the 'crisis' went beyond the im­
mediate economics of profit rates to the more general issue of controlling and reproducing the 
empire. At home, the Americanstate was confronting a civil rights movement and a youth 
rebellion that included sections of the working c1ass. Abroad,' it was. now facing extensive 
trade competition from Europe and Japan and a third world restless and frustrated with its 
position within global capitalism. The unpopuiar war in Vietnam directly limited the immedi­
ate possibility of any American acceptance of, or active leadership in, the kind of economic 
and social restructuring necessary to restore its relative competitive strength. At that point in 
time, the American state was in no position to take on the risks associated with a reconstructi­
onof its economic base. 
The historic significance of the Vo1cker shock was that it came to gripswith the American 
reluctance to firmly take the lead and restructure itself as weIl as the world order along neoli­
berallines. Just as the American state initially blocked the outcome of competition and there­
by reinforced the continuation of the stagnation through the seventies, the American state now 
reversed itself on this and - contrary to Brenner' s argument - accelerated the closing of ~aci1i­
ties after the early eighties in spite ofsunkcosts. In 1961 the business failure rate in the U.S. 
was 64 per 10,000 existing firms; this rate steadily dec1ined and by the late seventies, it had . 
fallen (in line with Brenner's argument) to well under half the 1961 rate. In the eighties, ho­
wever, the business failure rate rose dramatically, reaching 120 by 1986 - almost double the 
rate at the start ofthe sixties (see Graph 1) and it remained weIl above theearlier rate right 
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through the 1990s. This was subsequently reinforced by the further liberalization of capital 
movements across regions and countries. 
Graph 1: FAllURE RATE OF BUSINESS (FAILURES/10~OOO) 
Source: Economic Report of the President, 2002, Table 8 ..96 
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The official intent of Volcker' s money targets, the decisive event introducing neoliberalism, 
was to break the back of inflation, which was threatening the Ainerican financial system, the 
Federal Reserve's control over monetary policy, and the credibility of the American dollar. 
The problem was not only an American problem since the earlier move to flexible exchange 
rates had,. by eroding pressures for internal discipline, reinforced global inflationary pressirres 
[Volcker & Gyohten: 1992]. And as Christopher Rude [1999] has shown, in' studying the in­
stitutional capacity and balance of c1ass forces that allowed Volker to act when he did, the 
Federal Reserve was not so much addressing a technical problem as a political one. Behind 
the concern with inflation lay the need to reconstitute American capital at horne and Ameri­
can-led restructuring globally .. The solution that emerged was based on the conclusion that the 
crisis could only be resolved with 'more capitalism', that is by building on the structural po­
wer of capital to restructure and discipline both labour and capital. 
It is important to emphasize that the passing of the golden age had also raised questions about 
internal (domestic) forms of accumulationand institutional arrangements in every other state, 
which were then compounded by the question of how to influence the reconstitution of the 
American-led international order. The twocould not be separated: the.reconstitution ofAme­
rican-led economic order was neither an abstraction happening 'out there', nor simply an A­
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merican project occurring against other nation states. By its very nature, it included mutual 
problemsthat had ~merged, through the golden age, within each of their own social formati­
ons. Although the economic gap between the United, Statesand Europe/Japan narrowed 
through the fifties and sixties, no serious challenge to American hegemony was ever' on the 
agenda. At most, the growing confidence of Europe and Japan led to hopes of renegotiating 
certain aspects 
-
of American dominance. Thiswas not only because hegemony involved more 
than economics; nor was it only that American economic dominance renlained intact, as can 
be seen if we look beyond trade figures and consider American leadership in technology and 
the relative scale and depth of American finance and foreign investment. What was central 
was the degree of economic, military, ideological, cultural, and state integration thai had al­
ready taken placein the quarter century after the war. That integration may not have been 
strong enough to avoid tensions once the slowdown came, but it was strong enough to block 
, the possibility of that tension leading to direct challenges to, or withdrawals from, the liberal 
world orderthat had beenjointly consttucted under American leadership. 
It is quite wrong therefore to see the transition to neoliberalism in terms of the Americans 
prevailingagainst (what were always quite tepid in any case) European or Japanese proposals 
for extending capital controls in the 1970s in the context of the crisis of Bretton Woods and 
the American state's delinking the dollar from gold [Helleiner 1994]. Rather, what prevailed 
was the emerging common understanding amongst the American, Europeanand J apanese 
elites that, in thenew integrated international environment already in place by the late 1960s, 
capital controls now implied much broader restrictions on economic activity and would have 
to go much further than they were prepared to have them go. For example, direct foreign in­
vestment, by then· starting to flow both ways, also camed with it pressures to liberalize inter­
national finance and involved' growing levels of intra-firm tiade. It was on this cascading pro­
cess of economic and social integration th,,:t neoliberal globalization was eventually built. ' 
This was reinforced by the project of European integration, through which the EU would be­
come an agency ofneo-liberal discipline, however much social policy and human rights were 
also on its agenda. 
By the eighties, a two-fold project of domestic and international reconstitution evolved in all 
G7 states under American leadership and this created the conditions for renewed national and 
global accumulation. After a decade of indecisive. arid stumbling attempts to escape the per­
sistent economic malaise" the new projectwas given coherence as neo-liberalism took the 
form of state-ledeconomic restructuring oriented to removing, through the expansion and 
----------------------------
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deepening of markets, democratically-imposed barriers to accumulation (earlier concessions 
on the part of capital that once reflected capitalism's munificence now resurfaced as problems 
that demanded reversal). 
That solution was presagedby the degree of economic integration that had already taken pla­
ce, and the growing influence and capacities of finance both at horne and abroad. While the 
-increased mobility of capital threatened the role of the American dollar, emphasizing the prio­
rity of investor credibility, italso represehted new opportunities: the structuraI power of Ame­
rican finance could potentially contribute to mobilizing global savings for use within the U.S., 
and the neo-liberal emphasis on discipline·cOuld·find no better friend than a section of capital 
ready to move where returns were highest. On this latter point, it is important to see that this 
was not a matter of the opposition between production and finance; with the exhaustion of 
Keynesianism (broadly defined) and no alternative focus for regeneration, productive capital 
readily accepted a new more aggressive role for finance as being functional to its own inte­
rests. 
In the period after theVolcker shock, the rates of growth in GDP, profits and productivity in 
the USA began their slow climb back to earlier levels - and investment soon followed, albeit 
with a lag (see Graphs 2, 3& 4): 
Graph 2: REAL GROWTH IN U.S. GDP 

Source: Economic Report of the President, 2002, Table 8-4 
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Graph 3: ANNUAL CHANGE IN OUTPUTIHR 

Source: U.S~ Bureau of Labour Statistics 
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As neoliberalism gained in coherence andconfidence, its ideology becoming more pervasive 
and its institutional drive more comprehensive. Labour everywhere suffered a major 'defeat. 
At the same time, the new digitalized economy brought, however unevenly and· apparently 
irrationally, significant new technological potentials; and finance - in spite of speculative ex­
cesses and scandals - proved to be functional to real capital accumulation and economic 
growth. The rate of growth in the USA from 1982 to 2002 was greater than in all the other G7 
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couptries (see Graph 5). And by the end ofthe nineties, the real GDP ofthe United States was 
some 200/0 higher than that the total of the largest dozen economies of Western Europe - a 
gap impressive enough compared to the approximate equality that existed in 1982, but especi­
ally striklng given that the gap at the beginning ofthe golden age, in 1950, was only 13% (see 
Graph 6). ForGermany, France, and Italy the gap was smaller in 1998 than it was in 1950; 
collectively, they were 55% behind the U.S. in 1950, narrowed this to 37% by 1982, but the 
gap rose back to 51 % by 1998. 
Graph 5: INTL COMPARISONS: AVERAGE GROWTH IN 

GDP 1983-2001 

Source: Economic Report ofthe President, 2002, Table 8-112 
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To be sure, the defeat of the American labour movement, crystallized in the restructuring of 
state agencies like the National Labour Relations Board, was reflected in the historically 
unprecedented stagnation in real wages: private sector hourly earnings, in 1982 dollars, were 
$8.40 in 1978 and only $8.00 in 2000 [U.S. Bureau ofLabor Statistics 2002]. But this did not 
lead to a corresponding stagnation in consumption. Rather, debt dependence expanded (with 
all its individualizing and disciplining repercussions) and overall hours of work increased 
dramatically. While Europe experienced a 12% decrease in hours of work per capita in the 
last quarter of the twentieth century, the U.S. saw a 12% increase [Maddison 2001: 352-5] 
This ability to extract more labour per capita (more family members working, more hours per 
worker, more intensity ofwork per hour) was one expression of American dominance and 
goes a long way to explaining the increase in the U.S.-European GDP gap cited above (espe­
ciallyifwe note that until recently, productivity as measured byGDPIhi was actually growing 
faster in Europe). 
The recent collapse of the 'new economy' has provided ample ainmunition to those originally 
skeptical of its hype. But leaving aside the exaggerated claims originally made for the new 
technology, and acknowledging the excess capacity and shady deals that were part of this, two 
facts remain. First of all, it was in the United States that the new technological innovations 
emerged rather than anywhere else, and there was everywhere a race to imitate and catch-up 
to the American innovations on this terrain. Even Hall and Soskice [2001: 57] recognize this 
American comparative advantage in explaining why companies from the 'coordinated market 
economies' of Europe moved to the USA 'to secure access to institutional support for radical 
innovation ... Nissan locates design facilities in California, Deutsche Bank acquires subsidia­
ries in Chicago ... , and German pharmaceutical firms open research labs in the United States.' 
Second, the significance of the new digitized technology is not confined to its own sectors. Of 
greater importance is its potential dissemination to other sectors (tradition al sectors such as 
autoas weIl as both old and new services) and, alongside this, the potential integration ofthe­
se technologies with broader managerialstrategies that combine centralization and decentrali­
zation within each sector (from to design to sales, from accounting to outsourcing). To date, 
this potential has only been scratched. 
There is a similar skepticism about the roleof finance. But here again, whatever moral objec­
tions one can raise, the fact is that finance has been more than a speculative drain on the 'real' 
economy. It has provided needed overall liquidity at a time of 'competitive austerity' and, 
through the depth of American financial markets, was especially important in delivering the 
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venture capital that. accelerated the development of the new digitized technology (as well as 
being a source itself for the development and application of that technology). The deepening . 
and spreading of financial markets has been crucial to managing the risk inherent in a globali­
zed economy of flexible exchange rates -'- even as it itself was one cause of that risk. In its 
role in enforcingproductive discipline, finance also reallocated capital across sectors, contri­
buting to the process of correcting the previousdecline in overall capital productivity. 
The globalization of financial markets, combined with the broader structural power of the 
American economy, was part of the mechanism that brought global savings to the United ' 
States. This created the space for the American state to bridge its role in ,stabilizing the inter­
national economy (via the imports of American consumers and businesses) while strengthe­
ning the American economy as the core material base for American neo-imperialism (through 
the additional investments generated by the capital imports). Where trade deficits were signs 
ofweakness and panic in the late sixties and early seventies, in the post-Volcker world - with 
the its renewed confidence in the political power of the American state domestically as well 
as intemationally - we witnessed two decades of repeated trade deficits with little or no inter­
national alarm until very recently. And even the sharp and possiblyunsustainable growth in 
the trade deficit since the latter nineties signals the relative success of the U.S. econonlYas 
much as any dec1ine. The deficit paradoxically reflects more rapid growth· in the latter nine­
ties; the attraction of the U.S. for investors in good times and bad; and the failure of Europe 
and Japan to restructure fast enough to lower the American deficit through their own growth. 
The last two decades ofthe 20th century, in short~ highlighted American-Ied capltalism's stun­
ning proficiency in reshaping labour markets, revolutionizing the forces of production and 
communication, integrating the worldspatially, commodifying more aspects of daily life, and 
generally restructuring the world 'after its own image'. Where specific breakdowns occurred, 
they have thus far been impressively contained -' that is, localized, limited in their duration, 
and so far managed to the' extent that, as,Peter Gowan [1999] has argued, such crises have so' 
far become functional to demands for expanded reproductioIl,of the global system. And all 
this was achieved while lowering the expectations of its citizens' and containing democratic 
opposition to a degree most ofus would nevet have thought possible. Can we really deny the 
remarkable (ifobjectionable) dynamism capitalism revealed? 
At the beginning of the post-war era, when the American neo-imperial order was being foun­
ded, Harry Truman, in a famous speech at Baylor University, said that 'the American system 
can survive only if it becomes a world system' [Clayton 1993: 213-4; Jagan 1994: I]. What 
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this meant for Europe at the time, as Donald Sassoon [1997: 207] has put it, was that 'how to 
achieve the European version of the American society was the real political issue of the 
1950s.' So was it ofthe 1980s and 1990s, we would argue, and aS'before, remaking the world 
in the American image, while it did not mean honl0geneity or anything like complete conver­
gence, it did mean accommodation and emulatiön. American financial and management prac­
tices have been very widely adopted within European industrial and financial fums. [Carpen­
terand Jefferys 2000; Lutz, 2000] In this context, it may be noted once again that even Hall 
and Soskice's [2001 :60-2lare forced to acknowledge that 'the internationalization of finance 
puts pressure on the institutions of coordinated market economies', citing one American fi­
nancial and' corporate practice after another in terms of their impact on German firms 'exten­
ding all the way down to production regimes'. Their assertion that the pace of change also 
allows German firms to 'maintain many aspects of their long-standing strategies' (the only 
example offered being the retention ofworks councils) hardly qualifies the mainpoint. 
-For all the talkof America's economic problems today, the immediate stagnation in the global 
economy has more to do with the inability of Japan and Germany to resolve their own slug­
gish development - a weakness that raises anew the question of exactly what we mean by 
'weak' and 'strong' states. Their limited capability to match the American economy's ability 
to restructure has left Elirope and Japan unable to ca:rry the weight of added international sti­
mulus and consequently playa role in any constructive correction of the American trade defi­
cit. Any real altenlative to Anlerican capitalism on their part wouldmean a radical break with 
global capitalism and neo-imperialism an alternative riot currently on their radar screen, and 
inconceivable, in fact, without a fundamental change. in class relations and state structures in 
those societies. 
3. Political Conclusions 
Any alternative politics cannot rely on the current tarnishing ofthe "American model" and thc 
imminent dec1ine of American hegemony (even though recessions and new instabilities will 
of course recur). The rejection of this model will have to be based on a collective condemna­
ti on of its relationship to human potentials even when it is doing 'well' in its own tenns. Poli­
tical.openings and contradictions will·have to be foundwithin capitalism's strengths and 'suc­
cesses' not önly its weaknesses and 'crises'. Such openings/contradictions will emerge, inside 
the USA and elsewhere, out of the impact of globalization on domesticc1ass relations; For 
example, capitalism's success in restructuring states to more c10sely serve the demands of . 
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global aeeumulation comes at the expense of the legitimation capacity of states. Where states 
could onee promise linear material progress· and demoeratie relevanee to national politieal 
institutions, the promise of material well-being, eeologieal sustainability and demoeratie par­
ticipation is inereasingly hollow for large numbers ofpeople in all eount,ries. 
Similarly, the drive to eonstitutionalize property rights internationally (through international 
agreements like NAFTA and institutions like the WTO) suffers from the social distanee of 
international institutions and their lack of authority to legitimate such rights. This stage in the 
development of eapitalist property rights eonsequently highlights and exposes -'- mueh like the 
original 'tragedy of the eommons' - property rights as eoming at the expense· of popular 
rights. The eurrent seandals in the U.S., reflecting an arrogance that comes with success and a 
system that has not yet matched new circumstances to new fornls of regulation, enhanees the 
conjunctural possibilities at least for ideologically challenging thecompetenee and authority 
of those who manage what are ultimately society' s resourees and wealth. 
To take another example, as globalization internationalizesdomestic eapitalist elasses - in the 
sense of shifting their orientation towards global accumulation - this affeets the relative roles 
of domestic elasses in national eeonomic development'. In the third world, this undennines 
the base for domestic bourgeoisies to create the national eeonomic coherence that is funda­
mental to capitalist development. While the strength of global neoliberalism comes from its 
pressures to restructure existing eapitalist institutions (political, legal, cultural as well as eco:-­
nomic) in the coordinatedmarket eeonomies üf Europe and Japan into even niore responsive 
vehic1es for aceumulation, it is rather ineffective when confronting the absence of such insti­
tutions in most of the world's states. Globalization eonsequently carries no general solution 
for third world development. The implications of this particulat faHure in the third world are, 
however, not self-evident; they will depend on the extent to whieh resistanee within the third 
world brings this failure into the first world - either through its unmanageable impact on in­
tegrated financial markets or via the costs to the Americcm state and its junior partners in the 
global-Western state having to suppress and police (and perhaps even be pushed to do so­
m~thing genuinely redistributive) to deal with the rebellions and reactions. 
Recent tensions between Europe and the United States revolve aroun.d the role of the Ameri­
can state as aeting on behalf of the particular interests of American capital as opposed to ac­
ting in the interests of global eapital; and, in broader tenns, acting as the embodiment of an 
all-too-often chauvinist definition of American national interests as opposed to the larger neo­
imperial interest. While universal global rules therefore becon:e essential, the American state 
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needs and demands the flexibility vis-a~vis any rules to reproduce its hegemony and that of 
American capital. The line between measures necessary for that continued hegemony, as op­
posed to measures that are simply reflective ofparticular American interests is, as we see with 
Bush, often blurred and therefore a source of on-going international strains even with the 0­
ther leading capitalist states which are junior partners in the American empire, and this provi­
des certain openings for oppositional forces [Gowan 2002]. We should have no illusions, ho­
wever, that the transformations in European class and state structure would have to be, very 
fundamental indeed before these strains become ruptures. European bourgeoisies have even 
less interest and intention today of challenging Anlericart hegemony than they did in the 
1970s. This is evident when the head of Bertelsman proudly and publicly pro claims that his 
investments in the USA should not be seen as foreign since he sees hirnself as 'an American 
with a German passport' ; and it is no less evident when Dainller' s take~over ofChrysler feeds 
back into German politics in terms of demands from its' CEO that the German govemment 
restrain its criticism ofthe Administration's warmongering towards Iraq. 
That said, it is by no mean$ impossible that their very integration with the American imperi­
um may lead to a domestic loss of legitimacy on the part of such bourgeoisies, and on the part 
of states insufficiently autonomous from them and the Americans state. And if and when this 
happens, the consequences are incalculable precisely because the imperium, even if it has 
military bases everywhere, cannot rule except with and through states. As Ellen Wood [2002: 
291] has puts it: 
National states implement and enforce the global economy, and they remain the most ef­
fective means of intervening in it. This means that the state is also the point at which 
global capital is most vulnerable, both as a target of opposition in the dominant econo­
mies and as a ,lever ot resistance elsewhere. It also means that now more than ever, 
much depends on the particular class forces embodied in the state, and that now more 
than ever, there is scope, as well as need, for class struggle. 
This isprecisely why a pomparative political economy that actually does take. institutions se­
riously is so badly needed if we are to really understand the state and globalization today. Of 
course whether one adopts a Weberian or Marxist analytic perspectivewill obviouslyhave . 
praetieal strategie implieations, affeeting how we think: about state 'autonomy' as weIl as how 
we approach the issue ofbuilding the political capacitiesto resist or modify the main trajecto­
ries of globalization. What is clear is that the integration of capital across borders means that 
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the strategic political issue can no longer be' merely expressed as responding nationally to 
external competition. Since national formations now include foreign capital inside each state 
and since domestic capital is increasingly outside-oriented, it i8 vital that those oriented to 
progressive politics more rigorously clarify the nature of national politicalprojects based on 
'national' capital. At the same time, the fact that discrete economies and states are such an 
integrated part of a coherent whole means that significant change -:- and perhaps minor chan­
ges as weH requires developing the popular political confidence and capaeities to transfornl 
the capitalist state into an alternative democratic state eapable of a degree of de-linkingfrom 
the neo-imperial international eeonomie order and·from the logie ofeompetition as the arbiter 
of what is possible. None of this would make any sense if aH differences between states have 
been eradieated. Not only institutional sedementation, but uneven elass and eeonomie deve~ 
lopment and eontingent new institution-building will inean the eontinuation'of differenee. The 
point rather is' that this variety remains part of the eonstruction of the whole, and therefore 
incorporates the limits' of that whole. The issue is not convergence versus divergenee, but the 
seope for substantive variety within a global eapitalist totality that is· still antithetieal to the 
full and universal development ofhuman potentials. 
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Imperialism, peripheral capitalism and European U nification ­
Some preliminary reflections1 

Introduction 
The question this paper attempts to elucidate refers to the extent to which concepts of imperi­
alism and dependent or peripheral capitalismcancontribute to understanding the European 
unification. Until now little conceptual work has been devoted to studying the interrelation 
between the capitalist dynamic which underlies EU-enlargementand the form oftheemerging 
capitalisms in eastem Europe. On the one hand, mainstream analyses stress the positive im­
pact of the (prospect oi) EU membership which helps the central east European countries 
(CEECs) to develop democratic market societies, modemize andcatch up with the west, and 
thus increases the stability of the continent. Accession negotiations themselvesare· commonly 
portrayed as negotiations among eql.lals. Mainstream analyses thus ignore the question of the 
political and economic form of domination which the EU exerts upon the candidate countries 
(and upon the wider region). 
In contrast, critical approaches offen conceptualize Eastem Europe's transformation and Eu­
ropeanization as "peripherisation", thus assuming a fundamental political and economic. a­
symmetry between the EU-center and the new European periphery (Berend 1996, Gowan 
2000, Prokla 128, 2002). The concept of periphery, however, often lacks specification. 
Although it is relatedtodependency theory and world system approach, fewauthors explicitly 
use these theoretical frameworks in analyzing the terms of Europe's unification (Neunhöf­
-ferlSchüttpelz 2002, Holman 2002). Neither are the concepts of periphery and dependent de­
velopment used in the debate on enlargement embedded in "the context of the theoretical tra­
dition that produced them" (Evans 1979: 16), namely imperialism theory. 
1 This paper was inspired by the stimulating discussions on the FEG conference on "The Emergence of a New 
Euro Capitalism", October 11/12 2002-inMarburg, whlch made me reconsider critically the conceptua1 too1s of 
critica1 approaches to eastem Enlargenient of the EU. As the present paper shows, I have only reached the pre­
1i.mjnary stage ofmy task. 
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How to explain the absence of conceptualizing the EU expansion as imperialist and the very 
general wäy in which periphery is used even in critical approaches? This question will be ta­
ken up in the first two sections. Baseq on a short review of critical accounts of eastem enlar­
gement, I will first argue that a number of elements of the enlargementstrategy of the EU 
point to the direction of imperialist'practices, and that, partly as a result of this, the features of 
east European capitalisms are reminiscent of earlier analyses of dependent or peripheral capi­
talism. The absence or vagueness of these concepts in the current debate thus cannot be 
explained by their irrelevance to European unification. Rather, as I will argue in the second 
section, what has to be considered is a shift in the terms of the~ debate on the development of 
capitalism, inc1uding its dependent variants, since the -1980s. By the late· ·1970s and early 
1980s, the influence of dependency and imperialism theory had diminished sharply. Partly as 
a result of the strengthening of institutionalist, statist, and neoc1assic paradigms, and partly as 
a conceptualization of truly novel features of recent capitalism, critical accounts of world ca­
pitalism shifted towards analyzing "globalization" rather than imperialism anddependent ca­
pitalism. The. third section explores some of the repercussions of this theoretical shift from 
imperialism to globalization as a framework for analyzing eastem enlargement of the EU. It 
identifies some areas, where the conceptualization of the EU system as imperialist might 
contribute to· a better understanding of enlargement and the new European configuration than 
recent critical attempts at theorizing it, and to outline elements of a research agenda for the 
study of Europe's unification. 
1. 	Europeanization as Peripherisation: Critical Accountsof the Eastern Enlar­
gement of the EU 
So far the formand results of CEE's transformation and rapprochement to the EU have led a 
number of scholars to engage critically with the mainstream analyses of eastem enlargement. 
Whereas the latter stress the positive impact of the (prospect of) membership for both east and 
west and commonly portray acce~sion negotiations as negotiations among equals, the former 
highlight the asymmetry of the relationship between theEU and its eastem neighbors, the 
economic deveIopment gap between east and west, and point to the self-interested agenda of 
the EU. 
Thus a number of scholars underline the fundamental asymmetries' in the relations between 
the EU and the east Europeari applicant countries. Both in political and economic terms the 
EU is the stronger party and it uses this power to impose its requirements on the applicant 
--
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countries. These countriesdo not have the choice to accept or reject parts of the requirements, 
rather they are condemned to a "take it or leave it position" (LindstromIPiroska 2002: 423 
(3». Accession itselfis "not a matter oftraditional negotiations to find acompromise between 
different interests, but rather ... enable one of the parties to attain a predetermined objective 
with the aidand under the supervision of the other." (Assemblee Nationale, quoted in Grabbe 
1998: 19) A number of authors. stress the "conditionality" throughwhich the EUmanages to 
impose its requirements on the applicant countries (Grabbe 1998,Smith 2001). Moreover, 
through its insistence on bilateral and differentiated treatment of each CEEC, the EU also 
weakens the bargaining position of the applicant countries. 
Another feature stressed by critical accounts of enlargement is the limited and selective nature 
ofEast European integration. Thus, on the one hand, the EU uses its influence in the region in 
order tgexport the core of its deregulatory program. In thisway it has gained important,in­
fluence Qver the transfonnation and policy making in the CEE applicant· countries. On the 
other hand, the EU has been very reluctant toextend all those policy areas towards the CEE 
which would make their transition and adaptation easier - such as substantial financial aid, 
free movement of labor, or liberalization of agricultural trade (Bohle 2002a). All in all, "ac­
cording to these critics, central and eastem European state's aspiration to join the EU has re­
sulted in an asymmetrical and dependent relationship that calls for comparisonswith other 
'developing states' rather than with states in the developed core" (Jacoby 2002, quotedin 
LindstromIPiroska 2002: 423 (3». 
The analogy of eastem Europe's current position in Europe to that of developing countries has 
informed many critical accounts of CEEC's· economic performance and development over the 
last ten years. Partly due to the EU's call for economic reforms, CEEC have embarked on de­
velopment paths which c.an be characterized as follows: 
. Trade dependency: In terms of its trade policy, the EU has laid the basis for a regional "hub 
and spoke structure" (Baldwin 1994), with each target state in the region relating to the others 
via its relationship with the western hub (see also Gowan 1995). As a consequence, the tradi­
tional regional economic patterns in eastem Europe imploded2 and were replaced by a strong 
trade dependency on the EU, and- especially Germany, a dependency which has resulted in 
increasing tradedeficits (Inotai 1999: 10). 
2 The implosion of the regional economic patterns was however mostly due to the breakdown _of the Comecon 
Regime, and the fact that eBBC shared simihir structural weaknesses, which did not encourage trade among 
them. 
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Development gap: Growth forecasts for the CEEC are still precarious despite a certain stabili­
zation. By 2001 only five out of the ten EU applicant countries had reached (more than) the 
level of their 1989 GDP. Moreover, several countries repeatedly experienced economic reces­
sions during the 1990s. Thus although east European countries have managed. to improve their 
GDP in relation to west European countries, their progress is very slow and unstable. Even 
more, the country with the fastest development, Poland, has also become one of the most lme­
qual countries - in terms ofincome distribution - ofthe OE CD (EBRD 2002, Kowalik 2001). 
Dual development: Mostly under the influence of foreign direct investment, several east 
European economies experience a process of upgrading and integration into a transnational 
regime of accumulation. This modernized economic segment coexists with the more burden­
some legacies of the old system: the ruins of heavy industry and agriculture It renlains a nati­
onal task to restructure these industries. Bridgesbetween both segments of the economy still 
remain scarce. Rather, islands of modernization coexist with deprived regions, sectors ·and 
groups of society (Kurz/Wittke 1998, Ellingstadt 1997, Bohle 2002b). 
Dominance oj joreign ownership in strategie economic sectors. Since the mid 1990s the 
CEECs have attracted increasingly important shares of global foreign direct investment. Most 
of this investment is directed towards manufacturing, with multinational cOIporations (MNCs) 
often accounting for more than 50% of CEE's foreign trade. Moreover, strategically important 
sectors, like telecommunications, transport, or banking are often dominated by foreignow­
nership. Although one might argue that globalization and Europeanization diminish the signi­
ficance of domestically owned strategie sectots, it is a fact that other European countries, 
inc1uding the southem periphery, have been much more successful in resisting the trend to­
wards foreign ownership in these industries (GreskovitslBohle 2001). 
All in all, these accountsare fairly consistent with concepts of dependentor peripheral deve­
lopment and with the following definition of imperialism: "Imperialism is a system of capital 
accumulation based on ... center capital' s acquisition of control över the means of production 
in those [less developed, D.B;] regions, accompanied by the utilization ofpolitical and milita­
ry resources3 to protect and maintain the means of production over which control has been 
acquired" (Evans . 1979: 16). However, whereas a nunlber of authors characterize emerging 
capitalisnls in eastem Europe as peripheral rather than explicitly drawing on the concepts and 
.3 Although the military integration of CEE in European and N orthatlantic structures is a crucial part of the Euro­
pean unification, in this paper I will restriet my analysis to the political and economic aspects of imperialism. 
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arguments rooted in the world system approach and de,pendency theory, they often "use this . 
notion in a very general, undefined way". (Holman 2002: 401 (2)) They make even less refe­
rences to imperialism theory when analyzing the political economy of European unification. 
How to explain the lack of a nl0re systenlatic reference to those earlier debates? 
2. From Imperialism and Dependency to Neoliberal Globalization 
One of the ,main reasons for the exclusion of imperialism and a more substantiated notion of 
peripheral capitalism in the critical debate on eastern Enlargement of the EU is a shiftin the . 
terms of the debate on the development of capitalism, including its dependent variants. After 
the revival of imperialism theory in the 1960s and 1970s, since the 19,80s this theory has lost 
ground to a'conlpeting intellectual agenda which focuses on the internal reasons for success or 
failure in peripheral countries in world economy. Partly. as a result of this shifting intellectual 
terrain and partly as areaction to the recent wave ofinternationalization in world economy, 
critical approaches tumed towards exploring "globalization" rather than imperialism or de­
pendency. 
2.1 The revival 0/ imperialism and the discovery 0/dependency 
The 1960s and 1970s marked a particularly productive period in the (marxist) investigation of 
the relationship between the expansion of capitalism worldwide and the dependent and de­
formed nature of capitalism intbe periphery. Theories ofimperialism and dependency became 
complementary elements in the analysis of capitalist dynamic. The revival of the reception of 
classical imperialism theories (Lenin, Luxemburg, Hobson, etc.) was limited in two respects. 
First, these theories were mostly associated with a phase. of imperialismwhich "involves the 
export of capital, competition for supplies of raw material and the growth of monopoli' 
(Sutcliffe 1972, cited in Palma 1978: 885). They could not account for the export of industrial 
capital and a more sophisticated pattern of foreign direct investment (FDI) which st<:trted to 
emerge after the Second W orld W ar.Second, classical theories were primarily interested in 
the political and economic systems of the advanced capitalist countries and their influence on 
intemationitl relations. They did not analyze theeffects of imperialism on the peripheral 
countries in a systematic way (ibid.). To overcome these limitations, 'a number of authors . 
started to analyze the post World War II or third phase, of imperialism. This phase has been 
characterized most significantly by the rise of MNCs and "involves a more complex, post­
colonial dependency of the peripheral countries, in which foreign capital {international corpo­
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rations), profit repatriation, adverse changes in the terms oftrade (unequal exchange) all play 
a role in confining, . distorting,or halting economic development and industrialization" (Sutc­
liffe 1972, cited in Palma 1978: 885).4 The basis for an analysis inthis respect was laid by 
PaulBaran in his essay "The Political Economy of Growth" (1968 [1957]). He provided a 
model of imperialism that attempted to 'layout the internallogic of capitalist development in 
the periphery. In his analysis of class relations in the peripheries Baran showed the main con­
sequence of imperialism was the obstruction of economic progress in dependent countries. 
Taking Lenin's observation of the "'solid bonds' created between foreign capital and the bour­
geoisie in less developed countries" (Evans 1979: 19) as a starting point, Baran argued that 
none of the dominant classes in the periphery (aristocracy, money lenders, merchants and fo­
reign capitalists) had any interest in promoting industrialization. 
Baran's analysisbecame an important source of inspiration for dependency analyses. These 
analyses set out to "discover those characteristics of national societies which express external 
relations" (Cardoso/Faletto 1973, cited in Evans 1979: 26). Different authors stressed diffe­
rent external pressures and mechanisms of their internalization and came to diverse conclusi- . 
ons concerning the (im)possibilities of dependent development.5 Whereas earlier dependency 
writing could not cope with the divergence ofperipheral capitalisms, with partial successes in 
industrialization and development, or with changesin the imperialist system itself, laterversi­
ons provided a powerful "methodology for the analysis of concrete situations of dependency" 
(Palma 1978: 909). This methodology consists ofthe·following elements: 1) The world capi­
talist system represents the starting point for any analysis of dependent capitalism. This inclu­
des an analysis of recent developments and transformations of the world capitalist system. 2) 
Equally important iS.the studY'ofthe internal conditions of each dependent country, including 
their economic structures, social classes, the distribution of power in society and the role of 
the state. 3) The most significant feature ofthis methodology is its stress onthe study of conc­
4Poulantzas took' another stance on the third phase of imperialism by analysing the reproduction of US Ameri­
can power within dependent European states. This "new" imperialism is characterized by the fact that "relati­
ons between the imperialist metropolises themselves are now being organized in termes of a structure of domi­
nation and dependence within the imperialist chain." (poulantzas 1975, cited after Panitch 1998: 9) Primarily I 
aminterested in the more c1assical imperialist relation between center and periphery, I will deal only margi­
nally with this aspect of the new imperialism here. 
5 Thus Andre Gunder Frank (1967) stresses the significance of trade for deforming peripheral.societiesand de­
nies the possibility of their development in the framework of a cäpitalist worId market;Emmanuel (1972) un­
derlines the une qual exchange between the center and the periphery as weIl as the resulting overexploitation of 
peripheral workers as a cause for underdevelopment. Among other alithors, especially Cardoso'(1972) rejected 
the generalization of one single mechanism for explaining (under)development in the periphery. Instead, he 
proposed to analyse the concrete forms in which dependency develops. Moreover, Cardoso acknowledged' the 
possibility ofdependent development. 
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rete situations of dependent development. The. analysis should focus "on the elaboration of 
concepts capable of explaining how the general trends in capitalist expansion are transfonned 
into specific relationship betweenmen, c1asses and states ... " (Palma 1978: 910) .. Cardoso and 
Faletto (1979: 140) maintain that "... there is no such a thing as ametaphysical relation of 
dependency between one nation and another, one stateand another. Such relations are made 
concrete possibilities through the existence of a network of interests and interactions which 
link certain social groups to other social groups, certain social classes to other classes. " 
All in all, the debate on imperialism,and dependent capitalism of the 1960s and 1970s provi­
ded marxist investigations on the relationsbetween advanced andbackward nations as well as 
on the internal development of backward nations themselves with powerful insights and me­
thodological tools. Especially the research agenda of the later branch of dependency theory 
promised to generate new insights into the nature of imperialism, whose analysis had been 
"frozen" as it drew mainly on experiences of an earlier phase ofworld capitalist development; 
as well as into the investigation of concrete fonns ofperipheral capitalism. 
By the,late 1970s and early 1980s, however, the influence of dependency and imperialism 
theory had been. pushed back. to a large extent. In light of the increasing differentiation a­
mong the peripheral countries and especially the success of the export-oriented Asian econo- . 
mies, theories of imperialism and dependent development seemed to lose their credibility in 
explaining social stmctures and developmental outcome in the periphery. A strong reaction 
emerged against the genuine contribution of the complementary couple imperia.,. 
lismldependency theory, namelytheir conceptualization of the interrelation of economic ex­
pansion in the center and internal socialleconomic relations within the periphery. Instead, in­
ternal factors - social coalition$, institutions and the newly discovered "autonomous" "deve­
lopmental" state - were made responsible for successes or failures ofperipheral trajectories. 
On the other hand, for the "new development economy", essentially a reassertio~ of orthodox 
neoc1assical economy, the successof the export-oriented Asian econonlies ,was the ultimate 
proofthat integration into the world market is the precondition fordevelopment and catching­
up. 
Thus, ironically, just as internati~nal domination reasserted itself, it disappeared as a key 
explanatory variable of developmental thinking. Nothing could have reminded more of~pe­
rialism than the·crisis management through IMF, the World Bank and the"Washington Con':" 
sensus" (Williamson 1991) after the outbreak: ofthe debt crisis in the 1980s and the consoli­
dation of the "Dollar Wall Street Regime" (Gowan 1999) in the 1990s. However, the intel­
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lectual discourse of the day pointed towards internal factors and towards the chances world 
economy holds for late comers. "As often happens, theory is out ofphase with reality" (Stal­
lings 1992: 43).6 
Partlyas a result of the intellectual and institutional strengthening of institutionalists, statists, 
and neoclassics, who marginalized the discourse on imperialism and dependent.capitalism, 
and partly as a conceptualization of truly novel features of recent capitalism, critical accounts 
shifted towards exploring "globalization" rather than imperialism and dependent capitalism. 
2.2 Globalization 
Although globalization is a highly contested concept, there seems to be some consensus in 
critical political economy about its character. Thus, on the one hand, globalization refers to 
the quantitative acceleration and the new quality of transnational econoniic activities, especi­
ally in the financial and manufacturing sectors. On the other hand, it refers to a far-reaching 
transformation of political processes and institutions. There is little agreemerit on the exact 
nature of this transfonnation. A number of authors see a widening· gap betWeen the (disem­
bedded) economic globalization and the steering capacities of the nation state (e~g. Altva­
terlMahnkopf 1996). Others focus on the transformation of the state itself (Hirsch 1995, Jes­
sop 1994). A third group of authors remark upon the emergence and increasing power of 
transnational institutions, networks and c1asses in goveming the global economy (e.g. Sklair 
2000). Globalization, moreover, is inextricably linked with the rise of neoliberal ideology and 
. practice, i.e. with the fight against the intervening state and trade unions, in order to "free" the 
market forces. Finally, it is associated with increasing regional and social inequality both 
within and among nation states. 
The recently changed features ofworld capitalism, conceptualized as. globalization, have 
implications how to analyze peripheral societies. Globalization seems to go hand in hand with 
a phase of ''postimperialism'' (Becker 1984), "in which relations of dominance and dependen­
cy between nations (the defining character of imperialism) are being relegated to secondary 
importance. Instead, relations of capitalist domination and exploitation are conceptualized in 
terms of global class relations, which transcend national class structures." (Hoogvelt 2001: 
6 F or a similar more than ironie "coineidence" of theories heing just pushed back from the public discourse whim 
they would promise strong explanatory powers see also Panitch's theory of the state(1996), Wright's view on 
sodal c1asses (1993) and Stallings dependency theory (1992). Taken all these three articles together, they state 
the obvious: marxist thinking and categories were pushed in the defensive exact1y at that moment when capital 
reasserted its (world wide) power position. 
107 Imperialism, perip~eral capitalism and European Unification 
57)7 Thus in the postimperialist phase of world capitalism, transnational enterprises are in­
tegrating the world economy, creating global dass structures. States not longer play the cent­
ral part in the expansion of capitalist relations. Instead,they mediate relations of exploitation 
without, however, contributing to them themse1ves (ibid). MNCs have emancipated themsel­
ves from their horne countries and gain access to peripheral countries by providing an ideolo­
gy which "holds that there is no innate antagonism between the global economic interests of 
transnational corporations and the national economic aspirations of host or horne countries." 
(ibid.: 57). 
In applying especially neo-Gramscianconcepts (Cox 1983, Gi1l1993) to the study oftransna­
tional relations· and world order, these approaches have forcefully argued against the state:.. 
centeredness of both mainstream and marxist international relation and internationalpolitical 
economy (IPE). These approaches, in app1ying Gramscian concepts to the study of transnatio­
nal relations and world order, tend to stress the consensual side of transnational power relati­
ons (i.e. hegemony) in explaining how economic structures and ideas spread over a hierarchi­
cally organized world economy. Moreover, Gramsci' s concept of civil society enables them to 
account for the many trans-societallinkages that have emerged in the process of globalization. 
Thus, according to neo-Gramscian analyses, an emergent transnational capitalist dass (Sklair 
2000) is more relevant to explain the recent phase (and form) of capitalist expansion than the 
state-capital nexus. 
The latter approach has informed theoretically a number of critical accounts of the eastern 
enlargement of the EU. The decisive question is whether these new terms of the marxist de­
bate are the result of a "leaming process", i.e. a process of accumulation of new knowledge 
which reacts to novel features of world capitalism, or whether we witness a paradigm shift, 
which leaves some of the potential of earlier debates unexplored? In other words, the question 
is whether European unification really is the result of the post-imperialist phase of world ca­
pitalism and whether it is amistake or not to ignore the remnants of imperialism in our post­
imperialist age. In an attempt to at least partially answer these. questions, the last section will 
argue that recent neo-Gramscian analyses of eastern enlargement of the EU remain illlsatis­
7 Hardt and Negri's Empire (HardtINegri 2000) represents a confmnation ofthe post-imperialism thesis. Accor­
ding to them, the era of imperialism is over because the world market has been created and because of the post­
modern character ofUS power. In light of the recent shifts in US internal and foreign policies, clearly reminis­
cent ofthe national security state and old style imperialism (Hozic 2002), one might, however, askwhether this 
is just another case oftheory "being out ofphase with reality" (Stallings 1992: 43). 
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factory if they do not take into account some of the insights of earlier debates on imperialism 
and dependent capitalism. 
3. Neo-Gramscian IPE and theories of imperialism. as fra·meworks for the study 
of European unification 
So far neo-Gramscian political economy has provided. the few extant attempts at studying the 
interrelation betweeh the ~apitalistdynamic which underlies EU enlargementand the form of 
emerging capitalisms in eastern Europe. Hence EU enlargement is seen as rooted in a process 
of neoliberal globalization, and most strongly sustained by an emerging transnational capita­
list c1ass and by supranational actors. The final aim is to strengthen Europe' s competitiveness 
within the triad by exploiting eastern European economic capacities. The CEECs are about to 
become part ofthis project not on the basis of a prior process of domestic economic restructu­
ring, but rather through their reformers who seek for external support for their restructuring 
strategies. As a result ofthe rapprochement tothe EU,domestic social relations are subject to 
restructuring, which lead to a very high degree of foreign penetration in important segments 
ofCEEC's political economy (Bieier 2002, Holman 2001, 2002, Bohle 2002b). 
By applying neo-Gramscian theory to EU enl argement , new insights are gained/obtained into 
the broadet context of the enl;;u-gement, the specific form ofeastern Europe's integration and 
the social relations in the emerging capitalisms. However, it also h~s contibuted to the repro­
duction of certain analytical weaknesses which, although not inherent in neo-Gramscian theo­
ry, characterize a number of studies undertaken within this framework. Thus, it has been sta­
ted that neo-Gramscian analyses focus too strongly on civil society actors and tend to neglect 
the role of the state in capitalist reproduction (panitch 1996). Even more, within civil society 
neo-Gramscian analysis tends tooveremphasize the role of transnational (business) elites at 
the expense of other societal groups or classes (e.g. Drainville 1992).8 Recent neo-Gramscian 
analyses of eastern EU Enlargement suffer from such problems in two ways. First, they exag­
gerate the relevance of the European Roundtable of Industrialists and supranational elite 'ac,.. 
tors in setting the terms of the process. While the emerging transnational· business elite and 
the European Commission are indeed central actors in the enlargement process, this fact 
should not lead to neglecting the role of national capitalist actors in. influencing the enlarge­
ment agenda. In this context, it would indeed be helpful to. draw on earlier debateson imperi­
8 For a comprehensive discussion ofthe poirits of criticism and their validity, see ScheITer (1999). 
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alisnl in determining the way in which France, Germany, Great Britain and USA inform or 
resist eastern EU enlargement. The salience of inner-imperialist rivalries concerning the en­
largement project has hecome obvious in the recent Franco-British contbversy regarding the 
adequate treatment of the applicant countries. On the one hand, France does its best to keep 
thenewcomers a~ bay, which reflects its inability to (economically) penetrate the Bast as well 
as its concern with being excluded from the center ofthe EU. Britain, on theother hand, uses 
the applicant countries.in order to push through its liberalizing and military agenda, an agen­
da, which is itself strongly shaped by US interests. 
A closely related, but unexplored question is the role of US imperialism in shaping and 
constraining . Europe's political, economic and military unific ati on. Considering the insights 
provided by theorists of the "new imperialstate" (Panitch 1998, see also footnote 4) seriously, 
the eastern expansionof the EU has to be placed on the complex map of an imperialist chain 
which combines both new. and old forms of imperialism. So far few analyses of this chain 
habe been provided.9 Thus instead of assuming one single transnational. agenda setter the a­
nalysis would have to disentangle the overlapping and contradictory items on the transnatio­
nal and national agenda for rebuilding the continent. 
Second, by overemphasizing the role of transnational elites and the consensus underlying 
CEEC's incorporation into the Eliropean "heartland", recent critical approaches faH to take 
into account the broader class base of peripheral societies. Thus CEE societies are often de­
picted transnationally incorporated on the level of the reform elites. This elite-based consen­
sus seems to be threatened by factors whose character, however, cannot be specified.Again, 
drawing on earlier debates of dependent capitalism, it would be necessary to map c1ass relati­
ons in the CEEC more. carefully to describe. their international connections as well as the 
conflicts and contradictions inherent in them. In this context it would be interesting to ask 
whether the concepts of compradora, or internal bourgeoisie (see e.g. Poulantzas 1973), are 
useful starting points for the analysis of eastern European societies. 
A third point of criticism ofneo-Gramscian theory is that it favors political voluntarism over 
"hard structures". When applied to eastern enlargement, the neglect of structures is reflected 
in the missing research on the emerging international division 01 labor, an analysis funda­
mental to all imperialismldependency framework. Indeed, neo-Gramscian analysis seenlS to 
9 Gowan (1999) is an exception. However, he only analyses the top of the chain, namely the US: both western 
and eastern European societiesremain a black.:.box for him. 
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provide a framework which does not stress (structural) hierarchies the way earlier theories of 
imperialism and dependency did. However, the question still remains whether the post-fordist 
regime of accumulation with it8 potential for flexibility does not allow for hierarchica1 divisi­
on of labor between the East and the West.. It still needs to be established which the industries 
and competencies located in the eastern part of the new Europe are and which impact they 
have on local development as well as in which way they inform c1ass position and political 
c1eavage. 
The final argument in favor of accepting - old style - theories of incorporating imperialism as 
a means ofunderstanding European unification is the fact that, despite globalization and post­
imperialist discourse, European unification goes hand in hand with the delimitation of clear 
territorial borders. It is this, aspect which most clearly highlights the fundamental contradicti­
on of the new European configuration: the EU system has not been designed as an imperialist 
system. Within its borders it has relied on equal economic and politicalparticipation of all its 
members, and only acted as an imperial system in its external relations. With eastern enlar­
gement, however, peripheral countries become integrated into the same institutional frame­
work under the sameconditions as the core countries. The coexistence of imperialist center . 
states and peripheral dependent states within the ~ame trans- and supranational framework 
might bring about some fundamental transformative effect in the EU system itself 
4. Conclusion 
The present paper. argues that, as a result of the intellectual consolidation of non~marxist pa­
radigms and as areaction to truly novel features of contemporary capitalism, the importarice 
of theories of imperialism and dependency as powerful frameworks for the study of the inter­
relation of economic expansion in the center and socioeconomic relations in the periphery has 
diminished since the 1980s. As a consequence, critical accounts of international political e~o­
no my have shifted towards exploring globalization rather than imperialism and dependent 
capitalism. This theoretical shift is reflected in EU enlargement studies in which critical ana­
lyses mostly draw on neo-Gramscian approaches in IPE~ However, the concrete form of eas­
tern EU enlargement points in the direction of an imperialist practice. Several insights provi­
ded by earlierdebates might contribute· to its understanding. Rather than replacing one theo­
retical framework with another, this paper argues for a con1bination of the two frameworks in 
order to understand both, the ideational, elite, truly transnational and consensual features of 
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Europe's unification, and those features which are related to structural hierarchies, nationalist 
rivalries and coercion. 
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Some Reßections of the Situation of the Trade Union Movement in the 

European Union 

Introduction 
Grahatn Taylor and Andrew Smith (2002) recently published anarticle entitled: "Social Part­
ner or Social Movement? European Integration and Trade Union Renewal in Europe" . The 
basic argument of the artic1e may be summarised as follows: European unions have gone 
through a deep crisis since the end of the seventies when a process of social, economic and 
political transformation began. This process . constituted a serious challenge to traditional 
forms of union strategy and identity. It resulted in a decrease in lmion density and power. 
Many of the unions reacted by seeking adaption to neoliberalism by vanous forms of "com­
petitive corporatism" and/or "concession bargaining". Recently, however, there have been 
signs of a rene wal of the trade union movement in Europe:the policy of "social partnership" 
is opposed by new forms by new forms of radical "grassroot" unionism and by wider (trans­
national) networks of resistance against neoliberalism. 
In my paper I shall discuss this issue by analysing empirical ~vidence as weIl as inquiring into 
the nature ofthe relationship between,new tendencies in European politics (and in the forma­
- tion of "Eurocapitalism") and forins ofmanifestation ofthe new trade union policy in the EU. 
1. 
A detailed discussion of the impact of the transition from Fordism to Postfordism uponEuro­
pean trade unions goes' beyond the scope of this paper. Even though developments in different 
parts of·Europe (for instance in the. Scandinavian countries, on the one hand, the· southern 
countries of the EU on the other hand) do not follow th~ same pattern, social scientists and 
trade union official agree that, as Richard Hyman wrotein 1992, there has been a "desaggra­
gation of the (fordist) working class" followed by a serious defeat in class conflicts (such as 
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the ones in Italyat the beginning ofthe 80s), losses ofmembership, less strikes, calls for reor­
ganisation etc. (cf. Deppe 1995)1. 
Since the end of the 70s relations among class forces have changed dramatically i~ favoUr of 
capitaL The change began with the victory of Neoliberalism and Conservatism in Britain and 
the US under Thatcher and Reagan administrations respectively, which spread all over West­
ern Europe and·included othercountries as well. What followed was the.implosion ofthe So­
. viet Union and the socialist regimes in Eastern Eur~pe which consolidated anti-socialist, anti­
collectivist 'and pro-capitalist forces for a whole epoch of history.Finally, the glamour of the 
reorganised American shareholder capitalism ("Wall-Street") during the boom of the nineties 
was regarded by many as a model of a new financiallybased formation ofcapitalism (Can­
deias / Deppe 2001). The changes which affected trade union organisation and power were 
caused by neo liberal govemment policies supporting aggressive strategies of the employers, 
mass unemployment and transformations in the systems of industrial relations. These changes 
occ"!flTed as a consequence of technological innovation and industrial decline in favour of the 
services sec tor and the "new economy" (Ferner / Hyman 1998: xi - xxvi; Waddington I 
Hoffinann 2001). 
Atthe same time neoliberal hegemony was reflected by a withdrawal of the national state 
from the management of industrial relations and collective bargaining (deregulation, espe­
cially concerning the labour markets and centralised wage agreements). Transition from cor­
poratist to flexible capitalism meant not only deregulation, dismantling of the national welfare 
state,. but also - at the same time - gradualloss of relevance of wage policies. Finally, there 
had been a shift from the macro-level (govemment social and economic policies) to the mi­
cro-level of the business companies as wen as a shift from demand-oriented to supply­
1 At first sight there seemed to be an general crisis of the European trade union movement in the 80s and 90s: 
10ss of membership, reduced capacity to mobilise workers, 1ess strikes, 1ess influence upon polities. More tho­
rough analyses, however, presented Irevealed a rather different picture: union decline in dramatic forms, ac­
companied bygovernments' and employers' offensives against the union only happened in the USA (since 
Reagan) and Britain (since Thatcher). At the same time, in northem and central Europe trade union positions 
proved to be quite stable. Most of them retained their "institutionally based capacities for the defense of work­
ers interests that they had prior to the 1980s" (Golden etal. 1999:224). 
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oriented economics2• Under the dominance of supply-oriented economics ("neoclassics") and 
monetarism the class compromise of theFordist "Golden Age Period" had been suspended. 
Consequently, economic and fiscalgovernment policies were no longer supposed to achieve 
full employment but to guaranteeprice stability. By accepting the "convergence criteria ofthe 
Maastricht Treaty" (1991) EU-governments implicitly accepted their subordin~tion to this 
new strategy based on the interest of private and institutional owners of financial capital 
(shareholder-capitalism). 
At the end of the 90s Martin and Ross (1999: 368) summarised the situation as follows: 
"European unions are under siege. Politicalleaders have accelerated European economic inte­
gration to create 'globalisation on one continent', rapidly lowering boundaries between na­
tional economies. Firms have sought greater flexibility, often by decentralised bargaining and 
redefining the issues to be bargained. Macroeconomic policy commitments have shifted from 
full employment to price stability. Market neoliberalism has taken over the ideological out­
looks and policy orientations ofpolitical forces. These processes challenge the basic premises 
of European unionism. Unions have lost clout in the all-important market arena. Traditional 
unionist identities no longer work weIl. Resource supplies from politics and the state are 
dwindling. Unions' organisational capadt~es are stretched thin." 
2. 
Whereas unions have been weakened at the national level in general, there has been a reori­
entation of Buropean unions (organised in the ETUC) at theEU-level (Waddington / Hoff­
mann 2001). "Modemizers" oftrade union policies demanded a farewell from traditional (na­
tional) class politics and a strengthening of union politics at the EU-level (Mückenberger et 
al. 1996). It was the French socialist Jacques Delors who, as president of the European Com­
mission between 1985 and 1992, integrated European unions into the projects ofthe Common 
Market and the Monetary Union by upgrading the "social dialogue" and by promising to de­
velop a parallel strategy of economic, monetary and social integration, and to defend the 
2 In Gennany, for instance, unions were forced into a defensive position under the liberal-conservative govem­
ment ofHelmut Kohl between 1983 and 1998. Yet Gennan unions proved to be quite strong. At the beginning 
ofthe 80s they fought - quite successfully - for the 35-hours-week (6 weeks of strike in 1984). The Kohl gov­
emment did not conftont the unions as Thatcher had done. In this way, despite sev,ere membership losses espe­
cially in eastem Gennany after the unification, the unions were not completely defeated. The conservative 
press in Britain and the USA still regards Gennan unions -especially the IG Metall - as some kind of soCialist 
powerhouses. The strength of Gennan industrial unions still resides in their efficient organisation in the me­
tallurgist industry, especially in the automobile industry, and in the role of the workers councils, dominated by 
unions. 
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European "social model" against "Americanisation". Left-wing comm~ntators were fascinated 
by Delors' strategy of the "Russian Dolls" (George Ross). Introducing the "Cecchini-Report" 
that praised thepositive economic and social effects of a completely deregulated European 
Common Market until 1992, De10rs (1988: 10 ff.) spoke of a "silent revolution" and prom­
ised, addressing mainly the unions, a politics of social coherence and protection and extension 
ofworkers' rights in the European Community (Ziltener 1999: 180). 
European unions reacted positively to these "initiatives taken by European political institu­
tions, principally the Commission and Parliament". They provided "new incentives to Euro­
pean unions to re-conceptualise their strategic interests. The unions have consequently 'Euro­
peanised' more than could be expected in therecent decade (the 90es), largely in response to 
what European-Ievel policy~mak:ers have offered them" (Martin / Ross' 1999: 314)., The range 
of activity of the ETUC in Brussels - mainly financed by' the German DGB has been ex~ 
panded significantly in Brussels during the 90s. 
Within the "social dialogue" participation of union representatives in the process of policy 
making has been considerably enlarged3• The "social protocol" of the Maastricht Treaty of 
1993, which was transferred into the Amsterdam Trea~y in 1997 after the victory ofNew La­
bour in Britain, was regarded as a success for the European unions. It raised a wave of "Euro­
optimism" among social and political scientist ?f a socia!" democratic orientation. On the other 
hand, the European Works Council Directive (1993), which has so far produced a huge 
amount of literature and empirical research, was regarded, especially by union officials, as the 
first step towards building a European system of industrial relations (for a systematic analysis 
, cf. Lee 2000). 
In the meantime, the optimism of these decisions has dwindled and been replaced by realism 
and even disappointment. Ziltener (1999: 180 f.) conc1udes that Delors' strategyhas failed 
simultaneously with the erosionof national welfare states. The role of the ETUC within the 
political system of the EU is .not legitimised by increasing of union strength, but by coalition 
policy games ofthe Commission and/or Parliament. The Workers' Council Directive, as other 
directives in the field of social policy as well, is still under discussion with respect to its rele­
3 Severalpolitical seientists eonsider this higher degree of partieipation in the process. of policy-making at Euro­
pean level to be a reeonfmnation of the demoeratic legitimisation of the European project as weIl as a eontri­
bution to its"social dimension" by "bargained Europeanizationf ' (cf. Lecher et al 2001: 23 ff.). However, it 
seems unlikely that demoeracy eould be redefmed merely by a policy-making proeess with a weak demoera­
tie legitimation (with no sufficient publie representation as is the ease in the EU poliey making proeess; cf. 
Bieling / Deppe 2001). 
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vance for participation, industrial democracy and workers' power. In most casesit is used as 
an instrument for implementing management policies in transnational (European) corpora­
tions by using "social partnership" ,of workers' and union representatives. There is - as far as 
recent research suggests (Lecher et al. 1998; Lecher et aL 1999) - no example where this in­
stitutionwas used as an instrument to enforce.workers power against capital by negotiations 
or by transnational strikes. Its value consists in the exchange of information across borders 
which may consolidate/strengthen the position of workers and workers' councils against man­
agement in conflict situations. This is, however, a rather marginal function of the European 
W orkers CounciL Most of recent literature interprets them as institutions of a new multi -level 
European "competitive corporatism" whlch in the end might rather weaken the positions of 
national union and councils. 
Several conc1usions can be drawn at this point of the analysis. Firstly, the fact that the rele­
vance of trade unions at the EU level has, increased 'does not automatically entail a general 
upward consolidation' of the European trade union movement, starting from the workplace 
level on to the branch and national leveL Secondly, European legislation in the field of social 
policy and workers' participation, which, according to Jacques Delors, was supposed to ac­
company the process of economic and monetary inte~ation, has not yet achieved its own dy­
namics. Even more, it ,seems to have come to astandstilL Finally, Dorothee Bohle has re­
marked with regard to the eastem enlargement of the EU that the future -role of the EU social 
policy, namely to increase workers' and unions' power and create funds for social and em­
ployment polides by means of redistribution, is rather insignificant. At the same time, social 
polarisation between countries and regions will become stronger. Govemments of the EU-15 
refuse to provide more money for' eastem enlargement. On the other hand, trade unions and 
political actors in the eastem European countries which might ,support the project of a: "Euro­
pean Social Model" (Aust et aL 2000) are still rather weak due to the double pressure exer­
cised by the transformation from socialist state ownership and planned economy to capitalist 
market economy, on the one hand, and ofmass unemployment and poverty, on the other. 
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3. 
After the German national elections of 1998, Europe seemed to be completely governed by 
social democrat govemments or by coalition govemments with a strong social -democrat par­
ticipation4• Itwas mainly discontent within the working class5 about the results of neoliberal 
politics (high unemployment rates, unequal distribution of wealth and poverty, dismantling of 
the welfare state, flexibilisation of the labour markets, privatisation of social insurance and 
pension systems) which was articulated in strikes, mass demonstrations and voting behaviour. 
The strikes 'in France (1995/96) were the most inlportant movements of this period resulting 
in a change of govemment towards a coalition ofthe Left (1996). The industrial working c1ass 
and its unions, which were the actuallosers in the process üf social and political transformati­
0ns since the end of the 1970s, did not play an important role in these movements. The most 
active fractions ofthe working classcame fromthe state apparatuses while trade unions re­
mained weak in the private services sector and the "p.eweconomy". At· the same time, the 
interventions of the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, who criticised neoliberal politics and 
ideology ("pensee unique") and pleaded for a new (transnational) coalition of intellectuals and 
trade unionmilitants·for the,"European Welfare State" (Bourdieu 1997; Bourdieu et al. 1997), 
drew attention to the possibility of a decline of neoliberal hegemony, of first steps in the re­
constmction of an alternate (progressive) counter-hegemonie block. The European Left pro­
jected its far-reaching expectations onto the red-green Gerrilan govemment whose minister of 
finance was Oskar Lafontaine6. For the moment there seemed to be a chance to co-ordinate 
European economic and financial policies to control financial markets and to create a "Euro­
pean economic govemment" which might combine the monetary policy of the European Cen­
tral Bank with an active policy of growth and employment. TheEuropean Trade Unions had 
always demanded such a reorientation ofeconomic policy in Europe breaking with the logics 
of mönetarism and austerity politics that were induced by the convergence criteria of the 
4 Spain was an exception In 1996 the conservative government of Jose Maria Aznar (PP) in 1996 put an end to 
the era ofFelipe Gonzales' PSOE-governments that had lasted since 1982~ 
5 This was also the case with sections of the middle c1ass threatened by rationalization and new management 
strategies in industry as well as by the closing. of careers in the states apparatuses, especially in univer~ities 
an~ colleges (unemployment ofteachers was a typical phenomenon which produced the "fear offalling" (Eh­
remeich 1992) among middle class families). "Downsizing" ofthe American middle dass has been a coninu­
ous process in the 90s (Sylvers 2002: 91 ff.). 
6 Peter Gowan (1999: 135) asked His there an alternative?" and went on sayingnAs for Blair's Labour leadership 
it is bought and paid for. But the new Gennan Finance Minister, Lafontaine, is certainly different. He is a 
·determined EuropeanKeynesianwith a strong will and a political following in a political economy that is 
absolutelycentral." 
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I 
Maastricht Treaty and the Stabi1it~ Pact of Amsterdam still enforced by the Gennan KoW-
I 
Waigel-Government. 
4. 
Five years later, at the beginningofthe new millennium, the political environment has chan- , 
I 
ged completely. Social Democra~s have lost their majority power again in Austria, Italy, 
Benelux, Norway, Denmark, Porttl.gal and France. Recently, Sweden· and . Gennany voted for 
I 
a "left wing"/green majority WhiC~ is very narrow in Gennany where we have - additionally­
a conservative majority in the B"4l1desrat. Summing up, social democraticgovernmeilts, to 
which Tony Blair's administration fOnnally, though not substantially, also belongs, are again 
I 
I 
in a minority' position within the 'European Council. This implies rtew accents in European 
politics (Dräger 2002: 12) First, :t~ere has been a shift from social policies to controlling and 
expanding security policies. The ~ummit of Sevilla (June 2002) reached a fast agreement on 
strengthening the "Fortress Europe" . The new governments favour the reinforcement 'of ele­
ments of a repressive European stttehood, The slogan of the new centre-right govemments is 
"less Europe" , but "more market'\ more flexibilisation, and deregulation of labour markets, 
more privatisation in the welfare s:ystems. This was the message of a common paper presented 
by Blair, Aznar and Berlusconi (~arcelona March 2002). Second, in foreign policy, the allies 
I 
ofthe Bush-Administration, which has dec1ared "war against terrorism" all over the world, 
without any time limitation, and ~s now making preparations for war against Iraq, besides 
I 
Blair, Berlusconi, Aznar and the Dutch, are much strongernow and favourrelative European 
i 
autonomy and independence in orfer to oppose/resist globalisation, dominated economically 
and militarily by the USA 7• I 
I 
·In as faras the subject ofthis ess4Y it might be asked: why has the politicallandscape ofthe 
EU changed so fast and so dramktically. Most of the new right-wing governments are not 
I . 
I 
traditional centre-right governmep.ts anymore, but coalitions ofneo-liberals and extreme 
right-wing populist forces. These Iexpress a deep crisisof democracy andthe old constitu­
tional system, like the Italian "Bonapartism cl la Berlusconi", for instance. Besides, thequality 
I 
I 
7 At the time when I prepared this mandscript for publication, March 2003, the crisis in transatlantic relations 
and within the EU (including thecandidates for Eastern enlargement) is quite open ("Letter of the Eight" a­
gainst France, Belgium and German~). The war against Iraq has begun, breaking international law, against 
the decision ofthe security council o~the UN, causing immense damage to the civil population in the region. 
AT present, the consequences of thispeep crisis in the structures of world politics and worldorder cannot be 
anticipated. So far this has been the ~ost severe intemational crisis since the second World War. 
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of this transformation is underlined by the faet that the radieal politieal· Left (Rifondazione in 
Italy, Izqierda 'Unida in Spain, the Communist Partyand various Trotskite groups in Franee 
and the PDS in Germany) did not really profit from the losses that the Social Demoerat Par­
ties suffered. Therefore, the answers to this question are still provisional. However, they help 
us to und erstand some ofthe dimensions ofthe tradeunion renewal in Western Europe and of 
the partial upwards revival of (grassroot) trade union militaney. 
5. 
Provided that the eleetoral vietories of social demoeratie parties from the mid-90es to 1998 
were a .refleetion of soeial diseontent among lower working elass and lower middle elasspeo­
pIe, ihen the defeats of eentre-left govemment parties (espeeially social demöeraticparties) at 
the beginning of the 21 st eenturymust be interpreted as an expression of disappointment of 
these social groups with respeet to the polities of govemments dominatedby social demo­
erats8. 
The main eontradietions of neo liberal polities whieh provoke diseontent ahd social protest 
were: eontinuous mass unemployment, growth of marginalised, preearious seetors of the la­
bour markets, informal seetors; polarisation ofprivate wealth and poverty; relative deerease in 
ineomes ofworking people;dismantling ofthe welf are state; deeay of subtirbias ("banlieus"), 
migration, growing rates of eriminality, drugs in the streets ete. The power of the unions - in 
the major fields of their original polities: wage bargaining, industrial relations (workers' eon­
trol and partieipation), welfare policies - was redueed. The moral eonsequenees of market 
radiealism ("survival of the fittest"), global injustiee, were eritieised by the ehurehes, the new 
""anti-globalisation" movement and by left-wing segments of theLabour movement Sqcial 
demoerat govemments aceepted the rules ofeapitalist globalisation - led by neoliberal ideol­
ogy and polities (international institutions like WTO, WB;IMF, EU ete.; and the Washington 
Consensus, i.e. the "Dollar Wall Street Regime", Peter Gowan). They proposed the following 
two things: first, to improve the eompetitive position of national eeonomy, i.e. of national 
eapitalism, in the world markets, and, seeond, to eOITlbine this with a new soeial poliey di­
reeted towards improving employrllent ehanees for diseriminated groups (espeeially for the 
unemployed and the poor) re-integrating them into the offieiallabour market as fast as possi­
8 Even in the recent German national election the Social Democrats lost 4,5 respectively 2,2 percent ofunionized 
workers or non-unionized workers;Christian Democrats won 4.3 of unionized workers and 3.70f oon­
unionized workers. 
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ble. This was the basic idea of Tony Blair's slogan "education, education, education", which i 
had nothing in common with a defence or renewal of the classical model of the social demo~ 
crat welfare state or a Keynesian employment policy. 
The second contribution of social demQcrat governments on the European continent consisted 
in a renaissance of neo-corporatism (Bielingl Deppe 1999: 280 ff.; Streeck 1999) which fa­
voured "micro-corporatism" at the enterprise level, i.e. between management and workers' 
councils; and created institutions for macro-economic co-operation between government, 00­
, . 
ions and employers organisations dedicated to modernization, i.e. improving competitiveness. 
It als'o contributed to the reconstruction of the welfare state, deregulation of the labour market, 
and reforms in the educational sector. The political status of the unions was consolidated by 
these "alliances". Their leadership - at least a vast majority of the unionbureaucracy - was 
eager to accept those offerts, after the long period of defeat and lo~s in organisational and po­
litical power since the late 70s. However, they had to pay a high price for it: they had to ac~ 
cept a wage "moratorium", the creation of a deregulated low-wage sector and the deconstruc­
tion of basic elements of the welfare state in the fields of pensions, health service and unem­
ployment and poverty subsidies. In exchange, they expected the government to suggest em­
ployment programmes, educational ref6rms, guarantees for ensuring the basic structure of the 
national welfare systems, legal reforms to ensure workers' and unions' participation rights in 
the economy. 
The basic strategic idea ofthese policies ofthe Third Way (or ofNew Labour) was to build a 
new "hegemonic bloc" of class forces, to reach a new class compromise, to find a new "peace 
fOrnlula" between capital and labour9 under the competitive pressure of 11 globalisation" and 
after the end of socialism. The stability of this bloc was supposed to be ensured by an alliance 
9 "A new'peace formula' between capital and labor seems to be emergingthat is gradually taking the place of 
the post-war fonnula of full employment and continuous income growth at constant distribution. Instead it 
emphasizes the sharing of economic risk and responsibility in less predictable environments, and the joint 
search for 'win-win' -strategies in competitive markets" (Streeck 1999: 170). In the "Socialist Register" 
. (1994: 81 ff.) Leo Panitch 'published an exceI1ent critical study of these policies of "progressive cornpetitive­
ness". 
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between the management of banks and transnational corporations 10 and relatively privileged 
("aristocratic") fractions of the working class and their trade union representatives. Middle­
class iritellectuals, mainly supporters of the Greens, provided trade unions with a programme 
of "modernisation" which stressed the new issues of ecology~ gender and democracy rather 
t)1an traditional tradeunion topics such as wage struggles, pension- policies, participation 
(workers' democracy) and politica1 interventions against atmament and war, right-wing ex­
tremism and fascism. "Modernisation" po1icies within the unions became a programme of 
adaption to the new class alliance framed by i11ternationa1 Third Way Po1iticswhich pro­
c1aimed a new balancebetween globa1isation, growth and innovation and socia1 security. 
Theses strategies, however, failed comp1etely. Socia1 democrat govemments disappeared and 
had disappointed their working c1ass e1ectorate. Representatives of capita1ist interests at en­
terprise and at the state level accepted "neocorporatism" on1y on the condition that it might 
improve conditions and consensus for further wage cutbacks, dismantling of the welfare state 
and deregulation ofthe labour market. The economic crises at the b~gimling of the 21 st cen­
tury again narrowed theframe for c1ass compromise and led to a radicalisation of capitalists' 
criticism of socia1 democrat govemments and tradeunions. The politica1 earthquakes (shifts 
to the right) in most European countries showed them how to remove such govemments. Un­
ion representatives cou1d not claim a lot of impressive success in exchange for their willing­
ness to co:-operat~ with capita1 and state. Modernisation programmes proved to give no an­
swers to increased unemp10yment and poverty, to the real socia! problems of growingparts of 
the working c1ass, especially its fema1e fractions in the private services sectors. They had no 
solutions to the problem of defending and/ot reconstructing basic elements of the Welfare 
State etc. On the who1e, they raised midd1e-class issues ofthenew socia1 movements and the 
"Realo"-Greens, but they were not ab1e or willing to work for a new strategie synthesis of 
these new issues with traditional issues ofworking-c1ass po1icies which still count forthe po­
litical strength and organisationa1 power of the unions. The pro grammatic contributions of 
10 The concept referred to those fractions of European capital that regarded "corporatism" and "social partners­
hip" aS an element of the European "social model" and a decisive factor of productivity in the competition 
with the American and East Asian capital. At the beginning of the 90s, the American economistLester Thu­
row in his "Head to Head. The Coming Economic Battle Among Japan, Europe, and America" regarded,'Eu­
ropean capitalism (with Germany as,its "powerhouse") assuperior in respect to productivity and competiti­
veness. This thesis was confmned by Michel Albert in his book "Capitalism against Capitalism". Only in the 
second half of the 90s, - on the background of rapid growth of the American economy and especially of its 
stock markets, these predictions were forgotten. Now the advent of "shareholder-capitalism" was the main 
topic of scientific and political debate. Shareholder Capitalism itself fell into deep crisis- with many bursting 
bubbles - since 2001 - starting in Wall Street and spreading all over the world - opening a new cycle of eco­
nomic and financial depression (cf. Brenner 2003; Gindin et ,al. 2003).. 
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these middle-class supporters were instrumentalised by tough right-wing trade union pragma­
tists, (in Germany, for instance, mostly members of the old, right-wing Union ofChemistry 
Workers and Miners) to attack and to push backleft-wing positions within the unions, which 
were denounced as "traditionalists" or worse. 
6. 
To conclude, we might say that social democratic governments did not succeed to mobilise 
support from below by a new policy of growth and employment, by social justice and by a 
new approach to international politics. On the contrary, they accepted neoliberalism - auster­
ity policies and supply-side-economics - and the laws of global capitalist competition. They 
accepted (at least before the Iraq war) American leadership in building a new world order, 
which was illustrated, for instance, by the role of the German red-green-government in the 
war against Jugoslavia in 1999. 
Electoral defeat ofsocial democrat governments - with a clear shift towards the extreme right 
- therefore is an expression ofthe disappointinent oflarge sectionsofthe underclass electorate 
with the social and economic consequences of social democrat government policies, accom­
panied by a continuous decline in the quality of formerly public, now largely privatised sec­
tors and goods: ~affic(railways), communication (postal services), health, education, social 
services, etc. The victories ofright-wing populist parties are the result of a paradox: the social 
question ispoliticised from the right (the fasclsts succeeded in doing fuis too )11, whereas the 
political Left seems to have lost competenc'e and the trust of its traditional working class 
electorate12. This tendency is determine,d by at least two further factors: 
- In nearly all countries a crisis of the democratic system of representation is indicated by 
cases of corruption of local governments, national parliament and national governments, in 
France the President himself. These cases of corruption have caused massive public interest 
augmented by the mass media which are ruled by extremely reactionary, pro-capitalist, pro­
American and neoliberal owners (from Murdoch to Berlusconi) and joumalists. This destroys 
confidence of the masses in democratic institutions and the political class. One consequence 
of this i8 a significant decline in participation in elections. This normally opens- the way for 
11 Right-wing parties in Austria, Denmark, Franee, Italy, ete. claim to be in favour of the welfare state, but only 
,for Austrians, Danes, Italians ete., not for immigrants. 
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antidemocratic populist movements denouncing democraticpolitics and politicians as corrupt 
and greedy for money and power. Such views are encouraged by news of managers of finan­
cial institutions or companies who ruined their companies and the shareholders by fraud and 
personal enrichment. 
- The. second dimension is more closely related to the significance of European integration. 
For many years in most EU-countries the pons ("Eurobarometer") indicated rather positive 
attitudes towards European politics (though many people did not really know what it meant 
concretely). In general, Europe and the EU were associated with growing sQcial and economic 
welfare. This has considerably changed since Maastricht (the creation ofthe Common Market 
and the Monetary Union, now with the coming enlargement towards the east and south-east of 
Europe).Now an poUs indicate a widespread suspicion ofEuropean politics which are associ­
ated with the deterioration of (personal) social and economic conditions. This change in pub­
lic opinion, combined with stronger articulations of nationalism and racism, reflects the fact 
that neoliberal globalisation does not strengthen intemationalism. Capitalistglobalisation 
rather favours new coalitions which defend particular interests on the world nlarket by pro­
moting competition between enterprises, regions, nations. 
This suspicion evolves from the feeling that European politics have become graduallys more 
important but less democratically contrQUed and publicly discussed. This is - at least - one 
element ofthe so-called Post-Maastricht-Crisis (DeppeIFeider 1993; Deppe 2001) which, for 
instance, is expressed by low participation in the European elections or the rejection of the 
Maastricht or the Amsterdam Treaty in national referenda (in Denmark or in Ireland). This 
crisis consists in a transformation of statehood within "new constitutionalism": national states 
. . 
transfer - especially in the field of economic, monetary and social politics - sovereignty to a) 
supranational institutions such as the Europeari Central. Bank, or b) to market forces. The so­
cial contradictions which are. produced by deregulation and by transitional competitive pres­
sure' are, however, not the target of EU-Policies. They remairi mainly within national borders 
but have givfm up essential elements and instruments of "anti-cyclical politics" on the basis of 
redistributive politics and Keynesianism. 
12 As "milieu studies" have shown this c1assical working c1ass eIectorate i~ today' a rni.riority "milieu". The 
middle-c1ass oriented and younger fractions ofthe electorate (wage eamer) are no longer stablevoters; they 
change their vote and do not participate in the elections regularly. 
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7. 
When scientists and journalists speak of new tendencies within the European trade union 
movement or even of a "renaissance" of the European working class movenlent, they refer to 
different facts. At the beginning of the new century there is renewed interest in labour, labour 
markets, continuous mass unemployment, goverriments politics and the reactions of unions all 
over the world. Unions are regarded as still important and powerfulactors and. forces in re­
establishing world order, which is the main characteristic of our epoch (HarrodlO'Brien 
2002). Analyses of recent developments have shown that unions have not been weakened in 
all countries in the same way. Although a general trend towards weakening'collective interest 
representation and bargaining is quite obvious, it has manifested itself differently throughout 
Europe. Especially in northem countrjes, unions became stronger. In other countries, such as 
Germany, conservative and liberal govemments were confronted with strong resistance by the 
unions. In Italy, forexample, unions recovered after aperiod of defeat and returned quite 
powerfully to thepolitical arena resisting conservative plans to dismantle the Welfare State 
(Telljohann 1996). In France, the organisational power ofthe unions diminished dramatically 
as a result of union membership falling below 10 percent. However, unions were still able to 
mobilise workers and employees for massive strike movements and mass demonstrations. 
Looking at the trade union landscape in Europe reveals many different· images which, at the 
same time, reflect fragmented and various soeia1 and political experience. From countries 
with rather strong unions (not only in the Scandinavian countries) to countries with still quite 
weak unions (especially in Eastem European countries which are ab out to join the EU). Still, 
unions operate primarily in the frame of the national state and its systems· of rult;'s and institu­
tions regulating "industrial relations" (more specifically "labour relations") and social poli­
eies. Analysis of trade union policies, like the analysis ofEuropean politics in general, needs 
a multi-level approach in order to inc1ude the relevance of different levels of decision-making 
(from the local to the European level) and in orderto take into account what we know about 
"Europeanisation" ofpolitics. 
Obviously, the number and the intensüy of strikes all over Europe has increased, ranging from 
wage conflicts to political conflicts about the reduction of social services and the privatisation 
of public services. Yet we do not dispose of systematic surveys. Therefore, we will restrict 
ourselves to mentioning some of these events. The British "sunlffier of discontent" in 2002 
began with a wave of strikes in the public services sector. At the same time, the influence of 
left-wing union representatives and critics of Tony BJair and New Labour became more inten­
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sive 13. For the first time in 20 years, membership of the TUC unions has increased by 
600,000 new members. Also for the first time, the British majority (60 %) supports the unions 
that opposed further privatisation ofpublic services (Beckrnann 2002). 
Another example may be Italy. Here the political Left and the left-:wing union suffered serious 
defeats after a short period of the centre-Ieft government, as a result ofthe victory of Ber­
lusconi, Fini and Bossi. The traditional Left (rooted in the PCI tradition) is still paralysed by 
the dec1ine of the Great Party (in the Gramscian, antifascist tradition). The nlajürity of the 
ancient communists follows a right-wing social democratic orientiation. Here it was the ini­
tiative of intellectuals and then. of union leaders like Cofferrati which led to mass meetings 
and finally a general strike protesting against further dismantling of workers' rights and 
against the destruction ofthe legal state and democracy. At the same time, forthe first time in 
many years, Spanish unions succeeded in organising a general strike against government 
plans to reduce unemployment benefits. 
Another case study may be devoted to Germany. Here the red-green government elected in 
1998 disappointed many expectations of the unions because the government promoted auster­
ity policies, neglected the necessity of increasing inner demand and began to "reform" welfare 
policies (pensions, health care, institutions of education and science) by opening these sys­
tems to privatisation. At the same time, in a revived neo-corporatist institution like the "Alli­
ance for Work" ("Bündnisfiir Arbeit"), social democratic politicians and supportersfavoured 
deregulation of the labour market and of collective bargaining by creating a low wage sector 
as the main "remedy" against mass unemployment. These politics caused massive protest by 
the majority ofthe unions represented by the metal workers union and.the - newly founded ­
ver.di-unionofthe private and public service sectors.Even though in the election campaign of 
2002 unions supported . the governnlent parties again, they organised a wave of strikes, meet­
ings and denl0nstrations in thesame year. Their main demand was the increase of wages, 
Meetings and rilass demonstrations concentrated on issues of welfare policies and, to a grow-: 
ing extent, on the danger ofwar against Iraq. 
This "radicalisation" of trade union politics in Germany obviously is areaction towards 
growing unemployment, neoliberal government politics and, first of all, the worsening of the 
13 The 2002 the British left-wingjoumal "Red Pepper" published a "Tue Special" with a round-table discussion 
among left-wing trade union secretaries who had been elected during the past months against the old represen­
tatives ofthe union infavour ofBlair. The title ofthe presentation was: "New Trade Unionism in the Making?! 
The editorial reads: "To run now as a Blairite (for union elections) .. is to invite defeat". 
Frank: ,Deppe 
social reproduction of workers who are affected by and suffer ftom decreasing wages and 
rising costs. 
The dominant feature of trade union politics is still "social partnership" and/or "competitive 
corporatism", which had always existed in various forms within the trade union movement. 
During the past decades, however: in the crisis of transition the traditionalleft wing of the 
European trade union movement, class-stmggle .oriented, socialist or communist, has. been 
weakened, whereas the forces of social partnership and corporatism (especially in Germany 
and Austria) have been strengthened. Only two decades ago these differences between Ger­
man "social partner" unions and more radical unions in other European countries clashed and 
prevented a common policy beyond declarations. Therefore, intensified political activity and 
influence ofthe ETCU at the EU level , financed mainly by the "rich"German unions, is one 
of the consequences of the c.onsolidation of the German social partnership type of union poli­
cies within the ETCU. 
On the other hand, "grassroot militancy" or radical, even "anticapitalist", class-stmggle ori­
ented politicisation of trade union activities is stillaminority position of interest representa­
tion. Yet it is this position which criticises the limits of· social partnership and of Euro­
Corporatism, combined with the constmction of transnational networks, of communication 
and resistance against neoliberalism at the national·and theEuropean level, whichhas become 
more active and stronger within the European trade Union movement (Mathers/Taylor 2000; 
Taylor/Mathers 2002: 100ff.; rather sceptical, concentrating on a comparison between Britain 
and France: Jefferys 2000). Thus we may suppose that this new tendency within ·the union 
may be arelevant factor for a renewal of the European trade union movement by going be­
yond the dichotomy of "Social- Partner"- and "Social-Movement"-orientation.Even in the 
Germanunions' debate positions favowing the type of "social movement" unions have a 
chance to be heard (Frerichs et al. 2001). In the mass demonstrations accompanying European 
summits or G-8 meetings alliances between different social movements but also alliances 
between official trade union representatives. and those of left-wing oppositions within the un~ 
ions are demonstrated in public. 
8. 
The relevant aspect of the above-mentioned new tendencies is the fact that some of the unions 
have become the most important organisations and movements articulating the contradictions 
of the present per'iod of transition to a new formation of capitalism CandeiaslDeppe 2001). 
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The present period of transition is clearly characterised by the reorganisation of capitalism (in 
space and time), by the dominance of neoliberal politics and ideology a~d by unilateralism in 
international politics exercised by the govemmennt of the ,USA. Unions, however, not only 
express the contradictions mentioned before but they also organise resistance and are open for 
debates on new concepts of mobilisation, organisation and an alternative programme of socia! 
and economic reproduction, a concept of radical democracy, but in a global dimensions. 
I shall now briefly show where and how this type of wuonisnl manifests itself and in which 
fields of activity it has already become an integral part of the new global social movement 
which has acquired specific characteristics and power during the time between 1999 in Seattle 
and the meetings ofPorto Alegre in 2002/2003. 
• 	 At European level there has been no summit since Amsterdam (1997) which was not ac­
companied by mass meetings and demonstrations. These are called "Euro~marches", pro­
testing against the high rate of unemployment in the European Union, against the politics 
ofNeoliberalism and demanding a "Social Europe",a "Europe ofthe Workers", and not of 
capital. Last year in Batcelona the press wrote of over 700,000 demonstrators in the streets 
of the city. In Nizza more than 300,000 came together. These demonstrations reveal, first 
ofall, disappointment with tlie progress of European social policy and trade union influ­
14 On the crisis, re-organization and re-orientation ofAmerican trade unions cf. Meyer 2002. 
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ence at this level. This seems to be the main reason for the ETDC and its leaders to call for 
such protest. At the same time - and this seems to me even more important - these activi­
ties articulate a strengthened alliance between unions and others elements of the global so­
cial movements criticising global capitalisnl under the motto "The world cannot be a 
commodity". The European Social summit in Florence/Italy at the beginning of November 
will be an important (regional) meeting to consolidate this alliance. 
• 	 At the national level, in many European countries there have been general strikes or mass 
campaigns against government politics, flexibilisation of the labour market, enlarging pre­
carious employnlent, dismantling of the welfare state, endangering the legal status of the 
unenlployed, and so on. One of the central issues at the European as well as the national 
level is and will be the debate about thereorientation of economic, fiscal and monetary 
policies. Continuation öf the present "austerity"-policies will necessarily hold down eco­
nonlic growth and increase unemployment, the costs of which will further dry out the fit"" 
nancial resources of welfare institutions. ,Some economists have already sharply criticised 
the blindness of governments facing deflationary tendencies which already restriet the 
Japanese economy since more than ten years. Monetrarism will be continued in the inter­
est of financial institutions(Shareholder-Capitalism; Dollar-Wall-Street-Regime); it has to 
be overcome by politics of strengthening inner demand, encouraging extensive public in­
vestment and employrnent policies. For the European trade union movement - beyond the 
ideological and political differences between right and left tendencies within it - this 
seems to be the most important issue oftheir politicalprogrammes and activities15• 
• 	 Below the national level there have been many disputes, conflicts and strikes at the fac­
tory and branch level. In Germany, for example, there have been numerous strikes from 
spring to summer this year, covering many sectors from nletallurgic industry to banks. 
Again, its. a mixture of conflicts provoking union action: on the one hand, wages must in­
crease after a long period of cutbacks. On the other hand, there is massive reduction of 
employment in the banking sector, a crisis in the"new economy" and the financial sectors, 
etc. causing frustration, anxiety and anger among the employees. At the same time, these 
prevent further union protest activities and function as a break against more union mili­
tancy. Intensified "grassroots" and "shop-floor" militancy will be necessary conditions ofa 
15 In December 2002 the fIrst "Memorandum" of European economists proposing "better institutions, rules and 
instruments for full employment and sodal welfare within Europe" hasbeen published and signed by more 
than a hundred economists and sodal scientists from different European countries. 
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"new internationalism". Reeonstruetion eeonomie and politieal power of the unions "at 
home" therefore is not ineompatible with the requirements ofa "new internationalisin,,16. 
These multi-level trade-union aetivities are bound together by eontradietions and eonfliets 
produeed by present-day eapitalism and neo liberal polities of eompetitive modernisation. We 
ean eonc1ude that segments of the international trade union movement have beeome the most 
important organisations whieh artieulate and politieise these eöntradietions and eonfliets. Yet, 
there is one serious problem whieh forees us baek to a elear realisation of the present 
hegemonie situation and eonstellation of the relationship of c1ass forees. At the politiea1leve1, 
- i.e. the distributionof politieal power within the state and civil society where state agencies, 
parliament, parties, interest groups, the media (for instanee TV-Talk-Shows) are the main 
arenas and aetors - these new tendeneies ofnational and international resistanee against eapi­
talist globalisation and neoliberal polities have not yet found an adequate politieal expression. 
Espeeially the old parties oftheLeft (social demoeraey, former eommunist parties like the DS 
in Italy) seem to be rather indifferent until they are not eonfrontedwith eleetoral sueeess ·of a 
radieal, anticapitalist Left. Positions like those of Bertinotti from Rifondazione Communista 
in Italy and in other left-wing politieal parties in Europe are still marginal within the politieal 
system at parliamentary or government level. Most politieians of former eommunist and so­
eialist parties 40 not yet represent a eoherent alternative to neoliberal polities. They rather try 
to eontinuethe "Third-Way" illusions to combine eompetitiveness with (more).social seeurity, 
whieh has been so c1early proved utopie by the polities of the eentre-Ieft-governments in the 
European Union at the end of the 20th eentury. 
This break b~tween social protest movements all over the world and the power struetures 
within the politieal systems and state apparatuses of the deve10ped and strong eapitalist states 
c1early indieates that the proeess of "Rifondazione" of the Left, of a new global "eounter­
hegemonie bl oe " is still in its initial phase. Considering the deep erisis of the Left during the 
past two and a half deeades of the 20th eentury, whieh threatens even. its existenee, this does 
not eome as a surprise! The really interesting and important point is eonneeted with the new 
allianees between left-wing union tendencies and new social movements all over the world. 
The new "post-modem Prinee" (Stephen Gill 2003: 211 ff.) will have to organise allianees 
16 "The evidence fonn Europe suggests that multinational campaigns are· unlikely to be effective if divorced 
from a vibrant and autonomous workplace trade unionism, and a critical engagement with corporations and 
state agencies. Social movement unionism provides thebasis for union ren~wal in the global context but its 
ultimate success will be measured by the extent to which it facilitates the (re) building of the independent 
political and economic power oflabor" (Taylor I Mathers 2002: 106). 
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between,very different social forces all over the world and cover a large spectrum of alterna­
tives: from social and economic issues which are especially interesting for working c1ass peo­
pIe in deve10ped capitalist countries, to survival issues of the masses in the Third World pe­
riphery, issues offeminism and of radical renewal of democracy. Lucio Magri (2002: 412 ff.) 
may have been right to speak of a "new political cycle" which is still in its fornlation or "ein­
bryonie" phase. This phase is characterised by debates and efforts to work out the programme 
of a true alternative. The mass demonstrations against the warfare politics of the Bush­
administration in 2002/2003 may, however, indicate that these movements have already en­
tered a new phase ofworld-wide alliances for peace and multilateral co-operation 'outside the 
constraints ofmarkets, forceful appropriation ofthe control ofbasic resources (oil) and profit­
production. 
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